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 Many forms of materialism, new and old, have lately offered highly visible 
avenues of critical and historical inquiry in modernist studies and in literary studies in 
general; there may now be as many materialisms as there are ideological ills in want of 
remedy. This dissertation takes as its point of departure a historical and intellectual 
discrepancy between the contemporary revival of materialism in the humanities and 
the prominent and typically explicit anti-materialism of modernist writers and artists, 
with particular attention to the fictions of Virginia Woolf and James Joyce.  
Modernist aesthetic and intellectual culture, I argue, can be seen as staging 
materiality as a crucial site for complex negotiations of modernity, technology, 
selfhood, and the artwork. I explore how this negotiation unfolds in the space, and 
occasionally at the limits, of the novel. In these terms, I explain how the vocal anti-
materialism of Woolf belies her fascination with the narrative figuration of materiality. 
My argument shows that this figuration is typically invested not in objects, things, or 
materials available to everyday experience, but in a non-phenomenological core of 
  
material being that can only be imagined as a force of erasure, destruction, loss, and 
finitude.  
I suggest that for Woolf, and for Joyce in a much different way, it is only a 
“view from no one” of disembodied spectatorship or eyeless sight that might be 
adequate to materiality in this sense. In readings of Woolf’s To the Lighthouse and 
Between the Acts, I show how this insight provokes a literary crisis embodied in the 
problem of materialism, which will appear to be the novel’s death sentence and its 
hopes for renewal at the same time.   
My reading of the “Ithaca” episode of Joyce’s Ulysses departs from standard 
interpretations of Joycean materiality. I suggest that the problem of materialism in 
Joyce lies at the crux of a conception of the literary artwork existing between total 
idealization (the figure of the encyclopedia) and the extinction to which ideality is 
finally exposed. I propose that the genuine Joycean figure of materiality may be 
located in this aesthetic oscillation between knowledge and its erasure. 
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CHAPTER 1 
LITERATURE AND THE IDEA OF MATERIALISM 
 
A recent issue of the Publications of the Modern Language Association, as reliable as 
any barometer of intellectual fashion in literary and cultural studies, features an eight-
page section of five articles grouped under the heading “Cluster on Textual 
Materialism.” Bill Brown, whose own scholarship has in large part motivated the 
recent fixation on representations of things and objects in the study of modernism, 
introduces the series of articles (on the poetics of Burma-Shave signs and “postwar 
typewriting culture,” among other subject matters) with a brief exposition of the – 
apparently contradictory – notion of “textual materialism.”1 The latter, writes Brown, 
is characterized by “an attention to the artifactuality of texts,” that is, by an 
interpretive relationship towards the physical embodiment of the instantiation of a 
literary text (Brown 24-5). What interests a materialist of this stripe is therefore less 
the ostensibly “literary” aspect of any work of literature than the manner in which that 
work comes to exist uniquely in space and time, and the way in which that existence 
ought somehow to be given special attention or precedence in discussions of literary 
meaning.  
                                                 
1 Brown, Bill. “Introduction: Textual Materialism.” PMLA 125.1 (2010): 24–28 
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 Why is textual materialism an apparently contradictory notion? As Brown 
himself notes, materialism in literary studies must above all reckon with the mode of 
existence of literary objects as such. It was Nelson Goodman’s discussion in Languages 
of Art that provided the locus classicus for a classification of the nature of literary 
objects; this discussion would continue in the work of, among others, Arthur Danto 
and Gérard Genette.2 Without reiterating the various debates and qualifications 
internal to this discussion, we can say broadly speaking that the existence of a literary 
text is in no small part ideal rather than material. In Goodman’s terms, literature is an 
“allographic” rather than an “autographic” art – which means, among other things, 
that a novel or a poem cannot be counterfeited, only correctly or incorrectly 
reproduced. Whereas a painting exists autographically in its sensuous and material 
individuality (its copies, reproductions, fakes, or forgeries may be more or less 
accurate as copies but can never become or replace the “original” work), a literary text 
is not bound to this or that particular sensuous individual or physical manifestation, 
copy, or edition. Thus Brown cites Goodman remarking of multiple copies of the 
same literary work that “differences between them in style or size of script or type, in 
color of ink, in kind of paper, in number and layout of pages, in condition, etc., do 
not matter. All that matters is what may be called sameness of spelling: exact 
                                                 
2 Cf. Goodman, Nelson. Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1976. 
Goodman provides an indispensable foundation for subsequent discussions, in the philosophy of art, about the 
ontology of the artwork in general and of the literary object in particular. See, e.g., Arthur Danto’s The 
Transfiguration of the Commonplace: A Philosophy of Art (1981) and Gérard Genette’s two-part study comprising 
The Work of Art: Immanence and Transcendence (1994) and The Aesthetic Relation (1997).  
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correspondences as sequences of letters, spaces, and punctuation marks” (Goodman 
115). According to Goodman, in other words, “both identity of language and 
syntactic identity within the language are necessary conditions for identity of a literary 
work” (209); these are the necessary conditions not for what a work means, but for 
what it is.  
 For a brief and straightforward example, consider Ezra Pound’s 1913 imagist 
quasi-haiku, “In a Station of the Metro.”  
The apparition of these faces in the crowd;  
 Petals on a wet, black, bough.  
This sequence of fourteen words and the essential formal element that is the line 
break between the eighth and ninth words (which is to say that the same order of 
words with a different pattern of lineation would not be the same poem; the line 
break has a quasi-syntactic function according to the identity criteria formulated by 
Goodman above) are, in the strict sense, the necessary and sufficient conditions of the 
poem’s existence. Whether that sequence is made manifest in faded black ink in 
Pound’s own notebook, in bright pink spray-paint graffiti on the wall of a metro 
station, or on an online webpage dedicated to the “Men of 1914,” the identity of the 
poem remains intact. If the physical manifestation of the poem is not identical with 
this ideal sequence of letters – if the webpage were to display “The apparition of the 
faces in a crowd; / Petals on wet and black bough;” if the subway vandal had written 
“The apparition of this facss in the crowd; / Petals on a wet black bow), then what is 
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inscribed is not “in a Station of the Metro” but another poem that in these cases are 
recognizably mistaken deviations from the ideal text. As Genette will say, such 
reproductions are not unfaithful, only incorrect. Finally, the poem continues to exist 
when Pound’s notebook is lost in a fire, when the municipal authority blasts spray-
paint away with jets of water, and when the administrator of the “Men of 1914” 
website deletes it in favor of an homage to Bloomsbury. This holds in principle for all 
works of literature. The text that constitutes Ulysses is indifferent to the sensuous (or, 
in Brown’s terms, “artifactual”) qualities of this copy of Ulysses sitting on the shelf in 
Cornell University’s Olin Library. Of course, one can and should investigate and 
debate which text does indeed constitute Ulysses, and this is a debate about the correct 
sequence of words and sameness of spelling: should, for example, the telegraph that 
called Stephen Dedalus, like the young Joyce himself, back to Ireland read 
“MOTHER DYING COME HOME FATHER” or “NOTHER DYING COME 
HOME FATHER?” Ultimately, whether the first edition published by the Egoist 
Press in London in October 1922 or the critical reconstruction edited by Hans Walter 
Gabler that appeared in 1984 – or any other past or future edition – is the “correct” 
Ulysses is a legitimate matter of historical dispute, but this dispute still applies to the 
ideal sequence of words. The Gabler edition is, like any text, not a single particular 
copy but is embodied in all copies that adopt exactly the same word order and 
spelling.  
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 How, then, can Brown grant the ineradicably ideal existence of works of 
literature and still say that “for the textual materialist, size matters, style matters, color 
matters” (Brown 25)? Why is the peculiar “materiality” of this or that text worth 
developing entire theoretical and critical methodologies around? How, specifically, do 
explicitly non-textual qualities of printed matter like size, style, or color matter? The 
critical stakes of textual materialism appear to lie, for Brown, in the “critical act of 
rematerializing the medium,” (26) which means giving a special interpretive status to 
the material composition or manifestation of texts – Brown here cites, among others, 
Jerome McGann, who in Textual Conditions calls for a “materialist hermeneutics” 
whose objects would include “ink, paper, type-faces, bindings, book prices, and page 
format” (26).3 
 It nevertheless remains unclear just how the “materialism” of textual 
materialism ought to be understood. After all, the “critical act of rematerializing” 
invoked and celebrated by Brown is only intelligible against a background 
commitment to the ideality of literary texts. How is this so? First and foremost, 
because the literary critic necessarily proceeds with a concept of the object of 
criticism. In other words, we either implicitly or explicitly understand what sorts of 
objects are plausibly available to interpretation using the means and methods of 
literary criticism. This concept may be more or less flexible, and can always be put to 
                                                 
3 Cf. McGann, Jerome. The Textual Condition. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1991. pp. 13-15.  
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the test or revised in the encounter with limit cases (in the sphere of plastic arts, 
Marcel Duchamp’s readymades come to mind, having by now been somewhat 
paradoxically institutionalized as the exemplary limit case), or by expansions in the 
institutional ideal of criticism as a discipline (especially in the wake of a notion of 
“theory” that, for better or worse, tends to level the generic differences between its 
objects: poetry, film, philosophical texts, architecture, and television sitcoms are all 
equally interpretable from the standpoint that wishes grasp, say, cultural signification 
as such or the reproduction of ideology in general). The concept of the object of 
criticism might even be confused or vague, in practice: it is without doubt possible to 
produce an interpretation of a poem like Pound’s “In a Station of the Metro” without 
holding any particular explicit views about the “literariness” of poetry, just as it is 
possible to read a novel and understand it as a work of fiction without paying any 
special attention whatsoever to its (or its genre’s) peculiar marks of fictionality, realist 
conventions, and so on.  
 All the same, we understand perfectly well that some objects are implausible 
candidates for literary analysis and interpretation: very obvious examples include the 
chemical components of sedimentary rocks in eastern Tennessee, the existence of 
Bose-Einstein condensates, the evolution of limbic systems in humans, and the 
presence of life on Mars. Certainly there are distinct and identifiable historical and 
institutional reasons why it happens to be the case that literary critics do not interpret 
phase states of matter or the evolutionary appearance of the amygdala, but logical 
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priority ought to be accorded to the formal reason, that is, the mere fact that we are 
able to differentiate literary objects (and literary “materiality”) from all other sorts of 
objects and all other species of materiality.4 For one thing, we know that literary 
objects are linguistic in a special manner, and as critics we presume (in fact, as a logical 
prerequisite of criticism) that their language is about something or other – even if a 
work is, hypothetically, “about nothing,” the critic would hasten to add that it is also 
about being about nothing. And, as Danto says of the constitutive distinction between 
“mere real things” and works of art, “things, as a class, lack aboutness just because 
they are things” (Danto 3). Sedimentary rocks are not about anything in this sense; we 
might say of a piece of sandstone that it exists because of the properties of various 
silicate minerals (mostly quartz) that compose it, in combination with readily 
identifiable environmental factors, but we would not go on to say that the sandstone 
is “about” the interaction of minerals with their environment.5 This may seem like a 
banal point, but it is the background capacity to differentiate the literary from the 
non-literary that muddies the methodological waters for textual materialism; this 
                                                 
4 The formal explanation has logical priority over the historical and the institutional ones because they, too, depend 
on the differentiation between literary and non-literary objects. Danto makes a similar argument when attempting a 
definition of the artwork; saying that an object is an artwork because it is recognized as such by the “artworld” 
(Danto has in mind the institutional theory of art articulated by George Dickie) “leaves unexplained, even if it can 
account for why such a work as Duchamp’s Fountain  might have been elevated from a mere thing to an artwork, 
why that particular urinal should have sustained so impression a promotion, while other urinals, like it in every 
obvious respect, should remain an ontologically degraded category” (Danto 5). 
5 This doesn’t mean that I cannot adopt an aesthetic relation to a piece of sandstone, but doing so would entail that I 
actually set aside considerations of the various qualities of its material – its being composed of quartz particles, or 
the presence of elements like iron that explain its particular shade of red – and attend to its mere appearing. This is 
an argument that I do not spell out in detail here; it depends on the idea that aesthetic experience is not somehow 
pre-conceptual. For a recent treatment of the “aesthetics of appearing” that presents a perspicacious account of the 
relation between conceptuality and the aesthetic, cf. Seel, Martin. The Aesthetics of Appearing. trans. John Farrell. 
Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2005.  
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differentiation has nothing to do with paper, ink, or the technologies of bookbinding 
(which, like sandstone, are not really about anything6) but pertains to ideal orders of 
words and their formal properties.  
 In fact, only this prior commitment to literary ideality could lend the critic’s 
appeal to materiality the special rhetorical or argumentative force it so often wants to 
access: to talk about the materiality of sandstone or of ancient water deposits on Mars, 
on the other hand, means very little. Emphasizing their materiality (or hypothetical 
materiality) amounts only to saying that they exist, whereas existence claims about 
literary texts, we saw, have little if anything to do with either their physical features or 
their factual existence in space and time. Consider a hypothetical scenario envisioned 
by Genette in which a researcher copies a handwritten letter composed by Napoleon: 
“he attentively reads” the document and transcribes it, an act for which “ideal textual 
identity is all that matters.” A master forger, on the other hand, proceeds quite 
differently: “he would not only imitate the great man’s handwriting, but would also 
provide himself with identical paper of the same type, ink of the same color, etc.” It is 
a fact of exceptional importance that “the forger could do his work without knowing how 
to read” (Genette 1997, 53). It is correct to say that the researcher and the forger are 
                                                 
6 Some might object that a writing technology like ink can certainly be interpreted in light of the cultural practices, 
objects, rituals, ideologies, etc., that become historically or factually associated with it, but this criterion of 
“aboutness” allows a simple and concrete distinction to be drawn between the ink itself, which is not about anything, 
and the cultural, economic, or historical networks in which it is situated as a technology. An even more 
straightforward example is the difference between “blackness” as such and a canvas covered in black oil, which we 
could say is about its own blackness, flatness, monochromism, and so forth.  
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dealing with two distinct objects: one can be read, the other cannot. The notion of a 
“materialist hermeneutics” must invoke an object of interpretation (or else it could 
not be a hermeneutics in the strict sense), but insofar as it aims to comprehend works 
of literature, it rests on a kind of category error: it confuses what can only be read with 
what literally cannot be read. A genuinely hermeneutic approach to literature would at 
the very least need to contend with arguments of the sort adduced by Hans-Georg 
Gadamer, who writes that 
“the written word and what partakes of it – literature – is the intelligibility of 
mind transferred to the most alien medium. Nothing is so purely the trace of 
the mind as writing, but nothing is so depending on the understanding mind 
either. In deciphering and interpreting it, a miracle takes place: the 
transformation of something alien and dead into total contemporaneity and 
familiarity. The remnants of past life – what is left of buildings, tools, the 
contents of graves – are weather-beaten by the storms of time that have swept 
over them, whereas a written tradition, once deciphered and read, is to such an 
extent pure mind that it speaks to us as if in the present. That is why the 
capacity to read, to understand what is written, is like a secret art, even a magic 
that frees and binds us. In it time and space seem to be superseded” (Gadamer 
156).7  
                                                 
7 Gadamer, Hans-Georg. Truth and Method. trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall. London: Continuum, 
2004.  
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Gadamer goes on to say, in one of the more programmatic statements of Truth and 
Method, that “every work of art, not only literature, must be understood like any other 
texts that requires understanding, and this understanding has to be acquired” (ibid. 
157). Now, we can surely bracket Gadamer’s quasi-mystical remarks on the “secret 
art” of transforming the dead, external matter of writing into ideal meaning (which 
surely alludes to the Kantian doctrine of schematism that explains the synthesis of 
pure concept with empirical intuitions according to a similarly “hidden art”). We 
ought likewise avoid the thorny path that would be opened by investigation into the 
putatively “metaphysical” stakes of the relation in this passage between writing and 
the living presence of “total contemporaneity and familiarity.” Nevertheless, the basic 
thrust of Gadamer’s point is correct (and accepting it as correct surely does not 
commit one to accepting or evaluating the entirety of Gadamer’s hermeneutic theory 
of literature or his explanation of how hermeneutic understanding is in fact to be 
acquired): the word is irreducibly more than its material support and because of this 
we cannot help but understand words on a page in a different way than we would 
randomly distributed blots of ink on a page. It is a more or less straightforward 
inference to say that a contemporary English speaker understands the word “faces” in 
the same way that Ezra Pound and his readers would have in 1913, whereas a 
hypothetical strange pattern of ink in a Pound manuscript that the latter privately 
intended as an obscure symbol for “face” or “crowd” could never been understood in 
the same way. Even if this peculiar smear were decoded by a feat of philological 
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excavation, the reader’s relation to the blot and to the word “faces” remains 
revealingly distinct. What, then, could a materialist hermeneutics be if its materialism 
renders untenable or impracticable its claim to interpretation?  
 This basic difference between our cognitive or perceptual relation to words as 
opposed to things may not matter for the historian, because the contents of graves, 
the development of ink, the prices of books, and the contents of literary works can 
each ground inferences in the domain of historical knowledge. Daniel Lord Smail, for 
instance, has written a stimulating critique of the dominant assumptions of 
historiography with respect to the “deep time” of Paleolithic “prehistory.” Smail 
proceeds by arguing for a history based on the analysis of “traces” rather than 
exclusively documents and artifacts that bear marks of conscious intention and hence 
restrict the purview of academic history to the time after the invention of writing. 
Smail’s understanding of the trace is in this respect similar to that of Jacques Derrida, 
because it denotes simply “anything that encodes some sort of information about the 
past” (Smail 48-9);8 one of the basic goals of his argument is to revise what (qua trace) 
can count as evidence for historical knowledge. Thus, he says, “documents bearing 
intended meanings cannot be seen as qualitatively superior to nondocumentary traces. 
Nor are the intended meanings superior to the word-sediment that figures in every 
written document. To acknowledge the importance of all forms of sedimentary traces 
                                                 
8 Smail, Daniel Lord. On Deep History and the Brain. Berkeley, CA: U of California P, 2008. Cf. pp. 40-73 et 
passim.  
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is to collapse the distinction between intentional and unintentional preservations that 
history in the Rankean vein – history that sought to decode the meanings of authors – 
had so carefully erected” (65). As we have seen, however, this is a perspective 
unavailable to literary studies: it cannot treat all traces as prima facie qualitatively equal 
simply because it has restricted its attention to those objects that for whatever reason 
are thought to deserve the predicate “literary.” Literary critics are not in a position to 
revise so radically what can count for them as evidence, because only some traces are 
literary; the critic cannot argue that “nondocumentary traces” like DNA or 
archaeological artifacts ground her inferences just as well or just in the same way as 
does the poem or the novel, if the latter are objects she wishes to interpret.  
 But what about the appeal, not the materiality of the text or the work, but of its 
conditions? This appeal might try to circumvent the arguments stemming from 
Goodman about the ideal, allographic reproducibility of the text by insisting upon a 
form of historical materiality that provide demonstrable, extra-textual reasons for a 
work’s being the way that it is. Stephen Kern refers, for example, to the “material 
foundation” of technological innovation at the root of “distinctive new modes of 
thinking about and experiencing time and space” in fin de siècle European culture.9 
Thus the conflict between private and public time that takes place in works by 
Conrad, Kafka, or Joyce can in principle be understood in terms of the 
                                                 
9 Kern, Stephen. The Culture of Time and Space, 1880-1918. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1983. p. 1 
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standardization of time made materially possible by the development of the wireless 
telegraph (13).10 Adopting a similar strategy, one might argue that in order to interpret 
a poem like Pound’s “In a Station of the Metro,” we ought to identify the material 
conditions for the creation or the production of the poem – perhaps via a history and 
analysis of public transportation around the time of the construction of the Métro de 
Paris between 1900 and 1913, when the poem was composed. Indeed, one could 
argue, this short poem cannot be fully understood absent a historical account of the 
modernization of urban transportation that makes it possible, the qualitatively new 
experience of waiting for a train amidst new modes of urban density and city life, and 
so on. Or, one might argue that the poem, as “imagist” experiment, must be 
understood in light of the technologies and media of photography or cinema and the 
new regimes of vision and perception that the latter were constructing around the 
turn of the century. The poem certainly effects a syntactic effort at a unification of the 
poetic and the visual – foregoing the linguistic device of comparison via simile by 
proposing that those nameless pale faces lined one-by-one are not like petals, but just 
“are” petals on a black bough, and its extreme compression of the temporality of 
reading or speaking poetry might be taken together as important clues to just how 
deeply it is indebted to photographic and cinematic forms of visual representation.  
                                                 
10 To be fair, Kern wishes to avoid what he calls a “monocausal technological determinism” which he more or less 
successfully manages to accomplish. More useful to the account developed in this chapter is his vocabulary of 
“material foundations,” by which he means concrete technological developments like cinema and the X-ray. 
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 We could proliferate these sorts of readings, perhaps indefinitely: and that 
indefiniteness is precisely what introduces a troubling problem for the appeal to a 
text’s necessary material conditions or foundations. According to this appeal, poems 
like Pound’s could not have been composed in precisely the same manner under 
different historical and material circumstances, since that is just the meaning of 
“condition;” if construction on the Métro had not been completed until 1925, Pound 
obviously could not have written his poem in 1913. Perspicacious analysis of these 
material conditions, then, ought supposedly to teach us just how to interpret the 
poem. Claims of this sort look prima facie defensible, but they conceal a difficult 
methodological problem for the critic who conceives materialism too strictly in the 
invocation of the explanatory force of necessary conditions. Because any particular 
poem undeniably has innumerable conditions that could by rights be called material 
and necessary, it becomes necessary to discriminate between apparently different 
orders or levels of necessity. This discrimination, though, is logically inadmissible: a 
condition is either necessary or not, so it makes no sense to say that one condition is 
“more necessary” than any other. But how could the appeal to material conditions or 
foundations avoid this path?  
There is an obvious sense in which the construction of the Métro provides 
the word “metro” in the title of Pound’s poem with semantic content: that is, if the 
word “metro” weren’t part of the English language, it wouldn’t have any intelligible 
meaning. In fact, the word entered the language soon after construction finished 
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on the Paris Métro, though the Oxford English Dictionary gives an obsolete 
definition of “metro,” dating from the early 17th century, meaning “a metrical 
poem or verse” (OED, “metro, n.2”). Couldn't we pursue this sort of analysis for 
any intelligible word in the poem? The modern meaning of “crowd,” for example, 
as “a large number of persons gathered so closely as to press upon or impede each 
other” or as “the people who throng the streets in popular centres” (OED, “crowd, 
n.3,” 1a, 2b) also enters the language during a determinate historical timeframe, and 
it is not too difficult to speculate about the historical, social, or economic reasons 
why a word that can denote “masses” or “multitude” would acquire common 
usage. Or, beyond mere speculation, one could investigate biological, ecological, 
climatological, or ethological studies of group-formation patterns on the European 
continent, which patterns are no doubt related in some distant fashion to modern 
crowds of people waiting for trains. Obviously, though, knowledge of those 
reasons is a prerequisite neither for correct usage nor apt understanding of the 
word “crowd.” It is clear, at least, that introducing the language of “conditions” has 
at least the potential to remove interpretation far afield of its object; even if it is 
unobjectionable to say that the existence of the Paris Métro – or, even more 
generally, the phenomenon of crowding in urban spaces – affects or inhabits the 
meaning of “In a Station of the Metro,” it is more difficult to successfully argue 
that the early settlement of Paris or the invention of tunneling technology can 
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explain what the poem is about. Surely these are material foundations or even 
necessary conditions of the poem? Yes, but equally necessary are the existence of 
the English language, the invention of writing, the evolution of language (not to 
mention consciousness), and the accretion of the Earth. This explains why the 
critic who speaks of necessary conditions or foundations (as part of a strategy to 
import philosophical materialism into literary studies) seems forced to introduce 
different orders of necessity, perhaps by arguing that although the Paris Métro is 
one among many conditions of “In A Station of the Metro,” it is certainly more 
historically proximate to the poem than is, say, the early settlement of Paris. This is 
not a bad solution, but it is not an especially useful one, either. It succeeds only in 
obscuring the methodological obstacles that confront the appeal to materialism – 
here the epistemological impracticability of the appeal to material conditions as 
explanations of textual meaning. As we have seen, after all, talk about conditions 
only verifies that the poem is a successful linguistic performance: its words and its 
syntax are intelligible to any English-speaking reader. But those conditions are 
therefore ostensibly the same for non-poetic linguistic performances, as well. It is 
not at all clear that they could be employed to explain the difference between 
Pound's poem and an email from a friend in Paris which reports that “the Métro 
was crowded today.” And, again, while this distinction may not be relevant to the 
historian, it is a presupposition of the literary critic.  
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This should not be taken as a recommendation against historically-inflected 
literary scholarship. If anything, critics need to ask exactly what “history” means 
within the confines of literary analysis and interpretation, and in particular what kinds 
of historical evidence can ground interpretive inferences with respect to works of 
literature.11 After all, we know that history is not immediately given to reflection as a 
sheer chronicle of facts and events; rather, it owes its existence to forms of narration 
that depend on intricate notions of cause, rupture, continuity, experience, and truth. 
No modern critic will be ignorant of these basic issues; nevertheless, the appeal to 
history or to historical conditions ought to be able to address the problems outlined 
above. Failing that, it seems to leave the distinction between historical objects (which 
includes works of literature, but also ruins, eyewitness testimonies, artifacts, and 
perhaps even DNA) and literary objects (which objects are more than their artifactual 
support) unobserved, and consequently can't say why the knowledge it purports to 
gain from the examination of literature is different in kind or degree from knowledge 
it gains from the excavation of ancient tombs. It seems more prudent, in any case, to 
reverse the order of explanation by asking how an abstract notion like “history” 
                                                 
11 I note in passing that the use of the terms “ground” or “grounding” are regularly employed but not always 
clarified with respect to the interpretation and comparison of literary works. A detailed discussion of this language in 
literary criticism is clearly beyond the scope of the present argument. As a matter of clarification, I note that here and 
elsewhere “ground” is intended to mean “reason,” such that the clause “ground interpretive inferences” is more or 
less equivocal with “give reasons for plausible interpretations.” The formulation here remains question-begging as 
long what counts as a “reason” remains open; I nevertheless proceed according to the assumption that there is a 
difference between plausible and implausible interpretations. In fact, this assumption is easy to validate as a premise; 
one only needs to suggest hypothetical “bad” interpretations (e.g., that “In a Station of the Metro” is a poem about a 
tree with hundreds of tiny faces) in order to show that there is indeed a difference between plausible and implausible 
interpretations, even while leaving undetermined the criteria by which to mark the difference. 
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becomes a concept, an object, or a problem within fictional narrative discourse. This 
strategy – one recommended and practiced in the readings of Woolf and Joyce that 
follow – can better accommodate reflection on the relation between fiction and 
history because it need not depend on an axiomatic claim about the interaction 
between historical or material conditions and individual works of art and literature, a 
claim that is itself structured as a narrative about the relations between historical (or 
social and economic) causes and literary and aesthetic effects. And, as I will begin to 
argue below, the worry that downplaying the historical aspect of literary works 
somehow deprives them of their political meaningfulness has been greatly 
exaggerated, and this exaggeration ought to be seen as providing some motivation for 
the rhetoric of materiality in literary studies.  
So far I have outlined the sorts of challenges that must be met by any well-
formed literary-critical methodology that would embrace materialism, and finally to 
explain why “textual” forms of materialism have such an apparently contradictory 
character: to the extent that they devote critical attention to texts as literature, they 
lose their strictly materialist character, and to the extent that they emphasize uniquely 
determining force of materiality, they can no longer recognize a “text.” Perhaps it 
cannot be both textual and materialist at the same time. In order to explain why her 
brand of materialism does not extend consideration to all sorts of material objects 
and processes (varieties of sandstone, limbic systems of non-human animals, obscure 
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phase states of matter), the textual materialist must invoke a restriction that already 
assumes the difference between the kinds of things we call literary (which are, 
minimally, readable and interpretable) and everything else. This is what we saw above 
in terms of textual materialism’s background commitment to the ideality or to the 
aesthetic character of the text as such.12 In related fashion, the reference to historical 
or material conditions of work directs attention away from any particular text and 
towards the nearly infinite task of arranging massive sets of historical and empirical 
information, which task only ends up obscuring what is presupposed by the 
principles of selection at work in the decision to focus on this text or this authorship 
and not any other. The implicit criteria that motivate this selection depend on an 
aesthetic judgment – not in the sense of determining the aesthetic value of a work of 
raft, but in the much more basic understanding that some object simply is an artwork, 
that it is “about” something in the sense evoked by Danto above. 
Despite these conceptual difficulties, “materiality” has nevertheless become an 
undeniably important concept for an exceptionally wide range of recent literary and 
cultural scholarship, as well as for philosophical and theoretical discourses on a 
variety of contemporary issues. Few will have overlooked the characteristic idiom 
                                                 
12 Accordingly, the examples of “rematerialization” provided by Brown show the sorts of claims that become 
possible once this background commitment passes without recognition: he cites an article on representations of 
animals in medieval literature which claims that “medieval literature is, in the most rigorously literal sense, nothing 
but millions of stains on animal parts” (Holsinger 619). Such a claim obtains only under the most liberal criteria of 
rigor and only with an extremely reductionist notion of the “literal.” Whatever else medieval literature might be, 
however it might survive as a set of artifacts, as “literature” it is made of words.  
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that accompanies the contemporary taste for materialism: whether the materiality in 
question belongs to history or the text, to the body or to the signifier, there can be 
little doubt about the deep investment of meaning and value into matter and its 
qualities. But what are these meanings and values, and where do they come from? 
What is it that matter or materiality are thought to explain that couldn’t be explained 
by or within some other critical framework? Why is the scholarly turn to “material 
culture” so often granted, as Daniel Tiffany notes, not only an epistemological but an 
ethical priority – even while, as Tiffany goes on to claim, critics who embrace 
materialism so infrequently raise the fundamental “question of materiality,” that is, 
the question about what material substance actually is?13 The rarity of this question 
explains why at least one self-identified materialist critic can affirm that “it is very 
difficult indeed to be a materialist: much harder, for example, than declaring oneself a 
materialist or wishing to be such.”14  
In truth, there are as many answers to these questions as there are invocations 
of materialism, and it is this fact that in part accounts for skepticism about 
materialism even among some avowed materialists: with “the question of materiality” 
unasked, the argumentative or speculative commitment to materialism unexplained, 
references to matter in discussions of literary or aesthetic phenomena remain 
enigmatic. As we have shown, this is so because they appeal fundamentally to a 
                                                 
13 Tiffany, Daniel. Toy Medium: Materialism and Modern Lyric. Berkeley, CA: U of California P, 2000. p. 2 
14 Jarvis, Simon. Wordsworth’s Philosophic Song. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2007. p. 79 
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domain outside the literary or the aesthetic in order to understand their (literary or 
aesthetic) object of inquiry, and it is this shift to the “extrinsic” (a term favored by 
Fredric Jameson) that is so often assigned epistemological, ethical, or political priority: 
in Jameson's words, “the scandal of the extrinsic comes as a salutary reminder of the 
ultimately material base of cultural production.”15  
It is outside the scope of this project to enter into too detailed a conceptual 
genealogy of this set of priorities and the multifarious determinations of “matter,” 
both implicit and explicit, that have underwritten them. Such a genealogy would easily 
entail the recapitulation not only of the reception of “theory” in Anglo-American 
literary and cultural studies since the 1960s (with its abiding emphasis on the critique 
of metaphysical ideas about essence, identity, and subjectivity and its concomitant 
politicization of the idea and the practice of literary criticism) but also an investigation 
of the links, most notably theorized within Marxism and the dialectical materialist 
tradition, between physical reality and political norms. These are relations perhaps 
best emblematized by V.I. Lenin's 1908 Materialism and Empiro-Criticism, which 
provides a virulent denunciation of the scientific theories of space and time 
formulated at the turn of the twentieth century by Ernst Mach and Henri Poincaré on 
the basis that they undermine the objective, material, and physically immediate reality 
of the world, and by extension the real basis of Marxist philosophy: as Stephen Kern 
                                                 
15 Jameson, Fredric. The Political Unconscious. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1981. p. 26 
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notes, “Lenin engaged in this polemic” against philosophers of science “because he 
believed that the reputation and political effectiveness of the Bolshevik party were at 
stake” (Kern 134). So while it is quite common within this tradition to use “material” 
as a synonym for “economic,” as in Jameson's invocation of the Marxist conception 
of an economic base or infrastructure underlying all other social, cultural, and 
institutional formations, this terminology should not be understood to lack implicit 
reference to the more or less immediately available physical character of hard facts or 
objective realities that Lenin wanted to defend against subjectivist or idealist trends in 
science at the turn of the last century. If we wanted to understand the conceptual and 
historical impetus behind the most recent forms of textual materialism, this would not 
be a bad place to start.  
Even without a very detailed genealogy, however, we can already effectively see 
how a more broadly construed materialism would be thought relevant to the 
interpretation of literature. Consider the methodological principles entailed by 
Jameson's commitment to the “salutary reminder” of the “material base of cultural 
production” as they are articulated in his broad interpretation of literary modernism, 
which pursues a dialectical resolution of the contradiction between modernism 
understood as a reflection or epiphenomenon of prevailing social conditions, and 
modernism understood as an avant-garde rupture from and repudiation of those 
conditions. Jameson writes that  
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“[M]odernism and reification are parts of the same immense process which 
expresses the contradictory inner logic and dynamics of late capitalism. Yet 
even if our aim, as literary analysts, is rather to demonstrate the ways in which 
modernism – far from being a mere reflection of late nineteenth-century social 
life – is also a revolt against that reification and a symbolic act which involves a 
whole Utopian compensation for increasing dehumanization on the level of 
daily life, we are first obliged to establish a continuity between those two 
regional zones or sectors – the practice of language in the literary work, and the 
experience of anomie, standardization, rationalizing desacralization in the Umwelt 
or world of daily life – such that the latter can be grasped as the determinate 
situation, dilemma, contradiction, or subtext, to which the former comes as a 
symbolic resolution or solution” (42).  
What follows is a sophisticated theoretical treatment of mediation (that is, the 
methodological corollary of the critical imperative to establish continuity between 
different regions – linguistic text and environment); for the purposes of understanding 
the interpretive commitments of materialism in contemporary literary studies, though, 
Jameson's understanding of modernism can be taken as exemplary. And while 
Jameson does, in passing, raise “the question of materiality” in order to voice his 
skepticism about theories of materialism that are not historicist in the Marxist sense 
(inasmuch as the latter “does not assert the primacy of matter so much as it insists on 
an ultimate determination by the mode of production” [45]), the ambition to establish 
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principles that allow one to move from the language of a text to its “external” 
conditions remains a primary motivation for contemporary critical practice.16 
More significantly still, it is quite intelligible to contemporary critics to employ 
the concepts of “matter” or “materiality” in far more flexible ways than does Jameson 
here, encompassing not only the historical or economic valences of these concepts, 
but the physical, objective, or anti-metaphysical ones, as well, as we have already 
witnessed. Thus Jed Esty, in a compelling account of the late modernism of Eliot, 
Woolf, and Forster, can identify his central argument as “strictly materialist” because 
of its central claim that “imperial contraction changed English writing through a series 
of symbolic mediations between social conditions and artistic production”17;here 
materialism refers to a mode of relating a global historico-economic event (imperial 
contraction) with specific cultural practices (British late modernism). Another critic 
writing about the influences of architecture, design, and domestic space on modernist 
narrative suggests the possibility of “a kind of material genealogy of some of literary 
modernism's apparently autonomous elements”18; in this case, the notion of a 
                                                 
16 In fact, then, what Tiffany calls “the question of materiality” becomes, for Jameson, a sort of ideological ruse, 
since for him the real nature of materialism is not a thesis about the “primacy of matter.” For example, in a recent 
introduction to a published collection of interviews, he professes his indifference to “the kinds of differences 
philosophers generally fight about,” in light of the “constructional and perceptual strengths and weaknesses of a 
given system.” This indifference should not doubt be understood in terms of Jameson’s properly metacritical 
project, which accords to Marxist historical materialism the privileged role of adjudicating the various liberatory or 
ideological impulses that inhabit any cultural object, including those made by philosophers, whatsoever. Finally, 
then, this means that “we’re all idealists, all materialists; and the final judgment or label is simply a matter of 
ideology, or, if you prefer, of political commitment” (Buchanan, Ian and Fredric Jameson, eds. Jameson on 
Jameson: Conversations on Cultural Marxism. Durham, NC: Duke UP 2007, p. 3) 
17 Esty, Jed. A Shrinking Island: Modernism and National Culture in England. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2003.  
p. 7 
18 Rosner, Victoria. Modernism and the Architecture of Private Life. New York: Columbia UP, 2005. p. 2 
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“material genealogy” – which, notably, contravenes the text's claim to autonomy – 
refers instead to an explanation of the textual representation of certain types of 
cultural products. Increasingly, predications of materiality in such formulations owe 
less to Jameson's notion of historical materialism as a doctrine about the 
epistemological and methodological priority of economic modes of production, even 
as they hew formally to the model we have seen Jameson provide: to be a materialist 
is establish continuity between only apparently disparate regions of the literary and the 
material, whether the latter is understood in historical, economic, political, or merely 
physical terms. In other words, materialism as it is so often used in literary studies can 
ultimately be understood to encompass a variety of forms of reference outside the 
language of the text itself, whether this reference is to modes of production (like 
capitalism), historical events (like imperial expansion, colonial domination, or 
discursive practices pertaining to nationhood, race, or gender), physical objects or 
cultural materials (like commodities or technological innovations), or indeed to either 
the real-world properties of the texts themselves (the material means of their 
production or dissemination, the socioeconomic networks of their reception) and the 
very materiality of their inscription (their nonliterary or non-signifying physical 
makeup, their embodiment as texts).  
A synoptic characterization of materialism in literary and modernist studies is 
therefore available: materialism, however else this term is modified, consistently 
prioritizes historical or genetic forms of explanation over formal or aesthetic ones, or 
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else it argues that the form of a novel or a poem is itself best understood as an effect 
of historical conditioning. In this respect, it is clear why critical and theoretical 
practices that either implicitly rely upon or explicitly wish to establish protocols of 
translation between the realm of literary language and that of material reality (again, 
however the latter is construed) have proliferated in the field of modernist studies. As 
we have seen with Jameson, it is one of the great problems of the field to understand 
the relation between literary or aesthetic modernism (whether in its formally or 
stylistically inventive character, its avant-gardism, its refusal of Victorian aesthetic or 
moral mores, and so on) and modernity as such. Of course, this procedure of 
translation lends itself to typically political concerns, especially in light of the 
prevailing assumption that the political meaning or value of works of literature resides 
in their overt, activist repudiation of any notion of literary autonomy. Rebecca 
Walkowitz's remarks on the notions of aesthetic autonomy and political commitment 
in recent Joyce studies, which according to her has “sought to emphasize the political 
aspirations or 'political content' of James Joyce's writing,”19 lucidly evokes this 
repudiation and its affirmation among contemporary readers of Joyce. According to 
Walkowitz, “these critics have aimed to correct or at least supplement previous 
studies that focused on Joyce's reputation as a European writer and aesthetic 
innovator...[w]hat it means to focus on Joyce's modernism has changed: we no longer 
                                                 
19 Walkowitz, Rebecca. Cosmopolitan Style: Modernism beyond the Nation. New York: Columbia UP, 2006. p. 55 
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reduce literary modernism to a collection of literary techniques, nor do we assume 
that British literary modernism … constitutes a homogenous cultural movement or a 
retreat from political and social action” (Walkowitz 55).  
Walkowitz is, of course, correct; the ambition to demonstrate that literary 
modernism (in its embrace of literary autonomy or its experimentation with formal 
abstraction in the novel or the lyric) is not a “retreat” from forms of concrete political 
engagement is prevalent not only among readers of Joyce but in all corners of 
modernist studies. The proliferation of redemptive reading practices is characteristic of 
the materialist atmosphere of contemporary literary studies; in general terms, this 
redemptive mode operates according to a rhetorical opposition between the aesthetic, 
the literary, or the formal and the material, historical, and political. Evidence for this 
opposition is found in Walkowitz's contrast between the image of Joyce as “aesthetic 
innovator” that is corrected by an image of Joyce as engaged in a kind of writing that 
aims at some manner of social or political effect (in her account of Joycean style, these 
effects are intended as a consequence of the purported anticolonialism and antiracism 
of Joyce's fiction; the latter, in Walkowitz's words, “gives texture to an insubordinate 
cosmopolitanism” that embraces “intellectual vagrancy as a form of social critique” 
which in turn is part of an effort to “transform the consciousness of his readers” [57-
8]). This rhetorical opposition between the aesthetic and the political (which, again, is 
a primary motivation for the invocation of materialism in literary studies) does not 
belong to Joyce's readers alone. For example, as I show in more detailed fashion in 
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the following chapters on Virginia Woolf's novels Between the Acts and To the Lighthouse, 
the one question that determines the critical orientation of so many recent readers of 
Woolf concerns whether or not the implicit political content of her work (or, indeed, 
the explicit political content of her non-fiction writing) mitigates the fact her 
membership in the British cultural and economic elite. As I argue, the attempt to 
politically redeem Woolf's fiction, on behalf of feminism or socialism, is often 
directed against an image of Woolf as Bloomsbury aesthete, severed from the “real” 
world and thus incapable of engaging in social critique through her art. Later, I will 
show through detailed readings of Woolf's fiction that a critic armed with the project 
of redemption from the start risks misunderstanding aspects of Woolf's writing that 
are not primarily political in nature.20 For the time being, however, I maintain just that 
the opposition between the aesthetic and the material (here qua politically-articulated, 
concrete reality) that motivates “redemptive” readings is a misleading one, and 
furthermore that understanding why it is misleading will begin to lead us to a more 
original and workable concept of materialism in literary studies. 
One of the central arguments that motivates the critique of materialism thus far 
elaborated is that the notion of an extra-aesthetic “materiality” falls short of 
                                                 
20 And, in keeping with a methodological principle that I’ve outlined above, I believe that it is preferable to first ask 
how and why “politics” becomes a problem, a concept, or an issue within specific works of literature. In Woolf’s 
case, this way of thinking provokes interesting reflection on what her fiction takes to be the specific nature of the 
“political” as such (as opposed, say, to the social, the economic, the cultural, the scientific, and so forth). The 
demands of this question are obscured by the approach that treats all works of literature as a priori political in 
exactly the same way, and where the meaning of this term is determined always in advance.  
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explaining the nature or meaning of actual works of art, since that project of 
explanation always presupposes a differentiation between the aesthetic and the non-
aesthetic, which differentiation troubles explanatory strategies based on the reduction 
of the aesthetic to the material. So far this argument has taken place in a mostly 
formal register – that is, it takes for granted that the criteria of differentiation must, 
logically speaking, exist even if they are not explicitly determined. I will now give a 
somewhat extended example of how my argument works in practice, and show a 
specific case in which a sophisticated reader of the twentieth-century novel is led to 
make explicit claims that are ultimately at odds with the presuppositions of his 
argument. In presenting this argument, I will shift from the formal register in order to 
identify at least one criterion of distinction between the aesthetic and the extra- or 
non-aesthetic domain. This criterion is the kind of irresolvable ambiguity that belongs 
to aesthetic and not to other orders of meaning.21 If the aesthetic is characterized in 
part by its articulation of a kind of meaning that is not conceptually articulated – if, in 
other words, it does not operate according to worldly epistemological norms – then it 
follows that it is intrinsically open to ambiguity. This is a version of the familiar thesis 
artworks produce and depend upon meaning in multiple ways, without needing to 
provide a standard by which to decide which of these possible meanings is the correct 
or final one. Ambiguity of this sort is, of course, a familiar phenomenon to students 
                                                 
21 The modifier “irresolvable” is absolutely necessary to this formulation, since ambiguity can indeed be a feature of 
(for example) historical or scientific discourses that are more typically submitted to norms of truth and/or 
objectivity.  
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of modernism, ever since (inspired in part by modernist poetics) William Empson 
resolved, in his celebrated typology, to track down all the “machinations of 
ambiguity” that simultaneously complicate and make necessary the interpretation of 
poetry. For the materialist, though, this ambiguity is either difficult to register or 
difficult to explain. In what follows, I will give a concrete example of a recent account 
of modernism that implicitly assumes the ambiguity of the aesthetic even as their 
interpretive programs tend to downplay or disregard the latter. By pinpointing this 
minimal concept at work in criticism that is, on the whole, skeptical about the 
“autonomy” of the aesthetic, I aim not to prescribe any particular interpretive method 
but to describe the commitments implicit in the idea of interpretation, which 
therefore hold in principle for any interpretive method. Over the course of this 
dissertation, I will demonstrate how making that commitment explicit will open up 
new avenues for understanding modernist narrative practices that attempt to broadly 
reconfigure the relations between literary meaning and “worldliness,” whether the 
latter is construed historically and politically (as is the case in the examples below) or 
philosophical and scientific.  
In endorsing what I have very broadly outlined as the materialist program in 
literary studies, Edward Said presents in nuce its characteristic reductive operation. This 
operation is developed in some detail in the magisterial Culture and Imperialism, the aim 
of which is to “read the great canonical texts, and perhaps also the entire archive of 
modern and pre-modern European and American culture, with an effort to draw out, 
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extend, give emphasis and voice to what is silent or marginally present or ideologically 
represented in such works.”22 One is therefore tempted, first of all, to align Said's 
critical practice with the critique of ideology so prevalent in so much of today's literary 
and cultural studies. Yes, of course, from the standpoint that understands British 
modernism as systematically imbricated with real networks of colonial exploitation, 
Kipling's representations of colonial India and Conrad's images of the African heart 
of darkness (both of which “brought to a basically insular and provincial British 
audience the color, glamor, and romance of the British overseas enterprise” [132]) can 
appear as little else but fantasmatic objects for a metropolitan imagination stained by 
its own apology for imperialist expansion. Indeed, one of Cultural and Imperialism's 
central claims – about the essential relation of its two titular phenomena – presents in 
crystallized form the background theoretical commitment and procedure of 
materialist criticism, namely the articulation of a duality of spheres or domains whose 
distinction is apparent but not real:  
“In much recent theory the problem of representation is deemed to be central, 
yet rarely is it put it its full political context, a context that is primarily imperial. 
Instead we have on the one hand an isolated cultural sphere, believed to be 
freely and unconditionally available to weightless theoretical speculation and 
investigation, and, on the other, a debased political sphere, where the real 
                                                 
22 Said, Edward. Culture and Imperialism. New York: Vintage, 1993. p. 66 
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struggle between interests is supposed to occur. To the professional student of 
culture – the humanist, the critic, the scholar – only one sphere is relevant, and, 
more to the point, it is accepted that the two spheres are separated, whereas the 
two are not only connected but ultimately the same. A radical falsification has 
established this separation. Culture is exonerated of any entanglements with 
power, representations are considered only as apolitical images to be parsed 
and construed as so many grammars of exchange, and the divorce of the 
present from the past is assumed to be complete. And yet, far from this 
separation of spheres being a neutral or accidental choice, its real meaning is an 
act of complicity, the humanist's choice of a disguised, denuded, systematically 
purged textual model over a more embattled model, whose principal features 
would inevitably coalesce around the continuing struggle over the question of 
empire itself” (57, emphasis added). 
If we accept, as we should, Walkowitz's description of the ongoing politicization of 
modernist studies, then Said's excoriation of modes of interpretation that endorse the 
strict separation between cultural and political spheres appears to motivate a research 
program that is now in the course of being fulfilled (if, indeed, it has not been 
completed). And while this characterization of the situation would not strictly 
speaking be incorrect, it doesn't fully capture the nuance of Said's own interpretive 
practices. Of course, Said is consistent in his view that economic or political histories 
and theories of imperialism (whether critical or affirmative) fail notably to explain the 
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special role of culture – especially literary culture and in particular the novel – in the 
formation and reproduction of pernicious Eurocentric values. In his words, “the 
global market accumulation that gathered the colonial domains into the world market 
economy was supported and enabled by a culture giving empire ideological license” 
(222). But Said's argument loses consistency, in a highly instructive fashion, when his 
remarks on literature and literariness call into question his more overt identification of 
culture and politics.  
It is possible to mark the points in Said's argument at which the procedure of 
translation (which I have argued is a method of reduction), used by the critic is to 
demonstrate that and how the manifest distinction between domains dissimulates 
their real unity, relies on an inherent and irresolvable ambiguity. At least two instances 
in Culture and Imperialism show Said distancing himself, whether consciously or not, 
from the idea that the spheres of culture and politics are “ultimately the same.” First, 
Said acknowledges in an early discussion of Dickens that refusing to endorse the 
supposed autonomy of fiction “does not reduce or diminish the novels' value as 
works of art: on the contrary, because of their worldliness, because of their complex 
affiliations with their real setting, they are more interesting and more valuable as works 
of art” (13). In other words, while he rejects any notion of aesthetic autonomy as 
prima facie spurious, Said nevertheless invokes a value for art as art, a value that it 
possesses in light of whatever marks or qualities (“worldliness”) that, somehow, 
indicate the unique vocation of art and literature. Even if the source of value is 
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explicitly the “world” as such, the sort of value invoked is specifically artistic or 
cultural. That becomes quite clear when we consider that there's nothing at all 
noteworthy about calling, for example, economic value or moral value “worldly.” 
Moral and political values serve as guides for action or for judgments of blame and 
praise, or as the background commitments of everyday decisions and allegiances – 
that such values are on some basic level “worldly” hardly bears remarking upon. Said's 
idea about the value of worldly works of art must depend on the idea that they can be 
shown to be worldly, that they are only apparently closed off from the world as it 
actually, historically, exists, and thus to secure their real value from the twin specters 
of aestheticism and literary formalism. This demonstration, of course, is the aim of 
Culture and Imperialism – which can now be read, in heterodox fashion, as motivating 
the defense of the specificity of aesthetic value. After all, it is the notion that literary 
artworks are even capable of being “reduced” or “diminished,” and especially that 
such reduction is a threat to be warded off, that marks them as somehow valuable in 
themselves. Even as Said is at pains to deny the autonomy of the aesthetic (which, 
again, only articulates a notion the aesthetic inaugurated by Kant that “isolate[s] 
cultural and aesthetic spheres from the worldly domain” [58]), he is participating in a 
long tradition – one that certainly includes Kant – which has meditated on the very 
idea of a species of value that belongs to the aesthetic alone. And it should not at all 
be taken for granted that this tradition opposes the aesthetic and the worldly in the 
manner Said habitually implies.  
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It could here be objected that Said's approving remarks about the value of 
worldly artworks should not be employed to ground extrapolations about the more 
general contours of his project or about the even more general impetus among so 
much of today's literary and cultural studies to denigrate “the aesthetic” as an 
autonomous domain opposed to the material, the real, the historical, or the worldly. 
This objection is not without merit, and of course it is the case that the best critics 
often have more nuanced attitudes or complex methodologies than the more or less 
schematic overview presented here allows. But however nuanced or complex criticism 
like Said's might be, it rests on certain basic methodological commitments, and it is at 
this level that my argument intervenes. Said's remarks about literary or aesthetic value 
have exemplary weight because they straightforwardly deal with methodological 
stances so basic as to be axiomatic: that works of literature are interpretable, that the 
world provides the criterion of their interpretation (keeping in mind that we haven't 
yet accounted for just what the world is, or in what worldliness consists), and finally 
that because they are interpretable in the light of this criterion they are valuable as 
works of art (not as material objects or brute facts or epiphenomena of some larger 
historical process, for treating them as such would be an unwarranted reduction or 
diminution – i.e., devaluation). And it is precisely these background commitments that 
entail the ambiguity or conceptual indeterminacy of the aesthetic. And, finally, this 
commitment does not license a reductive explanatory strategy that would disallow 
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treating a work as meaningful only in light of its material or “worldly” contents and 
effects.  
Consider that to “reduce” a work of art or literature means not simply 
devaluing it, but explaining it exhaustively in the terms of an order that is by definition 
neither artistic nor literary; for reduction to be possible, every element of the work 
needs to be straightforwardly decoded in terms of the reality to which it corresponds 
(it is worthwhile to note in passing that this is an operation strictly analogous to 
reductionism in the philosophy of mind, which argues that all qualities of conscious 
experience [qualia] ought to be explained only in terms of brain properties). Another 
way to put this is that “reduction” names a relation between forms of explanation: if 
the work in question requires no interpretation whatsoever, then it is available as pure 
data for the historian or the sociologist, and the historical or sociological explanation 
supplants the literary or aesthetic one. Even though Said overtly rejects the autonomy 
of the aesthetic, he clearly does not think that rejection underwrites reductionism of 
this sort. As he writes in an important passage, the fact that “the structure connecting 
novels to one another has no existence outside the novels themselves … obliges 
critics to read and analyze, rather than summarize and judge, works whose 
paraphrasable content they might regard as politically and morally objectionable” (76). 
This strict requirement that works be interpreted, that the “structure” they together 
form is strictly speaking not available to empirical reflection on history or society or 
politics broadly construed, encapsulates the fundamental ideas of Culture and 
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Imperialism. So while we ought to countenance the objection that a few passing 
remarks of Said's cannot reliably tell the whole story about his thought, in this case 
that objection carries no force – unless we suppose without reason that Said is not 
expressing his considered views.  
I've just argued that Said rhetorically and conceptually allows space for a 
modest conception of aesthetic autonomy first by invoking a notion of value specific 
to the aesthetic and second by preserving the latter from the threat of reduction. As 
we saw, these are related moves in the argument: the aesthetic has value in view of its 
worldliness, and the observation that works of art and literature are fundamentally 
worldly does not serve to extinguish their artistic or literary character. This is the first 
instance in which ambiguity enters the picture. The (reductive) evaluation of the 
aesthetic or the literary in terms of a heterogeneous order – such as the political or the 
moral – is illicit to the extent that it neglects the demands of reading and analysis, that 
is, of interpretation. Interpretation is demanded in order to discover those worldly 
elements that give literary artifacts their value as literary (we take for granted that, for 
Said, the literary is the privileged but not the exclusive site of the aesthetic, for reasons 
that shall not be considered here). And interpretation is necessary because of the 
ineradicable ambiguities of the literary, by the non-communicative aspect of its language, 
in Said by the fact that the ideal networks and “structures of feeling”23 in which 
                                                 
23 Said employs this notion, originally articulated by Raymond Williams, essentially to describe the concrete social 
effects of the novel (including the modernist novel), essentially inasmuch as the latter normalizes certain ideas about 
imperialism, the relation between the metropolis and the colony, the cultures of colonial subjects, and so forth. In 
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literature participates must be constructed by the work of criticism. As Said argues, 
“there is no such thing as a direct experience, or reflection, of the world in the language 
of a text” (67); if there were, interpretation would not be required, because the 
language of a text could only ever be meaningful in virtue of the way it directly reflects 
“the world.” In the most basic and banal sense, this means that the language of 
literature isn't a report on an actual state of affairs, and we don't understand that 
language in the way that we would understand such a report. When Pound's poem 
says that the faces in a crowd are “petals on a wet, black bough” we don't understand 
the faces to have literally been transformed into plants, just as we don't suppose that 
“In A Station of the Metro” is about one particular crowd seen at a certain time in a 
certain place in Paris. If the epistemological norms by which communication, “direct” 
reference or reflection, or reports on actual states of affairs do not uniquely determine 
the meaning of a work, then interpretation, however this procedure is actually 
construed in theory or in practice, is required at least in order to work out the range of 
plausible meanings a work might have. Conversely, if interpretation is necessary, as it 
obviously is for Said, then a variety of plausible meanings for the interpreted text must 
be available. But if this is so, the near-absolute privilege accorded to politically 
                                                 
Williams’s terminology, a structure of feeling is contrasted with official ideology or worldview and denotes “a 
particular quality of social experience and relationship, historically distinct from other particular qualities, which 
gives the sense of a generation or a period” (Williams 131). It is akin to practical consciousness or the lived 
experience peculiar to a specific social formation. Said’s argument concerns literature that “makes constant 
references to itself as somehow participating in Europe’s overseas expansion, and therefore creates what Williams 
calls ‘structures of feeling’ that support, elaborate, and consolidate the practice of empire” (Said 14).  
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motivated forms of criticism (specifically anti-colonialism) implied by Said's claim 
about the identity or quasi-identity of the spheres of culture and politics ultimately 
lacks warrant. This, finally, is what poses a problem for the repudiation of a concept 
of the aesthetic domain as autonomous.  
This problem in Said's approach become most clear when his claim about the 
identity of culture and politics finds itself at odds with his explicit worries about 
“reduction” of works of art to direct forms of political or social experience. This 
tension culminates in the following claim: “a novel is neither a frigate nor a bank 
draft. A novel exists first as a novelist's effort and second as an object read by an 
audience … but for all their social presence, novels are not reducible to a sociological 
current and cannot be done justice to aesthetically, culturally, and politically as 
subsidiary forms of class, ideology, or interest” (73). A novel is neither a “material” 
historical object nor an instrument of imperial expansion in literally the same way that 
a ship carrying colonists supports the endeavor of imperialism; despite its manifest 
social contents, it is not ultimately reducible to a sociological current, they ought to be 
treated justly in order to be understood: this certainly reads as a formulation of a 
minimal kind of aesthetic autonomy. However, to the extent that Said seems to 
endorse the political form of opposition between the aesthetic and the material 
elaborated above, he does not think in terms of what is specific to the aesthetic or the 
literary domain, and what I see as an important methodological insight of his 
argument is passed over.  
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The assumption that the marked presence, in a work of fiction, of any social, 
political, or historical content destroys any literary claim to autonomy rests, I want to 
argue, on a false notion of what autonomy of this sort means. I have shown Said 
excoriating a concept of the literary artwork as somehow immured from society, 
which concept he associates with aesthetic autonomy, even while he argues on behalf 
of a differently-conceived sort of autonomy. The solution to this impasse, which I 
have tried to motivate, is to reverse the order of explanation by asking how abstract 
concepts like “history” or even “imperialism” get articulated as concepts or problems 
within fictional narrative discourse. Pursuing things in this way, I argue, allows one to 
circumvent the problems associated with materialism that this chapter has so far been 
devoted to elaborating. Among other things, this means revising our conception of 
the relation between aesthetics and materiality (or its various conceptual surrogates): 
we needn't commit ourselves the untenable positions outlined in various guises above: 
either that these terms are coextensive or that they are opposed. It instead to treat the 
aesthetic and the material as autonomous domains, and ask after their points of 
interaction. With respect to literary studies, this means asking how it is, finally, that 
“materialism” becomes an active notion from the point of view specific to literature.  
This is precisely the background procedure of this dissertation. I argue that 
even though the notion of materialism poses conceptual issues for the literary critic, it 
is not thereby an unrecoverable concept. For it is indeed the case, I will show, that the 
project of thinking through a form of “materialism” is actively at stake in literary 
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modernism and its successors. Elaborating this case depends, at least, on asking what 
Tiffany above called “the question of materiality;” but rather than asking “what 
material substance actually is,” it is philosophically prudent to ask how material 
substance is known, qua material. Framed in this way, the reasons for asking how and 
why “materiality” becomes a problem for modernism become more evident. This 
framing also allows a consideration of why said materiality becomes a problem 
specific to literature in general and a thematic and generic issue in the modernist novel 
in particular; that is, it allows us to develop an account of materialism in modernist 
narrative discourse that does not enact an ultimately untenable disavowal of the 
autonomy of the aesthetic domain. In effect, this means that one can argue that 
literature is autonomous without meaning that it is divorced from, say, political, 
historical, or scientific concerns; on the other hand, it also means that political 
concerns (for example) cannot be given absolute privilege over other thematic issues 
that are also articulate the problem of materialism. Furthermore, I will argue that we 
should first of all understand these concerns in virtue of how they relate to formal and 
aesthetic questions; in other words, I want to show that what comes to be at stake in 
the encounter between the literary and the material is always the former's autonomy – 
not from the material, but from other domains that take materiality (in whatever form) 
as their object. In other words, the encounter with materiality provides modernist 
authors with both an obstacle and an opportunity for aesthetic renovation, because by 
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grappling with the experience and the knowledge of materiality, they find provocative 
but ambivalent images for the work of the novel.  
 
43 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
WOOLF, MATERIALISM, AND THE ELEGY FOR LITERATURE 
  
Materialism Then and Now 
If  it is possible to settle on a single intellectual trend that might plausibly 
provide the most urgent research program for the humanities in twenty-first century, 
then materialism — in one guise or another — is the most obvious candidate. After 
all, it seems that materialism is not just one trend among equally satisfying (or 
unsatisfying, as the case may be) alternatives. Rather, it forms the explanatory horizon 
of  so many forms of  theoretical and philosophical endeavor, from those philosophers 
of  mind still grappling with the modern explosion of  neurological discovery to 
literary critics who perceive in the concept of  materiality a refuge from the putative 
idealism of  the so-called “linguistic turn.” And while not all philosophers and not all 
critics are or claim to be materialist, it nevertheless appears that a genuinely 
contemporary approach to understanding the objects of  a great many intellectual 
domains will eventually be obliged to confront materialist explanations of  those 
objects. This cross-disciplinary materialist revival is in evidence in “continental” and 
“analytic” philosophy, in literary and cultural studies, in aesthetics and art history, and 
in political theory, to the extent that multifarious species of  materialism (whether 
scientific or speculative, historical or metaphysical, cultural or textual) seem 
particularly well-equipped to respond to some of  the deepest, most foundational 
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problems of  these respective fields. The “hard problem” of  the relation between 
brain and qualia or consciousness, problems of  selfhood, subjectivity, and personal 
identity, questions about the epistemic status of  the hard sciences and about the 
ontological status of  objects posited in scientific theories, questions about the 
relationship between naturalism and normativity, the whole sub-disciplines of  
ontology and metaphysics, the philosophical fate of  the human being and other 
animals, the inquiry into sheer life and its discursive, social, and “biopolitical” 
thematization, the effort to grasp conceptually those events, multiplicities, virtualities, 
temporalities, and other recalcitrant objects that are in whatever fashion asymmetrical 
to thought or experience, questions about the nature and role of  the artwork and of  
aesthetic experience, the philosophical and political status of  embodiment, the 
widespread recrudescence of  historical materialism and the whole question of  
communism in the face of  globalization and massive, unprecedented economic crisis: 
this is but a short list of  the irredeemably complex and abiding problems which the 
contemporary resurgence of  materialism might be said to address, in one way or 
another. The purview of  the abundant “new materialisms” today seems, accordingly, 
vast. 
 Less than a century ago, however, the fascination with the concepts materialism 
and materiality which has gripped so many contemporary scholars was virtually absent 
from European intellectual life; on the contrary, there persisted a widespread view 
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according to which materialism was bad philosophy rooted in outdated science, a 
remnant of  debates that stretched from the time of  Democritus and Epicurus to the 
nineteenth century but which had apparently been rendered obsolete by twentieth 
century revolutions in philosophy, science, and technology.24 Surprisingly, the rejection 
of  materialism betrayed a deeply modernist spirit (even, perhaps especially, when that 
rejection was carried out in an anti-modern or “unmodern” spirit, as in the case of  
Nietzsche). And while literary modernists like Woolf  and Yeats saw in materialism an 
apt figure for the intellectual and especially the artistic vices of  their Victorian and 
Edwardian predecessors, matter's ostensible death-bed had already long been 
prepared. 
 In order to understand Woolf's modernist refusal of  aesthetic or novelistic 
materialism, made explicit in the 1919 essay “Modern Fiction”25 and ostensibly 
practiced in her major works of  the 1920s, it is necessary to consider how the fate of  
materialism as a philosophical enterprise unfolded in the 19th century, and accordingly 
what this enterprise meant for Woolf  and her intellectual contemporaries. A complete 
account of  this unfolding would be the goal of  a book-length study, and so cannot be 
presented here in any kind of  detail; it's possible, however, to identify a few of  the 
                                                 
24 Certainly this sort of scientific anti-materialism remains in existence today (e.g. in the empiricism of Bas Van 
Fraassen or the structural realism of James Ladyman et. al.), though these views could almost certainly be situated in 
a historical account of the development of the modern philosophy of science inaugurated in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries and refined – alongside rapid scientific and technological development and with an 
increasingly sophisticated understanding of scientific practice – throughout the twentieth century. 
25 Woolf, Virginia. “Modern Fiction” in The Common Reader. San Diego, CA: Harcourt Brace and Co., 1984.  
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important plot twists of  a more intricate story. This story largely takes place in 
Germany, where the legacy of  Kantian transcendental idealism and its relation to 
scientific research formed the horizon of  most dominant trends of  philosophical 
activity; we will see, however, that questions about the relation between philosophy 
and modern science that were so urgent for nineteenth century German intellectuals 
set the stage for the prominent British anti-materialism of  the first decades of  the 
twentieth century. 
 The activity of  philosophical critique discovered by Kant's Copernican turn is 
in part designed, Kant says in his preface to the second edition of  the first Critique, to 
“sever the very root of  materialism, fatalism, atheism, of  freethinking unbelief, of  
enthusiasm and superstition,”26 alongside other pernicious threats to philosophical 
rationality as much as to social well-being. The gesture of  root-severing should be 
taken literally: for Kant, materialism is groundless metaphysical speculation. In the 
light of  transcendental philosophy, it is neither more nor less justifiable than the 
“pneumatism” it opposes; both mistake a difference “in the mode of  representing 
objects” (as either internal or external to consciousness) for a difference in things 
themselves, which are in Kant's view unknowable. Not only does materialist 
metaphysics succumb to the moral and social vices of  atheism and fatalism, it cannot 
even secure its defining speculative proposition in the face of  the skeptical demand 
                                                 
26 Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. Paul Guyer and Allen Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998. 
p. 119/Bxxxiv.  
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for justification. As such, the claim that “there is nothing but matter” is 
indistinguishable from the claim that “there is nothing but soul” (or, for that matter, 
“there is nothing but water” and “there is nothing but fire”). Materialism is 
subjectivist idealism by another name, unable to reconcile its explicit stance with its 
implicit commitments. 
 The post-Kantian idealists continued to offer refutations of  materialism by 
various means; like Kant, for example, Hegel saw in materialism the mistaking of  an 
intellectual or conceptual activity for a real quality of  the external world and a 
consequently illicit metaphysical system: materialism fails to recognize the intrinsically 
conceptual character of  “matter” and collapses into an unreflected and groundless 
idealism. By the middle of  the century, however, the scientific and technological – as 
well as the political – situation had altered in ways that provoked a vigorous 
reconsideration of  both idealism (whether transcendental or speculative) and its 
interpretation and critique of  materialism. Ludwig Feuerbach's influential critique of  
Hegelian idealism, which damned Hegel as having both illegitimately abstracted from 
and subsequently erased the real, experiential foundations of  human life in his system 
of  spirit, paved the way for a more thoroughgoing scientific materialism that was 
visible in both intellectual and public life in Germany in the 1850s. The 
Materialismusstreit associated with figures like Karl Vogt, Jacob Moleschott, Heinrich 
Czolbe, and especially Ludwig Büchner (whose popular defense of  scientifically-
grounded materialist atheism, Kraft und Stoffe, would be re-printed throughout the 
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century in multiple editions and translations) is largely absent from English-language 
scholarship, though its importance for subsequent philosophical history is 
undeniable.27 
 Here it is tempting and perhaps not altogether incorrect to interpose the claim 
that the German materialists of  the fifties formed the continental analogues to the 
influential naturalists and agnostics emerging at the center of  Victorian intellectual life 
in England, such as Herbert Spencer and Thomas Henry Huxley, one of  the main 
proponents (alongside German biologist and artist Ernst Haeckel) of  Darwinism after 
the 1859 publication of  The Origin of  Species, and, later, Virginia Woolf's father Leslie 
Stephen. Both English and German scientists and intellectuals enjoyed a growing 
public audience to whom they could address popularized accounts of  recent scientific 
and philosophical developments, and if  those developments implied or seemed to 
imply an embrace of  materialism, then the stakes were viewed no longer in exclusively 
philosophical or scientific terms, but social and even ethical ones. The social purview 
of  the scientific stance (certainly a common theme in Victorian intellectual life) is 
perhaps nowhere better expressed than in Huxley's lecture on “The Physical Basis of  
Life,” which concludes with a plea on behalf  of  the monumental relevance of  
                                                 
27 The main study in English of the materialism controversy of the 1850s is Gregory, Frederick. Scientific 
Materialism in Nineteenth Century Germany. Dordrecht: Riedel, 1977. See also Gardner, Sebastian. “Idealism and 
Naturalism in the Nineteenth Century,” in Allison Stone, ed. Edinburgh Critical History of Philosophy, Vol. 5. 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP 2011, and Burrow, J.W. The Crisis of Reason: European Thought 1848-1914. New 
Haven, CT: Yale UP 2000. Finally, the mid-century materialists are briefly but evocatively described by Rudiger 
Safranski, in his biography of Martin Heidegger, as articulating an “ethos of a materialism of force and urge and 
glandular function” (29).   
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scientific inquiry even if  the latter should embrace a (deceptively, to be sure) 
“materialistic” terminology:   
Why trouble ourselves about matters of  which, however important they may 
be, we do know nothing, and can know nothing? We live in a world which is 
full of  misery and ignorance, and the plain duty of  each and all of  us is to by to 
make the little corner he can influence somewhat less miserable and somewhat 
less ignorant than it was before he entered it. To do this effectually  it is 
necessary to be fully possessed of  only two beliefs: the first, that the order of  
Nature is ascertainable by our faculties to an extent which is practically 
unlimited; the second, that our volition counts for something as a condition of  
the course of  events.” (Huxley 165)28 
 However, materialism was rarely if  ever explicitly embraced in the British 
context of  post-Darwinism and in debates about spontaneous generation – debates 
which comprised the ostensibly materialist view that life could spontaneously be 
created by lifeless and insensate matter, what Huxley called “abiogenesis”29. 
Importantly, Huxley as well as Darwin himself  considered abiogenesis to have been 
experimentally invalidated by Louis Pasteur in the early 1860s30 While the emergence of  
life from inorganic matter may once have happened deep in the past, it was 
                                                 
28 Huxley, Thomas Henry. Collected Essays, Vol I. New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1901. 
29 A good overview of the spontaneous generation debate in the nineteenth century, see Strick, James. Sparks of Life: 
Darwinism and the Victorian Debates over Spontaneous Generation. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2000. 
30 Cf. Strick 20-1 
50 
 
considered conclusive that no such emergence could happen in the present (a view 
which seems prima facie accommodating to natural theological views about the origin 
of  life on earth). In his aforementioned 1868 lecture addressed to an audience 
gathered in Edinburgh for lectures on “non-theological topics,” Huxley therefore 
explicitly set out to refute materialist doctrines of  abiogenesis and vitalism that were 
putatively both philosophically and scientifically unfounded (as Strick points out, the 
explicitness of  this refutation may well have had some distinctly rhetorical end: 
“[Huxley] was known as a very shrewd public speaker that often cleverly undercut 
theology by appearing to use its own arguments” [21]). The naturalist and physicalist 
but vocally anti-materialist stance that Huxley prepared in “The Physical Basis of  
Life,” with is its enshrinement of  the “protoplasm” as the crucial point of  scrutiny 
for the emergent biological sciences, was an important influence over the course of  
the entire century, and its genuine attitude towards materialism is difficult to decipher. 
This difficulty is engrained in its enigmatic conclusion, which appears to urge the 
“man of  science” not to mistake the increasingly materialistic language of  science in 
its descriptions of  the “phenomena of  Nature” for the reflection of  a world that we 
actually know in its intrinsic character. If  “matter and spirit are but names for the 
imaginary substrata of  groups of  natural phenomena” (160) and materialism and 
spiritualism alike are therefore unjustified (on Humean grounds) in virtue of  their 
status as inductions, then we can happily adopt the physicalist stance of  biological 
science (by refusing the appeal to non-physical or supernatural entities in order to 
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furnish explanations of  biological phenomena) while rejecting the metaphysical “errors 
of  systematic materialism may paralyse the energies and destroy the beauty of  a life” 
(165). In effect, truly modern science can be “materialistic” without the old fancy of  
materialism; what genuinely scientific endeavor could embrace so firm a metaphysical 
commitment to the ultimate nature of  things, after all, in an age when novel 
hypotheses and theories were produced and discarded at such rapid pace?31 
 In fact, the conceptual relation between materialism (as both a figure 
rhetorically employed and an actual philosophical doctrine) and modernity at large 
turns out to be surprisingly fraught. To return to the German materialists of  the 
fifties, Frederick Beiser has said (in a scathing review of  a historical volume on 
nineteenth century philosophy that neglects any mention of  the mid-century 
Materialismusstreit) that “the materialism controversy was as important for German 
philosophy in the late nineteenth century as the pantheism controversy in the late 
eighteenth century. The position of  every philosopher was determined by where he 
stood in this controversy. It was the very touchstone of  whether a thinker was for or 
against the cause of  modernity.”32 In one respect, this importance ultimately has less 
to do with the explicitly endorsed doctrines of  the materialists themselves than with 
                                                 
31 On Huxley and Helmholtz's wariness of metaphysics in the heyday of positivism à la Auguste Comte and Ernst 
Mach, despite their own explicit criticisms of the same, cf. Daston and Galison, Objectivity. New York: Zone 2007. 
p. 213 et passim. 
32 Beiser, Frederick. “Alan Schrift and Daniel Conway, eds. Nineteenth Century Philosophy: Revolutionary 
Responses to the Existing Order.” Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. West Bend, IN: U of Notre Dame College of 
Arts and Letters, August 2011. Web. April 29, 2014.  
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the increased visibility of  the problem space that materialism indexed (concerning the 
fundamental relations between scientific research, empirical discovery, and 
philosophical methodology) and especially with the reaction that the resurgence of  
materialism in intellectual and public life provoked. As Helmut Pulte has observed, by 
the time that writers like Vogt, Moleschott, and Büchner were popularizing 
contemporary science (which, for them, went hand in hand with the philosophical 
defense of  materialism) in journals like Die Natur and Das Jahrhundert (Gregory 7), 
“science had become the prevailing signature of  culture, and philosophy – at that time 
dominated by the systems of  speculative idealism – lost its authority in matters of  
scientific rationality. Quite the contrary, philosophy itself  increasingly became the 
target of  'scientistic' criticism, that is, it was accused of  not (or of  no longer) being 
able to judge what rationality meant in the different discourses of  science and of  not 
obeying scientific standards in its own discourse” (Pulte 101).33 It's in light of  the 
apparent possibility and tenability of  an empirical refutation of  the claims of  
philosophical reason that the challenge of  materialism (as a doctrine ostensibly 
founded solely on the largely reductionist worldview of  modern science and so 
supported by new technical developments in the sciences of  evolutionary biology, 
physiology, empirical psychology, optics, and so on) fully emerges, and the response to 
this challenge defined the scope of  philosophy in Europe for decades to come. 
                                                 
33Pulte, Helmut. “Kant, Fries, and the Expanding Universe of Science” in Michael Friedman and Alfred Nordmann, 
eds. The Kantian Legacy in Nineteenth Century Science. Cambridge, MA: MIT UP, 2006. 
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 Perhaps inevitably, the attempt to ground the authority of  philosophical 
rationality in a debate about the respective foundations and boundaries of  philosophy 
and science quickly alighted upon the need to reformulate Kantian philosophy in light 
of  or in the face of  contemporary scientific practice. The notorious rallying cry of  
neo-Kantianism – “back to Kant!,” the demand that Otto Liebmann addressed to 
Kant's lesser “epigones” – established the tone for an institutional renaissance of  
Kantian thought in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century (a renaissance 
which also provided the intellectual and philosophical background for the 
philosophical trends that are far more visible in literature departments today, like 
phenomenology and Frankfurt School critical theory). Certainly, the stakes of  early 
neo-Kantianism were decidedly anti-materialist, a fact made explicit early on in its 
history in the work of  Friedrich Albert Lange. His monumental 1865 work History of  
Materialism carried out a critique of  all materialist philosophy, from Democritus to the 
scientific materialists of  the fifties.34 In some ways, this critique takes shape in ways 
that would have been familiar in Kant's day: Lange writes, for example, that 
“materialism lacks relations to the highest functions of  the free human spirit. It is, 
                                                 
34A longer consideration of materialism in the intellectual history of the nineteenth century would give centrality to 
Lange's work (Lange, Friedrich Albert. The History of Materialism and Critique of its Present Importance, Third 
edition. Trans. Ernest Chester Thomas. London: Kegan Paul, 1925). In fact, the History of Materialism had not only 
broad influence upon later neo-Kantians (who set the stage for many of the major developments of twentieth-century 
philosophy) as well as Nietzsche and Russell, as I've indicated here; as a matter of sheer historical curiosity it is an 
important document for the philosophical background of  Pound's and Eliot's poetics in the 1910s. This is because it 
is indirectly responsible, as Michael Levenson reports in A Genealogy of Modernism, for the revival of interest in 
Max Stirner's work The Ego and his Own in England and abroad in the first decades of the twentieth century. Cf. 
Levenson, Michael. A Genealogy of Modernism: A Study of English Literary Doctrine, 1908-1922. Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 1984. pp. 65-6. 
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apart from its theoretical inadequacy, barren for science and art, indifferent or inclined 
to egoism in the relations of  man to man. It can hardly close the circle of  its system 
without borrowing from idealism” (Lange 340). But it was ultimately necessary to 
pursue a rejection of  materialism that Kant could not himself  have formulated, if  
only because materialism had become a stronger and seemingly more empirically 
sophisticated opponent in the intervening decades. Lange admits, for instance, that 
the scientific endeavor to determine with exactitude the physiological mechanisms of  
sensation, a determination or discovery which might putatively solve the problem of  
reducing conscious sensation and experience to purely material mechanisms, is neither 
“superfluous nor inadmissible.” But such a discovery still only pertains to appearances 
– “necessarily occurring picture(s) of  an unknown state of  things” (229); accordingly, 
“the resolution of  psychical activity into brain and nerve mechanism is the surest way 
to the knowledge that here our horizon of  our knowledge closes in, without touching 
the question of  what mind is in itself. The senses give us, as Helmholtz says, effects of  
things, not true pictures nor things in themselves. But to the mere effects belong also 
the senses themselves, together with the brain and the molecular movements we 
suppose in it” (ibid.). In other words, a neo-Kantian conception of  appearances can 
accommodate even the most sophisticated scientific explanations of  the mechanism 
of  sensation by defending the claim (likewise empirically well-founded in virtue of  
Helmholtz's research) that the matter of  all sensation – including sense organs 
themselves in scientific physiology –  is constructed inferentially on the basis of  
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unknowable things in themselves. Materialist forms of  explanation are once again 
severed at the root. 
 By preserving the priority and authority of  philosophical reason while at the 
same time accommodating the explanatory autonomy of  experimental science with 
respect to “appearance” Lange (in this respect on common ground with the 
conclusions reached by Huxley above) and the neo-Kantian tradition that he helped to 
initiate prepare a new conception of  the failure of  materialism. The familiar 
counterarguments – that materialism collapses into idealism or that it cannot explain 
mind or consciousness – retain some of  their force, to be sure. But with rapid 
changes in scientific and technological discovery (for example, the development of  
thermodynamics and electromagnetic theory in mathematical physics and evolutionary 
accounts of  speciation, individuation, and the origin of  life in the emergent life 
sciences), the ancient substantialist view of  matter became increasingly irrelevant to 
experimental and explanatory practice as well as the scientific worldview at large. 
Accordingly, Friedrich Nietzsche — no great defender of  science but an enthusiastic 
reader and critic of  Lange — could write twenty years after the publication of  The 
History of  Materialism that “materialistic atomism” is “one of  the most well-refuted 
things in existence,”35 and Bertrand Russell, introducing Lange’s work to a 
contemporary Anglophone philosophical audience in 1925 (the same year that Woolf's 
                                                 
35 Nietzsche, Friedrich. Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future. Trans. Judith Norman. 
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2002. p. 14 
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“Modern Fiction” was revised and published), reminded his readers of  the 
“professional contempt” held by scientists and philosophers of  metaphysics alike 
toward materialism.36  
This contempt is shared by those philosophical figures who are for various 
reasons thought to be most proximate to the cultural modernism that emerged in the 
early decades of  the twentieth century: in France, Henri Bergson; in Germany, 
Edmund Husserl and his erstwhile pupil Martin Heidegger, as well as Freud; in 
England, Russell and especially Alfred North Whitehead, not to mention Wyndham 
Lewis, who straddled the boundaries between fiction, painting, philosophy, and 
outright polemic. It’s crucial to see in these developments, however, not merely a 
rejection of  materialism but a rejection of  an older conflict between materialism and 
idealism whose very premises can be abandoned according to sufficiently modern 
philosophical and scientific criteria: this is a characteristically modernist approach to 
the problematic of  materialism. This approach has to do in no small part with a 
continued and intensifying need on the part of  philosophers to account for new 
discoveries in the exact sciences; Whitehead, for example, sees in Einstein’s relativity 
theory reason enough for revising the notion of  materiality that had hitherto been 
constructed on the basis of  an induction from the evidence of  sense data: since it 
may be that an electron does not continuously traverse a space but appears 
                                                 
36 Russell, Bertrand. “Materialism, Past and Present,” in The Basic Writings of Bertrand Russell. London and New 
York: Routledge, 2009. p. 211 
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discontinuously in different points in space (like an automobile that “appeared 
successively at … successive milestones”), then “we have to revise all our notions of  
the ultimate character of  material existence.”37 The cosmology that sees “brute 
matter…spread throughout space in a flux of  configurations,” and which is “in 
itself….senseless, valueless, purposeless” is for Whitehead an assumption that is 
“entirely unsuited to the scientific situation at which we have now arrived” (17).  
Russell likewise wrote that “materialism and idealism have been guilty, 
unconsciously and in spite of  explicit disavowals, of  a confusion in their imaginative 
picture of  matter. They have thought of  the matter in the external world as being 
represented by their percepts when they see and touch, whereas these percepts are 
really part of  the matter of  the percipient’s brain;”38 a sufficiently revised 
understanding of  material existence in the light of  a sufficiently scientifically-
grounded understanding of  perception would yield, on the contrary, a picture in 
which such perceptions do not track “pieces” of  physical matter — tables or chairs or 
oranges or sheep, individual substances in the Aristotelian sense — but instead, 
Russell emphasizes, “physical event(s)…not to be confounded with pieces of  matter. A 
piece of  matter,” Russell says, “is a logical structure composed of  events” (590).  Two 
years earlier, in “Materialism Then and Now,” his preface to Lange’s History of  
Materialism, Russell wrote that materialism is acceptable as a thesis of  the reducibility 
                                                 
37 Whitehead, Alfred North. Science and the Modern World. New York: The Free Press, 1925. p. 35 
38 Russell, Bertrand. “Physics and Neutral Monism,” in The Basic Writings of Bertrand Russell. London and New 
York: Routledge, 2009. p. 589 
58 
 
of  scientific theories to the language of  physics, so long as it was understood that 
“physics itself  is not materialistic in the old sense, since it no longer assumes matter as 
permanent substance,” (Russell 219-220) in the manner of  the indestructible and 
impenetrable atomon of  the old cosmology. The genuinely scientific attitude toward 
matter must always be up to date, and in being up to date it can only in the current 
state of  knowledge an indication of  what is possibly the case, not what is necessarily 
real. With the arrival of  Einstein's theory, even the old deterministic worldview – long 
associated with naturalist scientific explanation and materialist metaphysics – 
eradicated the required assumption on the part of  either physicists or philosophers 
that atoms behaved with the lawlike regularity predicted by Newtonian theories of  
space and time. “Thus even within the pure physics of  inorganic matter,” Russell 
writes, “the reign of  law cannot be asserted to be universally indubitable” (217). And 
the increasingly plausible doubt directed toward determinism in physics holds a fortiori 
in younger scientific disciplines whose experimental success was putatively less well-
founded than that of  mathematical physics: “this doubt cannot but be increased when 
we pass on to biology and psychology... the discovery of  quanta in physics shows how 
rash it is to dogmatize as to the further surprises which an advanced science may have 
in store for us; and psychology is by no means an advanced science” (ibid.).  
The skepticism directed towards materialism by Russell and others is an index 
of  what they conceived to be a specifically modern relation to science; it is intended 
neither as a defense of  piety nor a reactionary effort to secure the vanity of  the 
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human in the face of  an alienating scientific worldview.   In the accounts of  Russell 
and his colleague Whitehead – and many of  their intellectual and cultural peers – 
materialism did not fall prey to idealist critique but to scientific refutation; its epitaph 
was engraved by the modern research in physiology, perception, and especially 
relativity theory. 
 It becomes increasingly clear that materialism has a decisively ambivalent 
relationship to modernity as such. Speaking of  the Materialismusstreit, Beiser says that 
in the middle of  the nineteenth century, a thinker's attitude towards materialism was 
an index of  his or her attitude towards modernity. Indeed, the whole vexed category 
of  modernity, depending on how the latter is construed, encompasses the 
materialization and the mathematization of  nature carried out by experimental science 
and natural philosophy from the time of  the Enlightenment.39 It seemed plausible, 
perhaps inevitable, to mid-nineteenth century thinkers that the technological capacity 
to map fully the place of  the human being in that material and mathematical order 
would soon arrive, if  it had not already done so; materialism (in both scientific and 
historical variations) became the philosophical doctrine par excellence of  an incipient, 
finally consummated modernity.  In subsequent decades, however, Beiser's claim 
about the relationship between materialism and modernity remained true, but often in 
virtue of  a diametrically opposed sense: being against materialism often explicitly 
                                                 
39 Cf. Blumenberg, Hans. The Legitimacy of the Modern Age. Trans. Robert M. Wallace. Cambridge, MA: The MIT 
Press, 1985. p. 164  
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meant being for modernity. Clearly this is true for Russell, Whitehead, Bergson, T.E. 
Hulme, and others; it likewise describes the rhetoric of  Woolf's modernist anti-
materialism in her widely read statement of  aesthetic doctrine, “Modern Fiction,” 
written in 1919 and revised in 1925 in The Common Reader, two years prior to the 
publication of  To the Lighthouse. 
 Woolf's anti-materialism was certainly not unprecedented even within the 
domain of  imaginative literature. Indeed, an old story about the cultural origins of  
modernism links the latter with a return to characteristically romantic fixations on the 
supremacy of  aesthetic experience and the life of  spirit; it was along these lines that 
Yeats wrote – already as early as 1897 – that “the reaction against the rationalism of  
the eighteenth century has mingled with a reaction against the materialism of  the 
nineteenth, and the symbolical movement … is certainly the only movement which is 
saying new things.”40 Edmund Wilson's early and influential study of  international 
modernism, Axel's Castle cites Yeats's anti-materialist enthusiasm in building its quasi-
dialectical case for the return of  the romantic in modernism41, and since that time a 
number of  scholars have emphasized the various ways in which this connection might 
be construed (especially with respect to modernist symbolism).42 What the account 
                                                 
40 Yeats, William Butler. Ideas of Good and Evil, Third edition. London: A.H. Bullen, 1907. p. 294 
41 Wilson, Edmund. Axel’s Castle: A Study in the Imaginative Literature of 1870-1930. New York: Scribner’s, 1931.  
42 Cf. Kermode, Frank. The Romantic Image. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957; and most recently Halmi, 
Nicholas. The Genealogy of the Romantic Symbol. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007. The question about the relation 
between modernism and romanticism is perhaps not so urgent today, but some of the major critical takes on 
modernism written in the 1980s, such as Ricardo Quinones's Mapping Literary Modernism: Time and Development 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1985) and Sanford Schwartz's The Matrix of Modernism: Pound, Eliot, and Early 
20th-Century Thought (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP 1985) felt the need to address or reevaluate the perceived 
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presented here demonstrates, however, is that the assimilation of  the modernist 
rejection of  materialism in particular to a romantic ethos is flawed to the extent that it 
does not recognize just how closely bound this rejection was to a specifically modern 
possibility of  “saying new things,” as Yeats has it. Woolf ’s distaste for the 
“materialism” of  her Edwardian rivals is most certainly a related attempt to diagnose 
— and prescribe a cure for — problems in the approach to writing novels that was 
for all intents and purposes formalized in the 18th century and which had attained 
cultural dominance by the end of  the 19th. Its repudiation of  materialism is tied so 
clearly to questions about a sufficiently modern aesthetic and novelistic form, and 
with a modern break from the dead weight of  convention impeding artistic freedom, 
that it is almost impossible to see it as expressing either implicitly or explicitly the wish 
for a return of  any identifiable romanticism, even if  a formal analogy between Woolf  
and her ostensible romantic forebears can be discerned. We have already suggested 
that this is due largely to the revised attitude toward materialist explanation found in 
philosophies of  science in the first decades of  the twentieth century. More important 
and more obvious is the fact that the cultural status of  the novel itself  is much 
                                                 
continuities between romanticism and modernism, not only in light of scholarship like Kermode's in the 1950s 
which cast suspicion on the New Critical idea that modernists exemplified a radical break with the nineteenth 
century, but also because the emerging focus on the “postmodern” ostensibly incorporated (by then canonical) 
modernists into the traditions and conventions of a burdensome cultural past. My argument about Woolf does not 
address this broader question of periodization. About this, my basic claim – undefended here – would be that the 
way to conceptualize the relation between the romantic and the modern is not in terms of formal continuity or 
analogy, but within the broader and more complex problematic of modernity as such. In short, I am arguing here that 
while Woolf shares with the romantics, generally speaking, an antipathy or allergy to materialism, this antipathy has 
distinctly non-romantic sources and identifiably modernist stakes. 
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different by the beginning of  Woolf's century than it was at the beginning of  the 
nineteenth; the fact that Woolf's battle against literary materialism is waged in narrative 
and not lyric will therefore be a central point of  exploration in the analysis that 
follows, since it will help solidify the claim that materialism indexed for Woolf  (and 
for many moderns) a distinctly contemporary intellectual and aesthetic problem. It 
will likewise open the door to a consideration of  Woolf's ideas about the status of  
narrative and the novel (as against the lyric modes of  Pound or Eliot, but also the 
plastic medium of  modern painting) within the broader artistic, intellectual, and 
cultural situation of  modernism. 
 Others have seen in Woolf's anti-materialism not a romantic pedigree but an 
explicit return to a form of  spiritualism held over from Victorian fashion of  the mid- 
to late-nineteenth century; they express surprise that Woolf  should have chosen to 
align both herself  and her conception of  modern art with spiritualism and against 
materialism and scientific naturalism.43 Even the brief  overview of  the conceptual 
history of  materialism presented here strongly suggests that such an interpretation 
misunderstands just how up-to-date Woolf's anti-materialism is; behind this 
misunderstanding is the more fundamental mistake of  assuming the equivalence of  
materialism and naturalism. As we have seen in cases from Huxley to Russell, 
scientists and scientifically-minded philosophers has no special need for the explicitly 
                                                 
43Cf. Gaipa, Mark. “An Agnostic's Daughter's Apology: Materialism, Spiritualism, and Ancestry in Woolf's To the 
Lighthouse.” Journal of Modern Literature 26.2 (Winter 2002-2003). p. 2 et passim. 
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ontological or metaphysical commitments that materialism entails. There are at least 
two points that this realization allows us to make vis-à-vis Woolf. 
 First, we can recognize to what extent “Modern Fiction” considers the artist 
and the scientist analogously in terms of  their unsteady positions within an uncertain 
historical situation; it is a largely tacit analogy but one that we can anticipates the spirit 
of  Eliot's declaration, published in The Dial in 1923, that Joyce's Ulysses had “the 
importance of  a scientific discovery.”44 Clearly, discovery was both a problem and a 
blessing for both artists and scientists. Modern science of  the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries had arrived, we've shown, at a position from which it could be 
more or less confidently insisted that the materialist dream of  unifying the various 
domains of  natural science by the total mathematization of  nature (“the inspiring 
vision,” writes Michael Friedman of  the Enlightenment rationalism contributing to 
this project, “fueled by Copernicanism and the example of  Galileo, of  a precise 
mathematical description of  all the phenomena of  nature under a single set of  
mathematical laws uniting the earth and heavens, to be achieved by an atomistic or 
corpuscular theory of  matter that reduced all natural changes to the motions and 
mutual impacts of  the constituent particles”45) had decisively mistaken appearances 
for reality. The old objection that materialism collapsed into idealism, precisely by 
taking a non-empirical and ostensibly irrational abstraction as the basis of  reality, 
                                                 
44 Eliot, T.S. “Ulysses, Order, and Myth,” in Selected Prose of T.S. Eliot. San Diego, CA: Harcourt, Inc. 1975. p. 
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45 Friedman, Michael. Dynamics of Reason. Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications 2001. 
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received new support and new formulations by empirically well-founded theories of  
the physiology of  perception and the technological possibilities of  measure and 
quantification newly afforded to researchers in optics, psychology, and the brain 
sciences. 
 Recall Russell's claim that both older forms of  idealism and materialism “have 
thought of  the matter in the external world as being represented by their percepts 
when they see and touch, whereas these percepts are really part of  the matter of  the 
percipient’s brain.” In other words, the objects of  immediate acquaintance are neither 
things nor ideas but products of  sub-representational physiological processes. These 
and related insights were tellingly crucial modernism's most prominent critics and 
intellectuals virtually since its inception, and established early on that aesthetic theory 
and artistic practice alike were in a special position to account for the enshrinement of  
subjective life that had become cutting-edge in science and philosophy. For example, 
Remy de Gourmont, among the chief  symbolist influences on Pound and Eliot, wrote 
that “idealism is definitely founded on the very materiality of  thought, considered as a 
physiological product … if  knowledge of  the world is the work of  a humble 
physiological product, thought … then the world can be considered as unknowable, 
since each brain or each nervous system draws from its vision and its contact a 
different image...idealism means materialism, and conversely, materialism means 
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idealism”46. T.E. Hulme, erstwhile poet and enthusiastic Bergsonian, likewise found in 
Bergson's attack on materialism (which offers yet another version of  the idea that the 
materialist has mistaken just one part of  reality for the whole) the grounds upon 
which to justify, or at least urge, a revised picture of  modern literature. In Michael 
Levenson's words, “as metaphysics becomes untenable, it is the intuiting subject 
which becomes pre-eminent. Similarly, as the epic aspiration disappears from 
literature, personal expression takes its place. The struggle of  modern poetry becomes 
the struggle of  le moi profond: against language, against convention, against habit, 
against the seductions of  metaphysics, in order to achieve satisfactory expression” 
(Levenson 47). 
 Woolf's objections to materialism in “Modern Fiction,” we shall see, are more 
or less continuous with these themes, and its conclusions certainly enshrine a form of  
life or spirit utterly unavailable to putatively materialist representation or depiction. I 
have already argued that in this, Woolf  is doctrinally consistent with one of  the 
dominant intellectual trends in modernism, though I will show below that Woolf's 
anti-materialism turns out to have unique and far-reaching stakes. But there is a 
second point to be made that will establish the analogy of  literature and science in 
Woolf's essay. The latter begins by expressing anxiety about whether modern novelists 
have made any improvement in their craft since the genre was formalized by 
                                                 
46de Gourmont, Remy. Selected Writings (Ann Arbor, MI: U of Michigan P, 1966), p. 167-8. Cited in Schwartz, The 
Matrix of Modernism. 
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predecessors like Fielding and Austen. After all, modern technology has made such 
spectacular strides – why not modern literature, as well? But whereas progress in the 
sphere of  technological development is easily discerned in the present, the same 
cannot be said with respect to the sphere of  literature (“it is doubtful,” Woolf  writes, 
“whether in the course of  centuries, though we have learnt much about making 
machines, we have learnt anything about making literature” [146]). This is because it is 
only from a “sufficiently lofty pinnacle” – that is, from the abstract viewpoint of  the 
contemporary moment in the context of  literary history as a whole – that anything 
like progress, development, or refinement in literature might be identified as such. 
And “it need scarcely be said that we make no claim to stand, even momentarily, upon 
that vantage ground … it is for the historian of  literature to decide; for him to say if  
we are now beginning or ending or standing in the middle of  a great period of  prose 
fiction, for down in the plain little is visible” (146). Of  course, holding such an explicit 
view doesn't keep Woolf  from (privately) claiming access to just such a lofty pinnacle 
– in a diary entry written in the summer of  1926, during the time that Woolf  was 
drafting To the Lighthouse, she records that a novel she is reading (C by Maurice Baring) 
“will not exist in 2026.”47 In any case, what we should recognize is that for Woolf, 
writers and critics who have found themselves dispossessed of  an absolute standard 
of  judgment that could only be provided by a historical view from nowhere find 
                                                 
47The Diary of Virginia Woolf, Volume Three: 1925-1930. Ed. Anne Olivier Bell. New York: Harvest, 1980. p. 103. 
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themselves on strikingly similar terrain as philosophers of  science who prudently 
refuse the mistake of  making qualities of  appearance into real features of  the world as 
it is in itself, not in the name of  skepticism but of  a flexible and empirically-grounded 
naturalism; to commit such a mistake, after all, would just be to expose oneself  to 
inevitable refutation by the next great scientific discovery. Likewise, the Edwardian 
literary materialists– Arnold Bennett, H.G. Wells, John Galsworthy – who Woolf  
scorns notoriously “write of  unimportant things … they spend immense skill and 
immense industry making the trivial and the transitory appear the true and enduring.” 
Art and science are together exposed to a broader “culture of  metaphysical crisis,” in 
the words of  Michael Levenson.48 
 But this leads to a second and more important claim that will underpin the 
interpretation of  Woolf's fiction carried out in this chapter. Whereas influential 
intellectuals like Gourmont and Hulme endorsed explicitly philosophical rejections of  
materialism (rejections typically allied with more well-known figures like Nietzsche 
and Bergson), and on that explicitly philosophical basis found possibilities for a 
renewed or refined conception of  modern art, materialism is for Woolf  finds its place 
in a system of  figures that exclusively concern art and the sphere of  the aesthetic. In 
other words, the critique of  Edwardian materialism that she pursues in “Modern 
Fiction” and attempts to practice in To the Lighthouse is not rooted in specifically 
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philosophical worries about the shortcomings of  materialism as a metaphysical 
doctrine. To be sure, Woolf  was most certainly aware of  these putative shortcomings 
to some degree or another; the main source for her vocabulary, in this instance, is her 
father Leslie Stephen's lecture “What is Materialism?,” delivered in 1886 and 
published in 1903 in the volume of  essays An Agnostic's Apology.49 For Woolf  
materialism, that borrowed word, is “vague” as a description for kind of  literary 
practice, but it has its own sort of  precision within the sphere of  art: for instance, the 
old idea that the materialist picture of  nature could neither explain nor comprehend 
the spontaneity or freedom of  human action is transposed onto an aesthetic terrain 
where freedom is no longer a question of  metaphysics but of  a writer's capacity to 
break with convention, habit, tradition, and artifice (it's perhaps another mark of  
Woolf's distance from romanticism that “Modern Fiction” doesn't betray much of  
any sense that an analogy might be found between artistic freedom of  this type and 
the metaphysical free will of  man in nature). 
 On the most basic interpretation, then, materialism in “Modern Fiction” only 
appears as an image of  the kind of  novels that Woolf  doesn't want to write; a modern 
fiction embraces the realization that “nothing – no 'method,' no experiment, even of  
the wildest – is forbidden, but only falsity and pretense” (154). The falsity of  
materialist writers, their adherence to a solid, well-established craft governed by 
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convention and artifice (“the writer seems constrained, not by his own free will but by 
some powerful and unscrupulous tyrant who has him in thrall, to provide a plot, to 
provide comedy, tragedy, love interest, and an air of  probability embalming the 
whole” [149]), leads only to “the dust and the desert” where life can find no home 
and no expression. Really, it leads to death in two senses: the writing of  the 
materialists is “embalmed,” lifeless, concerning bodies lacking any spirit or vital spark, 
and so on. But it is also, we surmise, fiction which (like Baring's) “will not exist in 
2026.” In a strong sense, materialism is a metaphor or device upon which Woolf  can 
project in an image of  the novel that will endure, and which will still find readers a 
century later; like the Leslie Stephen surrogate Mr. Ramsay, Woolf  betrays a distinct 
anxiety about the thought that “the very stone one kicks with one's boot will outlast 
Shakespeare”.50  Worried constantly about his fame as a scholar and his place in 
philosophical history, Ramsay believes that “it is permissible even for a dying hero to 
think before he dies of  how men will speak of  him hereafter. His fame lasts perhaps 
two thousand years. And what are two thousand years? (…) What, indeed, if  you look 
from a mountain top down the long waste of  ages?” Woolf, too, has in mind a view 
on “the long waste of  ages” provided by that “sufficiently lofty pinnacle” to which 
she had earlier denied herself  access; how else could she recognize in materialism 
merely an embrace of  the trivial and the transitory? 
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 The construction of  modern literature – that is, giving literature a modern 
form – involves the thought of  Ramsay's “hereafter,” not on heaven but on earth. 
And this thought, I will suggest, is not entirely consonant with the rejection of  
materialism that Woolf  explicitly pursues. Of  course, in the most literal sense, she 
does not write like Arnold Bennett. But the system of  metaphors that she employs 
while refusing the blatant artifice of  her rivals suggests that death and the infertile, 
lifeless desert of  matter – the objects of  a vision only in the hereafter – are 
inextricable from Woolf's conception of  modern literary form. To the extent that this 
is so, it becomes possible to justify the claim that the whole problem of  materialism 
and the figuration of  “materiality” in Woolf's criticism and fiction are actually key 
parts of  a broader project of  self-description; what we find in To the Lighthouse is that 
this project is carried out most visibly and most compellingly when allegories of  
literary and narrative form become likewise most conspicuous. The point of  making 
this argument, in the end, is certainly not to say that Woolf  turns out to be a 
materialist despite herself, and ought thus to be celebrated (Whiggishly) as a precursor 
to today's fashionable materialism – a political and metaphysical radical and not, after 
all, an idealist and a snob. Rather, I will show why a “view from no one,” which 
destroys as much as it preserves life and the living presence of  conscious experience, 
remains a central aesthetic problem in Woolf's fiction, and identify the ways in which 
it expresses a unique and uniquely modernist preoccupation with both the conditions 
and the future of  art. In this, it will ultimately become clear why Woolf ’s treatment of  
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materialism as an aesthetic problem can never itself be materialist, even as it borrows 
from materialism a certain will to destructive abstraction. Because the figuration of  
so-called materiality in art is only recognizable as such within a work which addresses 
itself  to its literary-historical situation as much as to its own formal status as art 
(neither of  which can be totally resolved just in terms of  “materiality” without 
sacrificing the very concept of  “art” and “artwork), Woolf ’s insight that materialism is 
the principal aesthetic obstacle to the literary effort to be modern suggests a complex 
relation to this sort of  figuration in her own work, but also a prescient skepticism 
about attempts (even contemporary and avant-garde ones) to champion a notion of  
ostensibly sheer materiality as the de rigeur object of  a genuinely modern theory of  art.  
 
What is Materialism?  
It was Woolf's father's lecture “What is Materialism?” that almost certainly 
forms the most immediate background to Woolf's use of  that enigmatic term. 
Stephen’s titular question remains entirely unsettled, and the theoretical problems 
borne within the deceptively simple term “materialism” are recalcitrant; today, there 
are perhaps as many answers to his question as there are materialists. Stephen himself  
says that “materialism should apparently denote the doctrine that matter is the 
ultimate reality,” which means that “nothing really exists except matter, in various 
combinations from stones to brains” (Stephen 129), just as spiritualism (or 
“pneumatism” in Kant's language) says that nothing properly exists but thought. 
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Immediately, however, he encounters a problem: “the statement is simple and clear 
enough if  we assume that matter and spirit are words which denote directly known 
entities. But this is exactly one of  the cases in which we have begged the question 
when we have given the names” (ibid.). “Matter” and “spirit” – as opposed names for 
an “ultimate reality” of  which everything that appears in experience is a modification 
– have, by themselves and qua names, no other content than what they have been 
coined to define; it's in this sense that some basic formulation of  materialism might 
be straightforwardly question-begging. Such is the difficulty in conditions where, as 
Stephen says to inaugurate his critique of  materialism, “metaphysical arguments are 
apt to take the form of  disputes about words” (127). 
 Stephen's subsequent account of  the epistemological problems of  materialism, 
including questions about knowledge of  the external world and the relation between 
mind, matter, and the physical and psychological mechanisms of  sensation, is robust 
and anticipates critiques of  materialist metaphysics that remain tenable well over a 
century later (this seems, in fact, characteristic, as Stephen is generally known not as a 
philosophical innovator but as a skilled and perspicacious explicator; perhaps his chief  
contribution to English-language philosophy is the rehabilitation of  the reputations 
of  the British empiricists – Locke, Berkeley, Reid, and Hume – that would prove to be 
especially influential for the style, sensibility, and problem space of  first generation of  
“analytic” philosophers). An overview of  the entire argument of  Stephen's lecture 
would prove indispensable in understanding how not only philosophical language but 
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concrete and contemporary philosophical problems, particularly the problem of  
knowledge, enters Woolf's thought and writing; this project has largely been 
accomplished by Anne Banfield in her extensive and uncommonly philosophically 
erudite study, The Phantom Table: Woolf, Fry, Russell, and the Epistemology of  Modernism.51 
Banfield's work scrutinizes above all the problem of  knowledge and the logical and 
ontological status of  unobserved entities (as well as the “self ” – or, indeed, lack of  
self  – that is the subject of  the unobserved world), and it makes Stephen's influence 
not just on Woolf  but on her philosophical contemporaries Moore, Russell, and 
Whitehead more than evident. The present study is devoted to the more restricted 
theme of  materialism; as such, while there is some significant thematic and conceptual 
overlap with Banfield's important account of  Woolf  and literary and philosophical 
modernism, it will diverge, obviously, in the emphasis that it places on Woolf's 
assimilation of  the idea of  materialism into her conception of  modern literary form. 
 At any rate, what we ought to observe most carefully in Stephen's presentation 
of  materialism is how rapidly it moves from the ostensibly “objective” side – that is, 
the judgment that matter qua lifeless extended existence is the “ultimate” reality of  
which all else is composed – to the “subjective” side – that is, to the consciousness 
that makes such a judgment, to whatever mode of  acquaintance with matter that such 
a consciousness might be said to possess. Claims about matter, in order not to be 
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question-begging or sheer groundless assertions (to name two of  the classic skeptical 
objections), are inextricable from claims about the experience and especially the 
knowledge of  matter. Hence the peculiar difficulties that attend the fateful question 
“what is materialism?”; unlike other unfashionable or discredited metaphysical 
systems, “materialism has an undoubted plausibility” (127) in virtue of  the prima facie 
explanatory support it lends to the natural sciences, which (generally speaking) 
suppose on at least pragmatic or hypothetical grounds an external world of  material 
things to which we have access via sensation and observation. It’s a stance that is 
coded into the scientific method itself, in virtue of  the latter’s construction of  fact on 
the foundation of  what is observable and nothing else: recall Bacon’s advocacy for “a 
form of  induction [which, opposed to deductive syllogism, is “the form of  
demonstration which respects the senses, stays close to nature,”52 and so on] which 
takes experience apart and analyzes it, and forms necessary conclusions on the basis 
of  appropriate exclusions and rejections” (Bacon 17). As Stephen says, echoing this 
Baconian philosophy of  science, materialism “represents … the point of  view of  the 
physical inquirer. A man is a materialist for the time being so long as he has only to do 
with that which may be touched, handled, seen, or otherwise perceived through the 
senses” (Stephen 130).  
At the same time, however, the prospects for a rigorous justification of  
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75 
 
materialist metaphysics seem ever weakened by the thorny problem of  exactly how 
this sort of  access is possible – it is granted, after all, not to just another thing in the 
world but to a consciousness, which consciousness must itself  be explained strictly in 
terms of  the materialist worldview. Once again, the putatively straightforward 
question about the meaning of  materialism requires much deeper and more complex 
questions about knowledge, science, experience, rationality, the human body, 
observation and observability, and the subject that binds these questions together. As 
Stephen says, explicitly articulating a commonly held empiricist view, “we know 
nothing directly except the modifications of  our consciousness, thoughts, sensations, 
emotions, volitions, and so forth; and all statements of  knowledge carry with them a 
reference, explicit or implicit, to the knower. An object without a subject is a 
meaningless phrase” (135). What Stephen’s account makes clear is that materialism is 
the name, fundamentally, for a problem of  self-reference, and given its misleading 
enshrinement of  matter, it’s probably not a very good name. What looks like a generic 
metaphysical doctrine (“there is nothing but matter, extended substance in space and 
time”) comprises a whole theory of  knowledge and philosophy of  subjectivity; 
furthermore, this philosophy cannot plausibly be articulated in exclusively causal 
terms (“the subject is an effect of  a specific arrangement of  material components”), 
because even then an explanation would be required for how the mind can discover 
and know with certainty necessary relations of  causality between material bodies. And 
“how,” Stephen asks, “are we to state the relation between brain and mind? That they 
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are related is undeniable; but the boldest theorist would hesitate to state definitely 
what is the nature of  the relation” (132-3). Stephen himself  professes to remain 
characteristically agnostic on the issue; even today, while the nature of  exactly this 
relation remains intensely scrutinized in an era of  cognitive science and evolutionary 
biology, his prudence seems eminently justified.  
Stephen is largely skeptical about materialism in the metaphysical sense, but less 
so about the prospects of  an empirically – that is to say, inductively – grounded 
scientific realism that both makes explicit and accounts for its foundations in “the 
knower” who is directly acquainted only with objects of  conscious awareness. If  it’s 
true that “we cannot get outside our own consciousness,” (135), then genuine 
knowledge (of  the external world, of  other minds, and so on) seems too much to 
hope for. To confront this obstacle and controvert the standard disaster scenarios 
proposed by the skeptic (like those of  the Cartesian malin genie variety), Stephen 
describes the process of  constructing scientific knowledge from the elements of  
sensation through a method of  reflection, which process is essentially a more 
sophisticated and formalized version of  normal, everyday practical engagement with 
the world. In fact, Stephen’s picture of  scientific knowledge is worth presenting at 
length, not in order to commend or criticize it, but to begin to establish more 
explicitly how the complex of  concepts under consideration – materialism, sensation, 
experience, and abstraction – enter into Woolf ’s language, her concept of  fiction, her 
literary practice, and her modernist agenda.  
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What is the process of  reflection that Stephen describes, and how does it 
“construct” knowledge in both ordinary and scientific milieus? “What,” Stephen asks, 
“are we doing when we raise this vast structure of  physical science, composed 
essentially of  time and space formula” (135)? His answer is rich with imagery that 
readers of  To the Lighthouse will immediately recognize, familiar as they are with young 
Andrew Ramsay’s deceptively simple (and not altogether unboastful) explanation of  
Mr. Ramsay’s philosophical work – “think of  a table, then, when you’re not there” 
(Woolf  2005, 27) – to the rather mystified Lily Briscoe. Stephen says in response:  
We are filling up the gaps in our immediate perceptions. Each man’s experience 
is fragmentary, discontinuous, and narrow. He sees infinitesimal arcs, and 
connects them by drawing the whole circle. We extend the range and supply the 
intervals of  our knowledge. We are doing so somehow every instant of  our 
lives, and when we reach the furthest limits of  physical science we are still 
doing the same. I shut my eyes for an instant, and believe that my pen and 
paper are still there. I believe that I should see them if  my eyes were open, and 
that other persons may see them still. If  I look back to the past, or forward to 
the future, or away to the furthest abysses of  space, I am carrying on the same 
construction. I am ‘producing’ the curve of  which a minute element is before 
my eyes. I form, then, a kind of  hypothetical consciousness, of  which my own 
is an essential part, but which extends indefinitely beyond it. By this artifice (if  
it may be called so) I state a general truth without implicit reference to my own 
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perceptions (135-6).  
Reflection, in the sense that Stephen gives it here, is an inductive process that 
produces from discrete elements of  sensation – like “infinitesimal arcs” of  an absent 
circle – a truth that is independent of  its having been founded in particular, limited 
sensations; “Kepler constructed the solar system in the same way,” by placing himself  
“in imagination at a different point of  view” (136). It is a method for passing with 
certainty from the observed to the unobserved. But such a method inevitably leads 
right to the precipice of  skepticism: what is it, after all, that distinguishes the “artifice” 
of  the hypothetical extension of  the subject via reflection from the pure “abolition of  
the subject” that would accompany knowledge of  the world outside all possible or 
actual experience?  The materialist apparently requires just such knowledge if  she is to 
posit a world of  insensate, unthinking matter that predates even the possibility of  
thought or experience (“we are sometimes told that the solar system was once a 
‘cosmic mist,’ a whirl of  incoherent atoms, which has gradually shaken down into 
such order as we see around us,” Stephen writes [148]).  This is an account that can’t, 
in his view, be disproven; but what we can coherently say we know about such a 
‘cosmic mist’ is gained only through reflection, the hypothetical extension of  the 
power of  observation, not from the annihilation of  subjectivity in imagination.  
To speculate beyond the properly delimited boundary of  the knowable, to 
abolish the subject and annihilate experience in an effort at genuine objectivity, is only 
to use words without meaning. This is, perhaps, the chief  philosophical sin in 
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Stephen’s eyes. He objects constantly to the adjudication of  metaphysical questions by 
grammatical means, in a manner that surely recalls Hume’s dissolution of  
philosophical problems into linguistic ones (most notably on the subjects of  
metaphysical and personal identity, which Hume suggests can ultimately “be regarded 
rather as grammatical than as philosophical difficulties”53) and anticipates a later 
philosophical tradition that encompasses figures like Wittgenstein and Carnap. Leslie 
claims that the “blind fate,” to which the materialist seems committed when 
explaining how consciousness could have appeared in a deterministic world of  sheer 
matter, is “a mere word” (144); he derides the materialist doctrine of  sensation as 
“betrayed by erroneous language” (141) because it relies on a “combination of  words 
[that] is without meaning” (142); he thinks that the fundamental premise of  
materialism – an invented “imaginary substratum in which sensible qualities somehow 
stick” – is a verbal attempt to abandon relation and experience by substituting a “mere 
name for the coherence of  certain groups of  sensation” (144). The essential 
metaphysical gesture that grants access for itself  to a world beyond knowledge and 
experience is, in reality, a banally grammatical procedure: “the unknowable, which lies 
beyond, is not made into reality by its capital letter” (ibid.).  
So, what is the difference between the legitimate expansion of  the sphere of  
the knowable by the hypothetical extension of  the powers of  observation and the 
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illegitimate claim on a behalf  of  a reality severed utterly from its being thought, 
sensed, or experienced? “When we speak of  what happened when the solar system 
was still an incandescent mist, we are only extending our experience, as we do when 
we say that the fire is still burning in the room that we have left,” Stephen writes. “To 
say what would or did happen,” on the other hand, “outside of  all experience, actual 
or potential – that is, supposing all experience to be annihilated – is to use words 
without meaning, as much as to say what I feel when I don’t feel” (138-9). The 
materialist, ultimately, grants too much power to language by supposing the 
annihilation of  experience; and “we escape from materialism,” in large part, “by 
refusing to admit mere empty phrases as solutions” (147). At bottom, then, the blurry 
line between “extending” and “annihilating” experience is focused and refined – at 
least in Stephen’s view – by distinguishing improper from proper uses of  language. To 
say that the sun will rise tomorrow is a meaningful sentence, and fits with the 
knowledge of  the movements of  heavenly bodies that we have constructed on the 
basis of  experience. To say that the sun will rise on the day after the obliteration of  
any possible percipient, in a world emptied of  experience, on the other hand, is only 
to imitate meaningful words, to mistake their formal appearance for their semantic 
content – one may as well be writing fiction.  
Eventually – asking, as we are, what materialism means in the neighborhood of  
Virginia Woolf ’s fiction – we must determine more exactly what sort of  influence 
Stephen’s quasi-empiricist understanding of  the experiential roots of  scientific 
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knowledge and practice, which undergirds his philosophical critique of  materialism, 
might have had in Woolf ’s own writing. There are various possible responses to the 
question of  this influence, with differing degrees of  plausibility and in service of  
different argumentative programs. Certainly, Woolf  scholars who have placed a special 
emphasis on the putative philosophical content of  her novels have often felt that the 
requirement of  demonstrating Woolf ’s biographical connections to philosophy – 
especially contemporary academic philosophy – is unavoidable. And we do know that 
Woolf  was enthusiastically interested in contemporary philosophical debates. 
Moreover, as a member of  Bloomsbury (with close ties to the Cambridge Apostles) 
she was acquainted, whether socially or as a reader, with some of  the most prominent 
philosophers of  the day. She audited lectures on Bergson delivered by her future 
sister-in-law Karin Costelloe, she socialized with Russell and Whitehead, not to 
mention Wittgenstein, and heard Moore explicate Bishop Berkeley’s epistemology. 
Banfield convincingly writes that “Woolf  … had a knowledge ex auditu of  
philosophy” (Banfield 30), and this claim is warranted by the historical record.  
The idea that Woolf  received some measure of  philosophical education – that 
her knowledge ex auditu, while not specialist in an academic sense, was both deeper 
and more sophisticated than untutored interest or enthusiasm – is a fortiori true in the 
case of  her relation to Leslie Stephen. There can be little doubt that Stephen’s 
informal pedagogy played some significant role in preparing Woolf  for the by all 
accounts rigorous philosophical conversation that would come to pervade 
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Bloomsbury. It may very well have been classic works of  philosophy that were among 
those works that young Virginia would precociously make efforts at reading, in part to 
impress her father: “how proud, priggishly, I was, if  he gave his amused little 
surprised snort, when he found me reading some book that no child of  my age could 
understand. I was a snob no doubt, and read partly to make him think me a very 
clever little brat.”54 Woolf, who never went to university (the Stephens could only send 
her brothers), received informal lessons at home, and Stephen himself  would read to 
the children on English literature, mathematics, and – almost certainly – the history of  
philosophy (it is widely known that in her childhood Woolf  read Plato in Greek). 
What exactly she read of  Stephen’s work, later in life, is not entirely clear. It’s possible 
she never read “What is Materialism?” though in all likelihood she had read both An 
Agnostic’s Apology (which includes the “Materialism” essay) and A History of  English 
Thought in the Eighteenth Century¸ and probably his late work The Utilitarians as well. She 
had a keen and critical sense of  Stephen as a writer. In 1940, she described his work in 
terms that emphasizes its ostensibly Victorian sensibility: “always cracking up sense 
and manliness; and crying down sentiment and vagueness. (…) That shows a very 
simply constructed view of  the world; and the world was, I suppose, more simple 
then” (115). We are familiar with the antipathy for vagueness and empty words that 
Woolf  finds in Stephen, given that it is this antipathy that’s at the root of  his critique 
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of  metaphysical materialism. Woolf  professed to have no special fondness for 
Stephen as a writer (a sentiment that is perhaps compounded by the complexity of  
her relation to the man himself); she writes evocatively that “he is not a writer for 
whom I have a natural taste. Yet just as a dog takes a bite of  grass, I take a bite of  him 
medicinally, and there often steals in, not a filial, but a reader’s affection for him; for 
his courage, his simplicity, for his strength and nonchalance, and neglect of  
appearances” (115-6). Given all this, it seems that under the constraints of  strict 
historical accuracy one would be justified enough to surmise that the language of  
materialism enters Woolf ’s critical writing and aesthetic doctrine through Stephen. If  
she devoted any significant length of  time to pondering materialism as a philosophical 
or a metaphysical problem, or subjected the essay “What is Materialism?” to careful 
scrutiny, however, then she left no written record of  having done so.  
It is possible, however, to defend the claim that what Woolf  recognized in the 
idea of  materialism was in fact an urgent aesthetic problem, and that as a problem it 
was visible especially in relation to the history and the future of  the novel. So far, this 
argument has proceeded by elaborating some historical and biographical links 
between Woolf  and her philosophical context. But that elaboration cannot amount to 
a demonstration, and in any case it is possible to outline the argument about the 
aesthetic dimensions of  the problem of  materialism in Woolf ’s fiction without further 
appeal to the authority of  archival reason. In order to do so we should first emphasize 
that the notion of  materialism analyzed by Stephen follows an itinerary from claims 
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about immediate material existence – e.g., the everyday objects that populate the world 
around us and persist in the absence of  our powers of  perception – to claims about 
the subject which, by means of  the constructive power of  reflection, forms 
conclusions about the material world, and finally to an image of  the total annihilation 
of  subjectivity – a world emptied of  selves and percipients. It’s in this image of  a 
lifeless material world, a paradoxical imagination of  the destruction of  self  and 
memory, perception and consciousness, that materialism terminates; for Stephen it’s 
an image that is epistemologically empty and composed with meaningless words, akin 
to describing the feeling of  complete anaesthesia or the consciousness of  being 
unconscious. Genuine knowledge is rooted in abstraction, but so is the fiction of  the 
materialist worldview.  A boundary needs to be drawn within abstraction in order to 
secure the possibility of  real knowledge and ward of  the exuberance of  what amounts 
to wordplay: “I abstract from my own consciousness, but not from consciousness 
itself. I cannot get into a world outside of  all experience” (Stephen 143-44).  
This itinerary has, undoubtedly, an aesthetic and an artistic significance that can 
be traced throughout Woolf ’s fiction and especially in To the Lighthouse¸ the novel in 
which her father and his life’s work are so explicitly portrayed in the figure of  the 
brilliant, demanding, and ultimately aggrieved philosopher Mr. Ramsay. But what must 
be considered above all is that the conceptual links forged around the problem of  
materialism, which we have observed in Stephen’s work, are constructed on the basis 
of  the relations between experience, abstraction, language, and fiction. To the extent 
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that this is so, we have good reason to treat the complex of  philosophical issues 
circulating around materialism not only as autobiographical material that has made its 
way to the surface of  her (not coincidentally) most autobiographical work of  fiction – 
not, in other words, solely as a matter of  content (the character of  Mr. Ramsay and 
other characters’ various impressions of  the man and his work) or theme (“subject 
and object and the nature of  reality” [Woolf  2005, 26]). On the contrary, these issues 
likewise resonate at the level of  novelistic form, and the problem of  materialism in To 
the Lighthouse can consequently be understood as a crucial aspect of  how that novel 
portrays itself  in relation to both the history and the formal limits of  its genre. It’s in 
this sense that the questionable status of  materialism becomes central to Woolf ’s 
efforts at either describing or composing a modern novel. Woolf  appropriates the 
language of  materialism in order to test the limits of  abstraction in the novel, to mark 
the boundary between (to borrow Stephen’s pointed comparison) abstraction from 
individual consciousness and the total abstraction from all consciousness, the effective 
annihilation of  subjectivity. At what point along this trajectory are words emptied of  
meaning, and where does novel capture rather than destroy or erase what it means 
above all to convey?  
This will turn out to be one of  the central aesthetic problems faced by To the 
Lighthouse. We are, of  course, familiar, with the various ways in which Woolf  describes 
the object of  modern fiction, “life” itself. Recall that Woolf  specifically indicts 
“materialism” as a style unconsciously embraced by her Edwardian rivals, principally 
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Arnold Bennett, John Galsworthy, and H.G. Wells: “for us at this moment the form 
of  fiction most in vogue more often misses than secures the thing we seek. Whether 
we call it life or spirit, truth or reality, this, the essential thing, has moved off, or on, 
and refuses to be contained any longer in such ill-fitting vestments as we provide” 
(Woolf  1984, 149). Woolf  writes that “life is a luminous halo, a semi-transparent 
envelope surrounding us from the beginning of  consciousness to the end” and that it 
is a “varying...unknown and uncircumscribed spirit” which the novelist is tasked with 
conveying (150). Perhaps echoing her father’s contention that “each man’s experience 
is fragmentary, discontinuous, and narrow,” Woolf  notoriously advocates on behalf  of  
the modern novelist: “let us record the atoms as they fall upon the mind in the order 
in which they fall, let us trace the pattern, however disconnected and incoherent in 
appearance, which each sight or incident scores upon the consciousness” (ibid.). (It’s 
not without interest, we note in passing, just how suffused Woolf ’s anti-materialism is 
with the language of  a certain materiality, not just in its atomism but in its figuration 
of  consciousness as a substance capable of  being “scored” by an external action.) 
And, like Stephen’s materialist, those writers who do indeed “fill in the gaps,” who 
perhaps emphatically do “take it for granted that life exists more fully in what is 
commonly thought big than in what is commonly thought small” (ibid.) risk obscuring 
or annihilating “the proper stuff  of  fiction” (ibid.) through blind adherence to the 
conventions of  plot, probability, and verisimilitude.  
Of  course, the lesson towards which Woolf  builds her modernist critique of  
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materialist fiction is precisely that, insofar as fiction must strive to convey in its 
minuteness the “incessant shower of  atoms,” (ibid.) and so to “transmute” the 
sensibilia of  life into literature, “‘the proper stuff  of  fiction’ does not exist” (154). 
This is just the logical consequence of  the apparent circumstance that “everything is 
the proper stuff  of  fiction, every feeling, every thought,” when “every quality of  brain 
and spirit is drawn upon,” and “when no perception comes amiss” (ibid.). Given this 
near-absolute broadening of  the scope of  fiction in the enthusiastic attempt to render 
every fluctuation of  sensation in the name of  life, the novel is formally exploded, 
affording the enthusiastic modernist with “a view of  the infinite possibilities of  the 
art and remind us that there is no limit to the horizon, and that nothing – no 
‘method’, no experiment, even of  the wildest – is forbidden, but only falsity and 
pretence” (ibid.).  
These words and the unbridled enthusiasm for the ostensibly new project for 
literature upon which they alight are perhaps exceedingly familiar to contemporary 
readers of  Woolf  and of  modernism more generally. We recall them here, however, to 
recast their significance vis-à-vis the renewal of  materialism as an aesthetic problem in 
To the Lighthouse. Above, we suggested that questions about this aesthetic materialism 
address both the formal limits and the historical development of  the novel as a genre. 
This is because Woolf  makes explicit the premise that her father had left for the most 
part implicit: that materialism really concerns how language may be used. Obviously 
the words of  the philosopher involve epistemological commitments and constraints 
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from which the words of  the novelist are freed; but it clearly is the case, for Woolf, 
that there is an urgently relevant distinction to be made between language that 
conveys life most fully and language which is false or which dissimulates its falsity by 
pretension and artifice. It may well be the case that Woolf  was motivated to elaborate 
this distinction in order to preserve the domain of  fiction from the scorn that 
Stephen pours on the “empty words” and “meaningless phrases” of  misguided 
philosophers. In any event, it’s possible to see the writer of  “Modern Fiction” 
directing her energy toward this preservation by presenting forms of  language that 
abstract too far from the experience of  reality which they have aimed, and which 
novelists historically have always aimed, at reproducing – in a manner analogous to 
Stephen’s materialist whose words are empty because they aim at representing a reality 
devoid of  all subjectivity. “Pretense” in this sense stands as much for falsity, or in fact 
giving falsehood and artifice the appearance of  the true, as it does for the techniques 
and traditions handed down by novelists putting accepted principles into practice: 
“the writer seems constrained, not by his own free will but by some powerful and 
unscrupulous tyrant who has him in thrall, to provide a plot, to provide comedy, 
tragedy, love interest, and an air of  probability embalming the whole so that if  all his 
figures were to come to life they would find themselves dressed down to the last 
button of  their coats in the fashion of  the hour” (149). It is no accident that such 
fiction only manages to portray corpses embalmed or dolls in want of  life; Woolf ’s 
repeated association of  materialist fiction with clothing or fashion – as in the “ill-
89 
 
fitting vestments” it provides for its subject matter or here in the “fashion of  the 
hour” come alive – is likewise telling. It betrays the materialist fixation on seemly 
surfaces, and condemns the writer whose work is no different from that of  the 
mortician who paints and dresses a cadaver.  
Once materialism has been recast into a problem about the aesthetic validity of  
language in literature, we can see more clearly how it co-implicates form and history 
in the genre of  the novel.  “Modern Fiction” presents an argument about how novels 
have been written and how they ought now to be written in order to endure (it is 
Woolf, as we saw above, who must hypothetically “extend” her consciousness beyond 
simple awareness of  the present in order to form judgments about works like Baring’s 
novel C, presumably alongside the novels of  Bennett and his ilk, which “won’t exist in 
2026”). But we also see that the very concept of  the novel is open to critical reflection 
and practical negotiation. The questions with which Woolf  opens her critique of  
materialism in fiction (“Is life like this? Must novels be like this? [ibid.]) are answered 
with a resounding “no.” The historical position of  the novel in thrall to tradition and 
false language can be rectified formally by recognizing “the infinite possibilities of  the 
art.” This exuberance about the possibilities of  the modern novel is inevitably linked 
with a conception of  the formal boundaries of  the novel as such.  
It’s this, finally, that returns us to a consideration of  abstraction, now 
transformed from an epistemological into an aesthetic technique, and perhaps as well 
a destiny for modern art. We said above that the epistemological status of  abstraction 
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in Stephen’s empiricist account of  knowledge – which insists on the admissibility of  
knowledge based on abstraction from my consciousness but not from consciousness 
or subjectivity tout court – anticipates the complex status of  abstraction in Woolf ’s 
fiction and criticism. It has generally been thought that strategy of  the novel is to 
depict in robust realistic detail the lives of  individuals; more generally speaking, it has 
been thought that the notion of  “experience” inheres in narrative as a category (and 
so encompassing narratives both true and fictional). Such inherence explains what 
makes narratives intelligible as narratives, as reports about events and actions 
unfolding in time, opposed to the ostensibly non-narrative realm of, say, mathematical 
formulae and empty, undifferentiated temporal continuums.55  And it is abstraction in 
language, which entails the construction in fiction of  a “view from no one,” that we 
will argue is the central aesthetic problem faced by To the Lighthouse. And it’s a problem 
because it will come to seem both intrinsic to the novel as a form and, at the same 
time, to risk repeating the errors of  materialist pretense, pretending that death is life. 
It might even come to seem that this pretense, the ornament applied to a world 
emptied of  life, is indistinguishable from the very nature of  art.  
                                                 
55 These characterizations of the novel and of narrative more broadly construed mask issues of considerable 
historical and conceptual complexity – so considerable that entire sub-disciplines of (predominantly) literary study 
have grown around the questions and problems attendant on the categories here invoked. It is not my aim to 
downplay the complexity of a category like narrative or the discipline devoted to its study, narratology, nor to 
impose unwanted and over-general “definitions” of the novel and so to mute the discussions about the history of the 
novel that have developed from the accounts of critics Ian Watt and Michael McKeon to the present (Franco 
Moretti’s idiosyncratic project of reformulating this history deserves mention in this light). On the other hand, the 
generality of the claim being made here – i.e., that both the novel as a historical artistic genre and narrative as a 
category (structural/socio-cultural/semantic/cognitive, or whatever the case may be) have deep and perhaps even 
irreducible relations to familiar versions of the concept of experience.  
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It might be tempting to see Woolf ’s writing as part of  a more general critique 
of  abstraction in service of  preserving the immediacy of  life, feeling, experience, or 
sensation. There are canonical views of  modernist art that place it squarely in relation 
to a philosophical traditions that were motivated primarily by the effort to rectify the 
abstraction of  experience effected either by pernicious forms of  concept-governed 
rationality (as in Nietzsche or Bergson) or by the realization of  abstraction that 
accompanied the onset of  capitalist modernity (as in Marx or Weber).56 This view sees 
in modernism, or at least in certain of  its most notorious exemplars, the goal of  
achieving the “direct recovery of  immediate experience and the invention of  new 
forms that reorder experience” (Schwarz 50). We will see that the status of  abstraction 
in Woolf ’s fiction, however, is a matter of  some complexity. If  truly everything is now 
to be the “proper stuff  of  fiction,” then extreme experimentation with the 
presentation of  experience in the novel is licensed – and it’s not even clear that 
“experience” remains an absolute constraint upon what’s possible in the novel. The 
critic Stephen Kern has recently provided a brief  but useful account of  To the 
Lighthouse in relation to modernist textual abstraction, which he believes to be “the 
most revolutionary stylistic development of  the modernist period.”57 Woolf, Kern 
notes, “never wrote an abstract novel,” presumably because he supposes total 
                                                 
56 A good source for the philosophical critique of abstraction vis-à-vis experience around the turn of the century is 
Schwartz, Sanford. The Matrix of Modernism: Pound, Eliot, and Early 20th-Century Thought. Princeton: Princeton 
UP, 1985. Schwartz’s explanation focuses predominantly on Nietzsche, Bergson, William James, and the British 
Hegelian F.H. Bradley.  
57 Kern, Stephen. The Modernist Novel: A Critical Introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2011. p. 167 
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abstraction to be impossible in the novel form: “abstract art avoids the clichés 
associated with conventional themes and familiar objects, but literature can never 
entirely dispense with words or replace recognizable subject matter” (ibid.). All the 
same, Woolf  “invokes the abstractionist position in To the Lighthouse.” She refers in her 
diary to “Time Passes,” the characterless middle section of  the novel, as “the most 
difficult abstract piece of  writing” which presents “the passage of  time, all eyeless and 
featureless with nothing to cling to” (172).58 Since the section is not, in Kern’s eyes, 
abstract, it is better understood as “abstractionist.” He goes on to describe the art of  
the painter Lily Briscoe in terms of  its abstractness (it is more exactly post-
Impressionist) and its effort, analogous to Woolf ’s own literary one, to “get hold 
of  … that very jar on the nerves, the thing itself  before it has been made anything” 
(ibid.).59 But here there is something unclear in Kern’s admittedly quite brief  
assessment of  Woolf ’s “abstractionism.” Lily’s thought highlights quite explicitly the 
discrepancy between the thing itself, whatever it is that scores consciousness in the 
very moment of  this scoring, and the artistic process of  making that performs an 
abstraction of  its own. We might be tempted to call the representation of  that thing 
itself  abstract when it departs in some radical way from the artistic codes and 
conventions that have governed ostensibly non-abstract, mimetic art, as in the single 
brushstroke of  a tree or the purple triangle of  Mrs. Ramsay in Lily’s own painting. But 
                                                 
58 Bell, ed. The Diary of Virginia Woolf, Volume Three 76 
59 Woolf, To the Lighthouse 193.  
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perhaps in Lily’s understanding of  her work we find a tension within abstraction itself. 
Is the work of  making art capturing or destroying that thing she seeks? Is she 
depicting reality at its most elemental, breaking with the banalities of  tradition and 
verisimilitude, or embalming life on the canvas?  
 
Excursus: Abstraction and Experience  
We have now encountered a few times the idea that experience forms the outer 
conceptual and practical constraint on the prospects for abstract art, and especially the 
prospects for the composition of  an abstract novel. It would be far beyond the scope 
of  the present argument to examine this idea in any detail or with any historical or 
critical accuracy. We won’t be sidetracked too far, however, if  we pause to consider 
how experience was understood to play a role in the genesis and formalization of  
abstract art around the turn of  the last century, according to two important and 
philosophically astute critics – one writing at the cusp of  the arrival of  avant-gardism 
in the novel and one assessing the place of  nonrepresentational painting in the 
contemporary artworld (and by extension the canon of  European painting). What 
follows is a brief  and unlikely comparison that should serve to illuminate the stakes of  
abstraction in Woolf ’s work – particularly the recurrence, throughout To the Lighthouse, 
of  an image of  the world without a self, a view from no one around which the only 
narrative that might coalesce is the bare passage of  time – whose attitude toward its 
own acts of  making are sometimes surprisingly ambivalent.    
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One of  the most influential proto-modernist descriptions of  the novel belongs 
to the Hungarian philosopher Gyorgy Lukács, who in his postwar (1920) work Theory 
of  the Novel famously wrote that “the novel is the epic of  a world that has been 
abandoned by God. The novel hero's psychology is the mature man's knowledge that 
meaning can never penetrate reality, but that, without meaning, reality would 
disintegrate into the nothingness of  inessentiality.”60 Lukács elaborates a vision of  
modernity that would today be recognized in terms of  its proximity to the so-called 
“secularization thesis:” that is, the notion that European modernity as a historical, 
cultural, and intellectual category can be defined by its translation or transposition of  
archaic religious sources into secular, hence modern, analogues.61 Within this 
interpretive framework, the novel, as the modern literary form par excellence, becomes 
the cultural record of  a world devoid of  transcendent, divinely authorized meaning, 
which world in turn ironically sanctions the “demonic,” fallen individual's attempts to 
reinscribe meaning. This description of  the novel depends on a specifically modern 
conception of  the world as bewilderingly meaningless or chaotic, waiting to be 
formed and ordered by a merely surrogate God. (Actually, Woolf ’s vision of  the world 
– what she at one point thinks of  in terms of  a genuine philosophy, is already not so 
                                                 
60 Lukács, Gyorgy. The Theory of the Novel. Trans. Anna Bostock. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1974.  
61Among the most prominent “secularization” claims belong to Feuerbach, Weber, and Löwith; more recent versions 
of the origins of modern scientific rationality from ecclesiastical or theological sources include Funkenstein, Amos. 
Theology and the Scientific Imagination from the Middle Ages to the 17th Century. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1986 
and Gaukroger, Stephen. The Emergence of a Scientific Culture: Science and the Shaping of Modernity, 1210-1685. 
Oxford: Oxford, UP 2009. See also Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age.  
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far from ideas of  the sort that Lukács proposes. In her memoir “Sketches of  the 
Past”, she refers to “what I might call a philosophy; at any rate … a constant idea of  
mine; […] that the whole world is a work of  art; that we are parts of  the work of  art. 
Hamlet or a Beethoven quartet is the truth about this vast mass that we call the world. 
But there is no Shakespeare, there is no Beethoven; certainly and emphatically there is 
no God; we are the words; we are the music; we are the thing itself ” [Woolf  1985, 
72]). The experience of  this world, as the experience of  modernity, is what structures 
the adventures of  the novel's hero: “the content of  the novel is the story of  the soul 
that goes to find itself ” (89). In Lukács's analysis, therefore, the metaphysics of  the 
novel (its representation of  the modern protagonist's formation of  an intrinsically 
formless world) is expressed most distinctly in the category of  experience. The novel 
not only reproduces formally and stylistically the vagaries of  an individual's conscious 
awareness of  her worldly milieu, but claims to record that individual's “gaining” of  
experience as an increased capacity to understand and to negotiate that milieu (since 
experience, as Martin Jay notes in his intellectual history of  the concept, likewise 
“connote(s) a worldliness that has left innocence behind by facing and surmounting 
the dangers and challenges that life may present”). 62 
 It is remarkable that at the other end of  modernism as an international 
movement in the visual arts, the great critic Clement Greenberg would rely on a 
                                                 
62Jay, Martin. Songs of Experience: Modern American and European Variations on a Universal Theme. Berkeley, 
CA: U of California P, 2005. p. 10 
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conception of  art surprisingly similar to the young Lukacs's in order to describe not 
the faithful realization of  modern individualistic experience in art but precisely its 
revocation in avant-garde abstraction. But even at the height of  abstraction, painterly 
abstraction will draw at least implicitly on the contents of  conscious experience. In his 
influential essay “Avant-Garde and Kitsch,” published in the Partisan Review in 1939, 
Greenberg explains that 
“[i]t has been in search of  the absolute that the avant-garde has arrived at 
'abstract' or  'nonobjective' art – and poetry, too. The avant-garde poet or artist 
tries in effect to imitate God by creating something valid solely on its own 
terms, in the way nature itself  is valid, in the way a landscape – not its picture – 
is aesthetically valid; something given, increate, independent of  meanings, 
similars, or originals. Content is to be dissolved so completely into form that 
the work of  art or literature cannot be reduced in whole or in part to anything 
not itself.”63 
Greenberg goes on to conclude that “the genesis of  the abstract” is effected when the 
“absolute” sought by the artist in her characteristically modern attempt to detach her 
work from the bourgeois sensibilities of  the public sphere64 is recognized to be a 
                                                 
63 Greenberg, Clement. “Avant Garde and Kitsch,” in The Collected Essays and Criticism, Volume 1: Perceptions 
and Judgments, 1939-1944. Ed. John O’Brien. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1986. p. 8 
64 (Greenberg 7-8); in Greenberg's view, there is a kind of originally political motivation behind the formation of the 
avant-garde, even if (1) this remains a more or less negative moment (as Greenberg writes of “the first settlers of 
bohemia,” “without the circulation of revolutionary ideas in the air about them, they would never have been able to 
isolate their concept of the “bourgeois” in order to define what they were not” [7]), and (2) this political moment is 
essentially repudiated by an avant-garde that ultimately demanded total detachment from base social and cultural 
values in the name of true art. 
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paradoxically relative absolute – it is an absolute conceived by and in art, within its 
autonomous terrain – “and so [the artist] turns out to be imitating, not God … but 
the disciplines and processes of  art and literature themselves” (8). This imitation turns 
away from the world of  experience, but it also sets for itself  a constraint in the name 
of  “aesthetic validity.”65 Since it can no longer draw on either the public sphere and its 
politics or on the familiar orders of  everyday experience for its constraint, it must find 
its organizational principles immanently, in the very processes of  creation: “this 
constraint, once the world of  common, extroverted experience has been renounced, 
can only be found in the very processes or disciplines by which art and literature have already 
imitated the former. These themselves become the subject matter of  art and literature.”66 
The great modernists of  both visual art and literature ought to be understood, on 
Greenberg's account, of  adhering to an “imitation of  imitation.” 
 What we should note is that Lukács and Greenberg place “experience” in 
similar positions at the heart of  their explanatory endeavors, in order to draw distinct 
conclusions about the art of  the modern world.  There is a shared conviction that art 
– whether in the form of  a novel or a painting – is to be understood in terms of  how 
                                                 
65Greenberg's use of the terminology of “aesthetic validity” (8), along with the fact that he appears to accept 
whatever sort of validity this may be as prima facie uncontroversial, perhaps demands a longer remark than can be 
accommodated here. A charitable interpretation of this notion might go something like this: we take it for granted 
that not all objects are worthy of the name art; if we view some objects as deserving the kind of consideration and 
attention that we by custom grant to artworks, then it follows that that object possesses some kind of “aesthetic 
validity.” In this sense, saying of something that it is art is already to make an aesthetic judgment. (This 
interpretation helps to make some sense of Greenberg's claim, I think, though it leaves much detail obscure – 
perhaps above all the tricky question about whether aesthetic validity is an intrinsic or a formal property of an 
artwork or whether it is merely communally agreed upon or bestowed by some external agent, like an “artworld” 
and whatever institutions the latter may comprise.)   
66 Ibid. Emphasis added.  
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and whether it enshrines or renounces experience; even the avant-garde renunciation 
of  experience in abstraction and non-representational artworks depends on a positive 
conception of  experience imitated in art just in order for the process of  that imitation 
to be purified of  subject matter (for Greenberg, this is true of  both visual and literary 
modernism; he includes in his account painters from Picasso and Kandinsky to Klee 
and Cézanne who “derive inspiration from the medium they work in,” exhibiting a 
“pure preoccupation with the invention and arrangement of  spaces, surfaces, shapes, 
colors, etc., to the exclusion of  whatever is not necessarily implicated in these factors,” 
as well as poets like Pound, Hart Crane, Stevens, and Mallamé [“even...Yeats”] whose 
work is supposedly “centered … on the 'moments' themselves of  poetic creation, 
rather than on experience to be converted into poetry”67). 
  We have so far tried to develop an account that emphasizes the importance of  
the aesthetics of  abstraction in Woolf ’s fiction, and especially how the latter evolved 
as a response to the problem of  materialism in literature. It has been easy to see how 
in Woolf ’s eyes the latter is guilty of  destroying experience (and its attendant forms – 
consciousness, life, sensation, and so on). It is not the case, however, that Woolf  
                                                 
67(Greenberg 9). It is of no small importance that Greenberg appends the following caveat to this description of the 
modernist poets: “of course, this cannot exclude other preoccupations in their work, for poetry must deal with 
words, and words must communicate.” This communicative power is a threat to the power of poetry to effect 
genuine abstraction, mitigating its capacity to relate to its medium in the manner of supposedly “pure 
preoccupation” that Greenberg attributes to modernist painters. These are claims that will demand serious attention 
by any attempt, like mine, to delineate the theme of materialism in modernist literature, especially in modernist 
fiction (which, it can easily be argued, stands in an even more complexly mediated relationship to its medium than 
does poetry; as Ian Watt notes in his seminal account of “formal realism” in the novel, the latter depends on a “more 
largely referential use of language than is common in other literary forms” [Watt 32]).  
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would rectify materialism in the name of  experience alone, even if  her critical rhetoric 
typically suggests that this is precisely her aim. The fact remains that the destruction 
of  experience wrought by the materialists is not so easy for Woolf  to dispense with; in 
what follows, we will attempt to see why.  
 
The (Empty) Form of  the Sentence 
Around 1956, W.H. Auden wrote that “a sentence uttered makes a world appear 
/ where all things happen as it says they do.”68 The world-making power of  even the 
most banal of  sentences certainly seems to lie at the heart of  literary creation, but 
Woolf ’s feelings about sentences stand in some contrast to this picture of  things. In 
“Modern Fiction,” Woolf  warns modern writers that in order to capture the fleeting 
variation of  conscious life they ought strive “to convey this varying, this unknown and 
uncircumscribed spirit, whatever aberration or complexity it may display, with as little 
mixture of  the alien and external as possible” (Woolf  1984, 150). At the same time, in 
Woolf ’s eyes there exists the distinct and compelling worry that language is itself  
“alien and external” to what it labors ceaselessly to nail down. At the heart of  the 
sentence’s creative and constructive power is the eternal threat of  destruction; if  
sentences may make worlds appear, they may at the same time annihilate the life that 
belongs to that world. There are at least two senses in which it’s possible to think 
                                                 
68Auden, W.H. “Words,” in Collected Poems. New York: Vintage 1991. p. 624 
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about this linguistic destructiveness in Woolf: the first is literary-historical and the 
second is, for want of  a better word, metaphysical. In the first sense, the sentence as 
the bearer of  or the material for individual style poses a threat to artistic originality. In 
a diary entry dated the 8th of  April 1925, Woolf  records her characteristic and 
recurrent worry about the fate of  her work (in this instance, Mrs. Dalloway) after 
having read Proust for the first time: “I wonder if  this time I have achieved 
something? Well, nothing anyhow compared with Proust … and he will I suppose 
both influence me and make me out of  temper with every sentence of  my own” 
(Woolf  1980, 7). Here it is the Proustian sentence that is alien and external, not to life 
but to Woolf ’s own work, a foreign substance that threatens to incorporate itself  into 
the body of  Woolf ’s prose.  
We encounter the stronger sense of  the destructive tendency of  the sentence 
and of  language more broadly in a later diary entry written during Woolf ’s preparation 
for composing To the Lighthouse. In a moment of  extraordinary significance for 
understanding Woolf ’s own attitudes toward both the process of  composition and the 
meaning of  her art, she devotes herself  in July 1926 to “writ[ing] the greatest book in 
the world.” She expands on the entailments of  this singular ambition in the following 
manner:  
“This is what the book would be that was made entirely [,] solely and with 
integrity of  one’s thoughts. Suppose one could catch them before they became 
‘works of  art.’? Catch them hot and sudden as they rise in the mind – walking 
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up Asheham hill for instance. Of  course one cannot; for the process of  
language is slow and deluding. One must stop to find a word; then, there is the 
form of  the sentence, soliciting one to fill it” (102).  
That idea about the “form of  the sentence,” empty and in want of  content, a figure 
of  both the demands of  writing and the distortion that written words exert on life, 
recurs in various forms throughout Woolf ’s writing. An early memoir, 
“Reminiscences,” seems to invoke it in anticipation of  the later complaint about the 
clothing-language of  the materialists: “written words of  a person who is dead or still 
alive tend most unfortunately to drape themselves in smooth folds annulling all 
evidence of  life” (Woolf  1985, 36).69 Another, less frequently cited assessment of  
modern fiction collected with “Modern Fiction” in The Common Reader, “How It 
Strikes a Contemporary,” complains that “book after book leaves us with the same 
sense of  promise unachieved, of  intellectual poverty, of  brilliance which has been 
snatched from life but not transmuted into literature. Much of  what is best in 
contemporary work has the appearance of  being noted under pressure, taken down in 
a bleak shorthand” (Woolf  1984, 237). Perhaps that “bleak shorthand” belonged to 
Woolf  herself: she was well familiar with the extreme contrast between the speed with 
which consciousness alters and the slowness of  the pen attempting to accomplish its 
alchemical transmutation into art. When in To the Lighthouse the novelist-surrogate Lily 
                                                 
69 Woolf, Virginia. “Reminiscences,” in Moments of Being. New York: Harcourt, 1985.  
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expresses the desire to genuinely, really, know Mrs. Ramsay, she can only think of  this 
knowledge in terms of  the obliteration of  any mediating relationship that language 
might introduce, for “it was not knowledge but unity that she desired, not inscriptions 
on tablets, nothing that could be written in any language known to men, but intimacy 
itself, which is knowledge” (Woolf  2005, 54). Hardly could a written character disdain 
more strongly the act of  creation that brought her, as it were, into being.  Lily’s wish 
to know “the thing itself ’ is among the clearest examples of  Woolf ’s own ideas about 
art and the difficulties to which it is exposed in its own making.  
But this difficulty only exists because of  the nature of  the relationship between 
language and life, which introduces a delay between the moment lived in its 
minuteness and the attempt to compose the former in writing, or which substitutes a 
concept for a feeling and so erases whatever it was that had originally motivated the 
substitution. At the moment of  creation, the destruction of  life is risked; perhaps it is 
unavoidable. At an important moment in Mrs. Dalloway, Clarissa Dalloway’s former 
lover Peter Walsh is walking around midday along Whitehall in London when a corps 
of  “boys in uniform, carrying guns” marches past him.70 The narrator’s free indirect 
discourse describes how Walsh sees “on their faces an expression like the letters of  a 
legend written round the base of  a statue praising duty, gratitude, fidelity, love of  
England” (Woolf  2003, 239). The laudatory language of  memorial statuary entombs 
                                                 
70 Woolf, Virginia. The Mrs. Dalloway Reader. Ed. Francine Prose. Orlando, FL: Harcourt, Inc., 2003. p. 239  
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the lives sacrificed in the name of  heroic duty and patriotism; it’s the same language, 
perhaps, that will suffuse the imagination of  Mr. Ramsay pacing around the Ramsay’s 
home on Skye, fretting about his work and his legacy while occasionally clamoring the 
words of  Tennyson’s “Charge of  the Light Brigade.” The thought of  young men sent 
to their doom – “someone had blundered” – occasions for Ramsay the justification of  
his own worry about the future of  his philosophical fame tinged with the fantasy of  a 
heroic death that might live on in song. “It is permissible even for a dying hero to 
think before he dies how men will speak of  him hereafter,” Ramsay thinks. And 
“Who then could blame the leader of  that forlorn party which after all has 
climbed high enough to see the waste of  the years and the perishing of  stars, if  
before death stiffens his limbs beyond the power of  movement he does a little 
consciously raise his numbed fingers to his brown, and square his shoulders, so 
that when the search party comes they will find him dead at his post, the fine 
figure of  a solider? (…) Who shall blame him, if, so standing for a moment, he 
dwells upon fame, upon search parties, upon cairns raised by grateful followers 
over his bones?”(Woolf  2005, 39).  
Ramsay imagines his own mortification, his afterlife as a statue, and wonders if  the 
words he has left behind can adequately portray the reality of  his philosophical genius. 
The narrator of  Mrs. Dalloway, describing the young soldiers on Whitehall marching 
past Peter Walsh, “weedy for the most part, boys of  sixteen,” leads readers toward 
similar conclusions about the value of  words chiseled onto monuments. Their 
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marching suggests to Peter that they move as if  “one will worked arms and legs 
uniformly, and life, with its varieties, its irreticences, had been laid under a pavement 
of  monuments and wreaths and drugged into a stiff  yet staring corpse by 
discipline … There they go, thought Peter Walsh … and all the exalted statues, 
Nelson, Gordon, Havelock, the black, the spectacular images of  great soldiers stood 
looking ahead of  them, as if  they too had made the same renunciation” (Woolf  2003, 
239-40). The narrative view that observes the eradication of  life in the soldiers’ 
disciplined march, that sees them mirrored by the statues lining the street, is certainly 
a melancholic one; it finds in the words of  poets and sculptors that might praise duty, 
heroism, and love of  country only an elegy for the walking dead.  
 These images of  lifeless materiality that pervade Woolf ’s writing about writing 
– corpses, statues, rock cairns – are especially revealing. Above, we supposed that the 
central aesthetic problem in To the Lighthouse (which we have here seen anticipated in 
Mrs. Dalloway, as well) revolved around the problematic status of  abstraction. Here we 
see Ramsay imagining a world without himself  in it, which is again both a formal 
exercise in abstraction (as in Leslie Stephen’s hypothetical extension of  his own 
consciousness) and a historical anxiety about the act of  writing and the precarious 
place of  written work in the world. But it’s tempting to wonder whether these images 
betray an even deeper worry that materialism might exhaust the scope of  the novel or 
even art as such, given its reliance on the magic of  making the dead come alive, and its 
construction of  a literally “spectacular” world in which statues have quickened eyes 
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with which to look ahead. Towards the conclusion of  the lengthy dinner scene in 
“The Window,” the opening section of  To the Lighthouse, the narrator is focalizing 
through Mrs. Ramsay, who as always is attuned to the shifting moods of  her husband. 
Finding him to be “in great spirits tonight,” her attention wanders to the “window in 
which the candle flames burnt brighter now that the panes were black;” and at this 
moment, “looking at that outside the voices came to her very strangely, as if  they were 
voices in a service in a cathedral, for she did not listen to the words.” Her husband 
begins reciting a poem – “he was repeating something, and she knew it was poetry 
from the rhythm and the ring of  exultation, and melancholy in his voice ... The words 
(she was looking out the window) sounded as if  they were floating like flowers on 
water out there, cut off  from them all, as if  no one had said them, but they had come 
into existence of  themselves” (112). Perhaps this is the perfect image of  the tension 
Woolf  finds in her literary language: abstract sound without meaning, voiced by no 
one, uncreated, appearing in the world as might any other object one could find 
floating on the waves, but no less expressive of  the power of  language – especially, 
perhaps, in Woolf ’s reconfiguration of  narrative language – to fix a moment or to 
make a scene. Mrs. Ramsay feels though the words, even though “she did not know 
what they meant,” seemed “to be spoken by her own voice, outside herself.” When 
the voice stops and the party begins to disperse, Mrs. Ramsay rises to leave but waits 
on the room’s threshold for “a moment longer in a scene which was vanishing even as 
she looked, and then, as she moved and took Minta’s arm and left the room, it 
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changed, it shaped itself  differently; it had become, she knew, giving one last look at it 
over her shoulder, already the past” (113-14).   
Earlier in To the Lighthouse, the two “allies” Lily Briscoe and William Bankes – 
artist and scientist, among the Ramsays's circle of  friends and family on holiday in 
Scotland – are discussing the Ramsays and their children during an evening walk. The 
words exchanged are left mostly unreported by the narrator's free indirect discourse, 
and the difficulty in discerning which of  the characters's thoughts might be left 
unvoiced serves to establish early on the often tenuous boundary that the novel draws 
between the public and the private. We know, for instance that Bankes expresses 
something about his childhood friend Mr. Ramsay in this conversation, because we are 
provided with a rare direct quotation of  Lily's response (entreating Bankes to “think 
of  his work!”). But whether Bankes's questions about the brilliant but flawed Ramsay 
(“What would a stranger think now? What did this Lily Briscoe think? Could one help 
noticing that habits grew on him? Eccentricities, weaknesses perhaps? It was 
astonishing that a man of  his intellect could stoop so low as he did – but that was too 
harsh a phrase –  could depend so much as he did upon people's praise” [26]) unfold 
fully in conversation, or whether they form part of  a private reflection, is difficult if  
not impossible to decide. “What did this Lily Briscoe think?” might be the narrative 
representation of  a question that Bankes addresses to Lily: “what do you think?” The 
use of  the determiner “this” to pick out Lily Briscoe, on the other hand, suggests an 
inner voice that Bankes keeps, at least in part, to himself. 
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 In any case, what Lily does “think” is a matter of  considerably more complexity 
than might initially be imagined.  Soon after Lily reminds Bankes of  Ramsay's 
philosophical brilliance (and by doing so betraying her memorable conception about 
the contrary objects of  art and philosophy: “naturally,” she supposes, “if  one's days 
were passed in this seeing of  angular essences, this reducing of  lovely evenings, with 
all their flamingo clouds and blue and silver..., naturally one could not be judged like 
an ordinary person” [27]),  their conversation about how to judge Ramsay's character 
is for Lily interrupted by a judgment of  a different sort. In a seeming flash, Lily is 
overcome with affection for the older Bankes, respectable and fine, whose demeanor 
is the perfect counterpoint to Ramsay's demanding eccentricity and self-absorption. 
Narrative time slows to capture in fine detail the catalogue of  Lily's impressions 
during this moment of  affection. “Suddenly, as if  the movement of  [Bankes's] hand 
had released it,” says the narrator, “the load of  her accumulated impressions of  him 
tilted up, and down poured in a ponderous avalanche all she felt about him. That was 
one sensation. Then up rose in a fume the essence of  his being. That was another” 
(27).  
 This accumulation of  impressions adds further emphasis to the problematic 
boundary between the public and the private that has been playing out over the course 
of  the passage. Our words for feeling are, of  course, publicly available; when 
someone says that they “like” another – as Lily certainly does “like” Bankes, even if  as 
she articulates this feeling to herself  she “simultaneously” remembers “how he had 
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brought a valet all the way up here; objected to dogs on chairs; would prose for 
hours...about salt in vegetables and the iniquity of  English cooks” (28) –they know 
that what liking means is also a matter of  knowing how the words “to like” are 
properly used and publicly defined. On the other hand, Lily is vexed by the 
multiplicity of  private impressions, memories, and ideas that ultimately lead one to use 
public words to denote some elusive and often fleeting inner feeling; she asks herself  
“how then did it work out all this? How did one judge people, think of  them? How 
did one add up this and that and conclude that it was liking one felt, or disliking? And 
to those words, what meaning attached, after all?” (28). Here the problem of  making 
the private public, and of  understanding the private meanings and impressions behind 
even the most trivial uses of  everyday language, makes itself  felt. 
 The metaphor chosen by the narrator to describe this state of  affairs is 
therefore especially important, and will serve to indicate how this negotiation of  the 
distinction between the public and the private is intrinsically related to the question of  
materialism in Woolf. Immediately upon asking herself  how one “add[s] up this and 
that” to articulate feeling in public domain of  communicative discourse, Lily stands 
“transfixed” as “impressions poured in upon her of  those two men [i.e., Bankes and 
Ramsay], and to follow her thoughts,” the narrator tells us, “was like following a voice 
which speaks too quickly to be taken down by one's pencil...” [28]. There is something 
almost contradictory in this description of  the speed and elusiveness of  Lily's 
thought, especially since the narrator has just shown in some detail the order of  Lily's 
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impressions of  liking Bankes (even if  the duration of  these fully individuated 
impressions in narrative time remains unclear). Of  no small importance, however, is 
the role that even the technology of  writing – here, the pencil – plays. The private 
contours of  Lily’s experience remain private at least in part because they are physically 
inaccessible; they cannot be inscribed into some external material support (hence 
made public) because the speed of  their unfolding outstrips the fairly primitive writing 
technology of  a pencil manipulated, and constrained, by a human hand. In other 
words, it is not just the sentence as such but also writing technology that here serves 
to articulate the difference between the public and the private. The metaphor appears 
to suggest that if  a system capable of  transcribing the speed and the quality of  Lily’s 
thought were available, a central condition of  publicity would thereby be met. As 
such, the quality and the experience of  thinking and feeling are linked to and mediated 
by the capacity of  these thoughts and feelings to be mechanically recorded or 
reproduced. 
 Conspicuous by their absence, therefore, are the new sorts of  “writing” 
technologies that could adequately have served to record and store the “voice” of  
Lily’s thought. Given this conspicuous absence, it is tempting, and perhaps necessary, 
to understand this textual sequence in the light of  the “historic shift” around 1900 
that the philosopher and media theorist Friedrich Kittler describes as a movement 
“from imagination to data processing, from the arts to the particulars of  information 
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technology and physiology.”71 In his major work Discourse Networks 1800/1900, Kittler 
articulates this thesis of  a historic shift (or what he also calls a “paradigm shift,” 
adopting the explicitly Kuhnian term of  art that makes the meaning of  this shift72 – 
no mere contingent historical variation – emphatic) in expansive theoretical and 
archival detail which, in some of  its particulars, is directly relevant to an understanding 
of  Woolf's scene of  imagined inscription. Despite the fact that Kittler's literary 
sources are predominantly (but not always) German, the technical and medial 
landscape that he portrays can certainly be adapted to discussions of  international 
modernism generally and British modernism particularly, as several critics have made 
clear.73 
Michael North, for example, has argued that “beginning with photography, (…) 
[new] recording media pose a fundamental challenge to literature and the arts, 
confusing writing and images by confounding the seemingly elementary distinction 
between language and perception.” On this basis, North goes on to suggest that even 
“Modernism itself, as a panartistic movement, begins with the critical interrogation of  
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the relationship between text and image, brought equally into literature and the visual 
arts by mechanical recording.”74 (Camera Works 11-12). The images of  thinking and 
feeling, which To the Lighthouse portrays in Lily's attempt to process the inner 
complexity of  associations and impressions linked with a single word, are constructed 
in part by the media technology that are available to represent them; the boundaries 
of  the private are not historically absolute, as they are technologically and materially 
demarcated. This demarcation indexes the modernism of  To the Lighthouse to the 
massive shifts in media technology that occurred around the turn of  the century. 
Woolf  was by no means immune from contemporary excitement about a 
technological future that might completely revise our understanding of  consciousness 
and the mind, as when she imagines a “wireless of  memory” capable of  returning a 
past seemingly lost forever back to present experience:  
“Is it not possible – I often wonder – that things we have felt with great 
intensity have an existence independent of  our minds; are in fact still in 
existence? And if  so, will it not be possible, in time, that some device will be 
invented by which we can tap them? I see it – the past – as an avenue lying 
behind; a long ribbon of  scenes, emotions. (…) Instead of  remembering here a 
scene and there a sound, I shall fit a plug into the wall; and listen in to the past. 
I shall turn up August 1890. I feel that strong emotion must leave its trace; and 
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it is only a question of  discovering how we can get ourselves attached to it, so 
that we shall be able to live our lives through from the start” (Woolf  1985, 67). 
It might be more appropriate, though, to see in this fantasy of  technological access to 
the past as it was actually lived less a sheer enthusiasm for the powers of  recording 
machines than a thinly veiled reflection on the novel, and the destruction at the heart 
of  its creative power to fix the past in view. It may be the case that if  every elemental 
feeling is floating around in the subjectless world of  matter, and if  such feelings can 
be transmitted by machine, then the purview of  the modern novel would be 
eradicated; this is a clue, it might be supposed, to why Woolf  describes a future in 
which bad novels aren’t merely unread but non-existent. These ideas about 
technological innovation and the physicality or substantial existence of  intense 
feelings are as much a part of  Woolf ’s picture of  the novel itself  as they are genuine 
speculations about the future of  wireless devices. If  anything, they make the 
boundaries and the possibilities of  the form more concrete and more urgent a 
concern for the writer. The image of  physical matter and its technological 
manipulation that it projects can easily stand for the risks and the promises of  fiction 
addressed to modern life.   
Accordingly, it would be misleading to dissolve too completely the separation 
between the mental and the material that this passage enacts. Indeed, there is a tension 
between two interpretations that Lily's unwritten inner voice licenses. Either it is the 
case that this inner voice demands more advanced forms of  technological 
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representation, or it will always be held partially in reserve, inaccessible by pencil and 
sound recording alike. We have tried to demonstrate that in Woolf ’s view the latter is 
the case. However compelling the attempts on the part of  theorists of  modernism 
and media to promote a vision of  the modern novel mediated by its ostensibly 
material conditions, they miss the complexity and the ambivalence with which a writer 
like Woolf  negotiates the problem of  materialism. If  they are eager to demonstrate 
how the real conditions of  the technological and media landscape affect, mediate, and 
constitute, in various ways, they risk missing the nuance with which Woolf  has 
likewise tried to understand the nature of  modern fiction. In another of  To the 
Lighthouse’s important early passages, the issues which are central to this attempt are 
dramatized around the status of  objects of  memory. Recalling friends, the Mannings, 
that Mrs. Ramsay had not seen in fifteen years, she imagines herself  as a ghostly 
presence in a scene (Herbert Manning killing a wasp with a teaspoon) that “was still 
going on,” that in other words has some real, independent existence apart from its 
being remembered. “Now” Mrs. Ramsay “went among them like a host; and it 
fascinated her, as if, while she had changed, that particular day, now become very still 
and beautiful, had remained there, all these years” (Woolf  2005, 89-90). If  it seems to 
Mrs. Ramsay not only “out of  the question” but genuinely “impossible” that the 
Mannings are building a new billiard room, as Mr. Bankes reports, this is because her 
vision of  the past does not allow for it to co-exist with the present unless its stillness 
and beauty should be irretrievably lost. Woolf ’s fantasy of  a wireless of  memory is 
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therefore only part of  a broader and more complicated attempt to understand the 
manner in which the novel both preserves and annihilates experience. The machine 
that “turns up” August 1890 and Mrs. Ramsay’s displeasure at the “extraordinary” 
thought that “they had been capable of  going on living all these years when she had 
not thought of  them more than once all that time” are, if  anything, part of  the set of  
metaphors and concepts that Woolf ’s work deploys when implicitly or explicitly 
describing itself.   
Precisely this complex self-description, characteristically paired with anxieties 
about her reputation, her originality, and her capacity to endure among the great 
works of  English letters collided with the conceptual obstacles she thought to inhere 
in literary language on the 5th of  May, 1927, the day on which To the Lighthouse was 
published. On that day Woolf  sent Vita Sackville-West a dummy edition of  her newly 
published work – a cover for To the Lighthouse enclosing a few hundred blank pages. 
She inscribed the gift with the following message, which she later worried anxiously 
might not be taken for the joke that it was intended to be: “in my opinion, the best 
novel that I have ever written.”75 Woolf ’s biographer Hermione Lee remarks in 
passing that the dummy book serves as a “tempting image,” and while she herself  
expends little energy in thinking through the form and the meanings of  this image, it 
is impossible to disagree. (For her part, Lee only cites the memoir 1960 memoir of  
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François Mauriac, who explained that Woolf ’s novel of  blank pages was “not the 
product of  an author who had nothing more to say, but of  one who had too much,” 
and, cryptically, that “when I say too much, I mean in terms of  quality rather than 
quality”[Lee 478]76). We are now in a much better position to assess the image of  the 
dummy book with exactness. In one sense, it both makes explicit and undermines 
Woolf ’s claim in “Modern Fiction” that now fiction will be open to infinite possibility; 
if  we take her joke to Vita even slightly seriously, we see that her “best work” might 
also be her most extreme experiment, designed for no reader save one, which in its 
blank inertness expresses all of  the intractable problems Woolf  finds in the relation 
between life and literature. It forces abstraction to the limit of  absolute purity; no 
longer can it be claimed that life is to be found on the pages of  the dummy book, 
which renders it at the same time aesthetically invalid (though only arguably so, since 
Woolf ’s joke anticipates even the most demanding tests of  the limits of  art like 
readymades and blank canvases) and the most apt picture of  the obstacles the modern 
novel must overcome. The joke characteristically reveals much about the joker; in this 
case, we have to recall that one of  Woolf ’s favored metaphors for artistic creation is 
“transmutation,” i.e., the alchemical process of  transforming base metals into gold. 
The dummy copy of  To the Lighthouse betrays every anxiety about the possibility of  
failed transmutation; it is inert matter as the remainder of  failed experiment and 
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effort. It is simultaneously the purest image of  Woolf ’s anti-materialism and the apex 
of  materialist literature, the empty, dead, and unreadable codex.  
 When we read To the Lighthouse and find its insistence on returning again and 
again to the image of  the world void of  subjectivity or experience, only most visibly in 
“Time Passes,” it is tempting to see a melancholic reflection on human death and 
finitude. Woolf ’s characters often find themselves imagining the persistence of  the 
world once they are no longer alive to experience it; Mrs. Ramsay hears in “the 
monotonous fall of  the waves on the beach” the eventual “destruction of  the island 
and its engulfment in the sea” (20). Lily likewise feels at the sight of  the dunes a 
sadness, “partly because distant views seem to outlast by a million years … the gazer 
and to be communing already with a sky which beholds an earth entirely at rest” (24).  
Woolf ’s formally radical attempt to access in narrative these deaths and destructions 
that can be imagined (through something like Stephen’s “hypothetical extension” of  
consciousness) but not genuinely experienced occurs in “Time Passes,” when the 
house emptied of  life is subject to “the insensibility of  nature” (141) “(The long night 
seemed to have set in … the saucepan had rusted and the mat decayed,” [141]); during 
a span in which “night and day, month and year ran shapelessly together” (138). In 
this shapeless temporal continuum, “loveliness reigned and stillness, and together 
made the shape of  loveliness itself, a form from which life had parted” (133).  
 The beauty of  that empty form is remarkable because it achieves something – 
loveliness, stillness – that the formation of  life in art. Of  course this must be so 
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because the formation is really a transmutation, a change in nature. It’s a situation with 
which Woolf ’s surrogate Lily is well acquainted: the passage from vision to canvas and 
the nearly heroic effort one must make to avoid admixture of  whatever is alien and 
external to what one really sees. Lily “would not have considered it honest to tamper 
with the bright violet and the staring white” of  the jacmanna flower she is painting 
early in the novel, 
“since she saw them like that … then beneath the colour there was the shape. 
She could see it all so clearly, so commandingly, when she looked: it was when 
she took her brush in hand that the whole thing changed. It was in that 
moment’s flight between the picture and her canvas that the demons set on 
her … she often felt herself  – struggling against terrific odds to maintain her 
courage; to say: ‘But this is what I see; this is what I see,” and so to clasp some 
miserable remnant of  her vision to her breast, which a thousand forces did 
their best to pluck away from her” (22-3).  
No matter the strenuousness of  the artistic effort to capture the purity of  the vision 
as it is seen, Lily ultimately concludes, imagining that “jar on the nerves” that the 
“thing itself ” makes before it has been made into art, that “the human apparatus for 
painting or for feeling” was “a miserable machine, an inefficient machine … it always 
broke down at the critical moment; heroically, one must force it on” (196). We are by 
now familiar with how Lily’s struggle with paint on the blank canvas mirrors Woolf ’s 
own encounter with the form sentence waiting to be filled. And this gives us reason to 
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accord a different significance to the view from no one around which To the Lighthouse 
is constructed. The fascination that this eyeless sight holds for Woolf ’s narrator and 
her characters as much as for Woolf  herself  can be explained in numerous ways; it is 
certainly integral to the novel’s thematic presentation of  death and finitude, time and 
memory, and at the same time it draws on autobiographical elements of  the text, such 
as the thought of  Leslie Stephen and Woolf ’s interest in and acquaintance with the 
philosophical discussions circulating around Cambridge and Bloomsbury. What the 
present account wants to emphasize above all, though, is that “tempting image” of  
the dummy book that Virginia presented to Vita on the publication day of  To the 
Lighthouse. Its emptiness, and Woolf ’s worrisome joke that it was her “best work,” 
seem to be recognitions of  the extreme point at which the heroic effort to mercilessly 
subtract one’s self  from what one sees and even how one sees it, to effect the absolute 
simultaneity of  what is seen and what is made as a means of  eradicating the alien and 
the external in avoidance of  materialist falsity, terminates. It stands at once for the 
freedom of  infinite artistic possibilities, the form of  a sentence that can be filled in 
uncountable ways, and for the destruction wrought by literature on life. Above all, 
then, the view from no one belongs to the novel’s ambivalent self-description in the 
moment of  its historical and formal encounter with the artifice of  materialism; it 
reflects on the inextricably linked possibilities and risks of  the written work and 
supports a fantasy of  the purification of  form which it likewise recognizes in death. 
And, as such, it forms a kind of  elegy – not for man, but for literature – expressed as 
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the latter’s most extreme possibility if  not also its highest achievement.  
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CHAPTER 3 
THE POLITICAL AESTHETIC OF BETWEEN THE ACTS 
 
Very early in Virginia Woolf's last novel, Between the Acts, Isa Oliver reads the 
following newspaper account of a gang rape perpetrated by English soldiers at 
Whitehall, in London: “The troopers told her the horse had a green tail; but she found 
it was just an ordinary horse. And they dragged her up to the barrack room where she 
was thrown upon a bed. Then one of the troopers removed part of her clothing, and 
she screamed and hit him about the face....”77 “That was real,” thinks Isa, but 
unusually this reality appears to denote neither accurate and objective description nor 
a somehow privileged status enjoyed by the rape among other kinds of apparently less 
real things and events. Isa's use of the word “real” depends not on factual 
verisimilitude and even less on sensible spatio-temporal existence, the sorts of mind-
independent circumstances where the appropriateness of talk about reality would 
customarily seem to be at stake. Far from referring to something beyond the horizon 
of Isa's internal experience, the word “real” stands out because it is associated with 
the intensity of imagined vision that the report induces in her. Thus, at the same time 
that it emphasizes the “reality” of the attack, this passage defers exhaustively realistic 
description of it. Instead, it recounts the vividness of Isa's reaction to the article and 
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the peculiar quality of feeling associated with bearing purely internal witness to the 
attack. It tells us that something is real, but to warrant that assertion, it shows us 
something private and personal. There is something counter-intuitive in this. The 
newspaper's report is “so real that on the mahogany door panels she saw the Arch in 
Whitehall” (BA 20); so real that, as in a daydream, Isa withdraws mentally from the 
room in which she sits and becomes momentarily blind to her immediate 
surroundings. The surface of a door becomes a private screen on which Isa 
experiences, visually, the scene of the rape as it had been described by The Times. As 
though she were viewing a film, Isa's imagined perspective narrows from an external 
view of the barracks, through the arches and into the barrack room, and finally to the 
bed where she sees the girl “screaming and hitting him,” her attacker, “about the face.” 
This private scene is cut abruptly short when Isa's husband's aunt, Mrs. Swithin, 
enters the room through the same door. At this point, when Mrs. Swithin's entrance 
destroys the illusory vision playing out on the door's surface and returns Isa to her 
immediate surroundings, the narrator finds it necessary to parenthetically remark that 
the door is, “in fact,” a door. A noteworthy distinction is thereby drawn: between 
reality and fact, between the role played by the door in Isa's private reality and its 
wholly unremarkable, factual existence.  
Why is the word “real” used to characterize the quality of an experience that is 
both private and imagined as distinct from what happens, factually, to be the case? 
This important question has been largely, if not exclusively, overlooked in the 
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considerable critical attention devoted to this passage. This is due, in large part, to a 
pair of substantial details which have until now sustained the interest of those critics 
who find Isa's reading of The Times and its narration worthy of extended comment. 
The first of these is brief but resonant. Mrs. Swithin enters the room carrying a 
hammer that she has borrowed from her brother, Isa's father-in-law Bartholomew 
Oliver, without asking. Here the narrative focus shifts from Isa to Mrs. Swithin and, 
in particular, to the relation between sister and brother, Swithin and Oliver. Mrs. 
Swithin has been nailing a placard on the barn in anticipation of the village pageant, to 
be held that evening on the grounds of Pointz Hall, the family residence. This she 
reminds her brother, “giving him a little pat on the shoulder,” to calm his irritation at 
having his property disturbed. Thereupon the narrative focus returns to Isa and the 
attention she gives to the brief conversation that passes between Mrs. Swithin and Mr. 
Oliver. “The words,” Mrs. Swithin's explanation to her brother that she had been 
nailing the placard on the Barn, “were like the first peal of a chime of bells. As the 
first peals, you hear the second; as the second peals, you hear the third” (21). Every 
year the same conversation takes place: Mrs. Swithin mentions the pageant, Mr. Oliver 
responds, “By Jupiter! I'd forgotten,” and together they speculate about the weather, 
which will determine the location of the evening's activities (in the barn if it rains, on 
the terrace otherwise). Isa, presumably in something of a dark mood, hears the same 
words that she has heard “every summer, for seven summers now.” But unlike the 
conversations of the six summers past, there is something distinct about the seventh: 
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“The same chime followed the same chime, only this year beneath the chime she 
heard: 'The girl screamed and hit him about the face with a hammer'” (22).  
Isa's imagined insertion of a hammer into the Times account of the rape has 
invited thorough critical attention. Christine Froula describes the appearance of the 
hammer as a fantasy that “embellishes the girl's resistance,” such that “the Pointz Hall 
family becomes not just a microcosm of civilization's 'germ-cell' [as it might have 
been, Froula points out, for Freud] but a laboratory for small, everyday changes that 
may lead to greater ones.”78 Froula applauds Isa's political act; that she has placed the 
hammer in the raped girl's hands indicates how “the news story initiates [Isa's] private 
struggle toward speech and, by extension, calls women's desire and speech out from 
the crevices [...].” Isa thereby embodies, for Froula, “a sort of test case for the 
challenge of women's speech to civilization's masterplot” (Froula 296). In a similar 
vein, Gillian Beer, who argues that Woolf has placed “violence near the center of 
meaning” in Between the Acts, believes that “the mild old lady,” Mrs. Swithin, 
“momentarily becomes a figure of female vengeance,” since it was she who provided 
the source material – the hammer – for Isa's “fantasy enactment” of the rape.79 
Marina Mackay likewise describes Isa's “imaginative reconstruction of the past” as a 
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“fantasy...of violent defense,”80 and as a “violent appropriation” (Mackay 238) in the 
course of her more general argument that Woolf is the “foremost activist” for a mode 
of narration and social thought that “claims the possibility of reading the great 
through the small, of discerning public life from the private” (228). If “the hammer 
used to nail a placard for the pageant has become inseparable from its violent 
potential” (236), Isa's fantasy of violent of resistance is likewise inseparable from the 
general atmosphere of political violence; like Froula, Mackay identifies Isa's “fantasy” 
as a political act, even a necessary one, but one that regrettably departs from Woolf's 
earlier pacifist ideals. By articulating the possibility of resistance to the threats posed 
by war and fascism, Mackay argues, “Between the Acts acknowledges the necessary guilty 
compromise of its time: of, to borrow Cecil Day Lewis's contemporary formulation, 
defending the bad against the worse” (239). In this account, Isa's act is political 
because of its symbolic nature, because of the synecdochal relation that holds between 
an imaginary hammer and the presumably real form of resistance in the novel and 
beyond its boundaries.  
Finally, while Karin Westman cites but does not devote sustained attention to 
Isa's imagined hammer, her remarks on the historical and ideological function of the 
newspaper in Between the Acts81 share important thematic and methodological 
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assumptions with the preceding interpretations. For Westman, the newspaper both in 
the novel and in early 20th-century Britain offers “a direct link to current events even 
as it prescribes the reader's experience of those events” (Westman 2). In being 
“paradoxically transparent and opaque” the newspaper presents its readers an 
opportunity for critical reflection on social and political realities at the same time that 
it serves as a vehicle for ideological manipulation; thus, “in following the characters' 
reading experiences of the morning's Times we follow a central thematic concern in 
Woolf's novels, particularly this last one: the possibilities for resisting ideological 
interpellation and revising cultural scripts” (2). Westman describes Isa's relation to the 
rape in terms of immediacy: her reading is said to provoke “an immediate experience 
of the girl's encounter with the troopers,” and, even more strongly, “Isa's reading 
makes the scene immediate, allowing the action to exist, realistically, in three-
dimensional space” (8). Ultimately, Isa's reading practice (contrasted to, for example, 
Bart Oliver's) and the latter's effects, periodically visible throughout the novel, 
contribute to the “awareness” that she eventually gains “of her relationship to her 
world” (10). Westman thus finds in Isa a compelling model of resistance to the only 
apparently natural ideological order. Because she is “inattentive to the voice of The 
Times, Isa's attention is focused elsewhere: on the voice of the girl,” (9). Because she 
attends to the real girl's cry while resisting the ideological context in virtue of which it 
is experienced, Isa occupies a position on the margins of ideological discourse to 
which readers of Between the Acts ought aspire. If both “a newspaper's and a novel's 
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seeming transparency can naturalize ideology,” then Isa's example demonstrates how 
“Woolf arms her readers with the active critical reading skills she believes necessary” 
(2) for her contemporary political situation (a continent at war), and, presumably, our 
own.  
But a second fact about this passage has been taken as crucial to its 
interpretation, in a manner that has lent considerable support to politically motivated 
readings of the abrupt reappearance of the hammer in Isa's mind. Unlike that mental 
episode, however, this fact is not to be found in the narration of the fictional world of 
the Oliver family; it is much more a part of Virginia Woolf's own historical 
circumstances, the “real world” of early summer, 1938. Then, Woolf was in the early 
stages of drafting Pointz Hall, the novel that would become Between the Acts. That June, 
The Times of London reported on the rape of a fourteen-year old girl and its 
consequences (indeed, the rape's legal ramifications were especially noteworthy, since 
the doctor Aleck Bourne was eventually acquitted of providing an illegal abortion for 
the victim); the article that Isa reads is not a purely fictional device, but an actual 
publication detailing an actual crime. For some critics, this fact is a meaningful one 
not only for historically informed readers of Woolf, but also for the narrative account 
of Isa's reading. It is the latter, after all, that calls attention to reality, now understood 
as the domain of historical fact distinct from fiction (including that of Between the Acts 
itself): “this news item about a rape of an English girl by English soldiers tears 
through the novel's illusion” (Froula 293).  
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In pursuing this argument, Froula posits a correlation between the historical 
rape and Isa's so-called toothache, the metaphorical affliction that had originally 
driven Isa to seek remedy in the written word (“as a person with a raging tooth runs 
her eye in a chemist shop over green bottles with gilt scrolls on them lest one may 
contain a cure,” Woolf writes, “[Isa] considered: Keats and Shelley; Yeats and Donne” 
[BA 19]). The toothache accordingly connotes a state of private, individual suffering 
that can and should be viewed in the context of women's suffering more generally. 
Froula goes on to claim that “by incorporating the real gang rape into her novel, 
[Woolf] broaches the issue of civilization's violence against women in a way that tears 
not only fiction's veil but the boundary between (women's) private and (men's) public 
worlds; between Isa's private 'toothache' and the state military, legal, and medical 
institutions involved in the rape and its aftermath; between Isa's silent thoughts and 
the girl's public speech (…)” (Froula 294-5).  
This deceptively simple claim is worth considering in some detail, since it 
exemplifies the dominant interpretation of this early, important passage from Between 
the Acts. For Froula, the appearance of the “real” (i.e., historically factual) Times article 
“tears fiction's veil;” this is a metaphor she twice employs to describe the relation 
between the article and the fictional setting in which it appears. The relation between 
the novel and historical fact is for Froula implicitly analogous to the relation, in this 
passage, between Isa's “toothache” and the rape itself, along with the atmosphere of 
institutional violence (against women especially) in which the latter takes place. In 
128 
 
Froula's structure of correspondences, in other words, the toothache occupies the 
same position as the novel itself. If these correspondences hold, it appears that the 
ways in which one may describe Isa's toothache can, on Froula's view, be legitimately 
extended to describe not only this particular novel but to the novel as a form. Froula 
provides no such descriptions herself; she only says that Woolf's text “broaches an 
issue” in such a way that blurs what might otherwise be taken as unquestionable 
boundaries, and she implies that this blurring occurs simultaneously in the two 
separate but analogous registers of form and content. There is warrant, therefore, to 
infer from her reading of Isa's toothache and its supposed relation to the newspaper 
article a more general picture of the way Froula's reading understands the relation 
between fiction and documentary fact. In the absence of this picture, the claim that 
the Times article “tears fiction's veil” remains difficult to assess.  
After all, in Froula's consideration of virtually the whole of Woolf's authorship, 
this tearing of the veil forms part of a purely local argument. That is, the same 
metaphor is not used to describe just any historical fact appearing within the novel's 
frame; it would at least seem out of place to assign special significance in a likewise 
fashion to, for example, the article about the French prime minister Édouard Daladier 
that Mr. Oliver had read earlier in the morning (“'M. Daladier,' he read, finding his 
place in the column, “has been successful in pegging down the franc....' [BA 13]). Nor, 
indeed, does reference to entities like “England” or “newspaper,” which requires for 
their intelligibility some minimum of linguistic competence and historical 
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understanding on the part of readers, tear the veil of fiction. To put all of this another 
way, Froula's claim does not pertain to narratological questions about mimesis or the 
techniques and theories of representing reality within a fictional milieu: it is not a 
claim about realism or verisimilitude. If historical fact trumps the means of its 
depiction, as Froula's argument suggests, then we are dealing not with representation 
but its transcendence in direct, concrete presentation. The novel thereby reveals its 
own unreal, illusory nature when it presents the rape as real and, just as important, 
subject to immediate apprehension as such. In this way, even Isa's first thought in 
response to the article, that “that was real,” does not mark her own private reaction to 
the rape but instead signals the point at which the novel's artifice fails, in its explicit 
demonstration to the reader that this is not fictional. For Froula, this failure of artifice 
is not without explicitly political significance.  
As a toothache is a species of suffering, the novel is a species of language. This 
is the apparent logic behind Froula's claim that the boundaries between world and 
fiction are made indistinct by Woolf's use of historical detail for political ends in this 
passage. The nature of the relation is to be understood in terms of the difference 
between the domain of literal, objective, public speech (belonging above all to the 
world outside the novel) and the domain of figurative, subjective, private speech 
(belonging above all to the novel). As Froula's reading of the toothache suggests, this 
relation is furthermore strictly analogous to that between society and the individual. 
The politically meaningful effect of this “blurring” of individuality and generality, we 
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have seen, is that “civilization's violence against women” is therein brought to light. 
How is this so? On the model of the toothache, the difference between individuality 
and generality is one of degree; a toothache typically causes suffering, but certainly not 
the kind of suffering associated with widespread and institutional violence against an 
entire class of citizens, the sort of condition subject to collective action directed at 
reform or revolt.  
The source of political meaning is on the side of generality, then, because what is 
most general illuminates its particular instances precisely as instances: that is, it would 
never occur to us think of something like a toothache as anything but politically 
neutral unless we can show that it somehow finds its place within a far more general set 
of circumstances, the suffering of women. The toothache by itself is a kind of 
suffering, but it is not politically meaningful suffering. It could only be so if it is 
somehow referred to actual, literal, and decidedly political forms of pain, however 
these might be defined (e.g., suffering caused by the abuse of authority). Likewise, the 
corresponding relation between the novel and the historical actuality of the rape is 
established by the way a use of language with only limited reference to actual states of 
affairs is conferred political significance when it employs a form of language that is 
totally and transparently “real” with respect to actual states of affairs. The newspaper 
article tears the novel's illusion because it straightforwardly and literally means 
something beyond mere literary connotation, symbolism, or allusiveness: at the dawn 
of war, an English girl has been raped by English soldiers. As opposed to events 
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portrayed within the frame of the narrative (Isa's search for reading material, her 
peculiar third-person perspective on the events therein recounted, the newspaper 
itself as a symbol of transformation in media and technology, and so forth), this extra-
literary fact stands for nothing outside itself, and requires nothing else to bear political 
significance. On this reading, the newspaper is a cure not only for Isa's “toothache,” 
but for Between the Acts itself: for its own intrinsic political indifference or 
ineffectiveness.  
I have elaborated Froula's interpretation at length because it provides a 
sophisticated version of a picture of Between the Acts that, I will argue, ought to be 
revised. But I will also suggest that it ultimately implies a position that Froula herself 
would likely not endorse. In this it is instructive for understanding the reception not 
only of this critical passage, but of the status of the political in Woolf's work in 
general. Building on her brief analysis of Isa, the article, and the toothache, Froula 
analyzes one the central objects of the narrative – the outdoor pageant, presented 
along with its seemingly constant interruptions by spectators and the natural world 
alike – according to the same picture of the “real world” supervening upon the artifice 
of fiction. Her understanding of this dynamic in Between the Acts hinges on the idea 
that “in keeping with the dissolving boundaries between the work of art and the world 
according to Woolf's 'philosophy,' between the real rape and the novel's fictional 
world, between nature and the pageant, the narrator writes the 'real' spectators and the 
'real' world into the picture. The pageant provides an occasion and a temporal frame 
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to hang the human voices on, a canvas for the narrator's documentary art.” Froula 
wants to see Woolf as committed to an understanding of the relation between art and 
reality such that, ultimately, “Between the Acts dissolves any notion of a divide between 
functional and poetic language” (Froula 305).  
This is a strong and provocative claim. At this stage, however, it is important 
just to indicate that, if my analysis of Froula's interpretation is correct, then it is 
demonstrable that she cannot simultaneously commit herself to this claim that Between 
the Acts dissolves the distinction between functional and poetical language and a notion 
that “reality” is the ultimate source of political significance. This latter assumption is 
by no means unjustified, and it plays a substantial role in Froula's reading: “The news 
story shakes its fist at Isa's paralysis, at fiction's evasions of half-civilized barbarism, 
with a vehemence neither 'fantastic' nor 'romantic' but real,” such that “the girl's real 
screams not only foil Isa's silence but hail her to speech” (296). Isa can be a model for 
our own reading of Between the Acts if, as Froula later suggests in her reading of its 
conclusion, “Woolf's last ending beckons us over the edge of the page toward 
opportunities that history's violence continually interrupts but can never foreclose” 
(318-9). In Froula's picture of the relation between the “real world” and the artwork, 
reality supervenes upon an artistic milieu that is self-enclosed (just like Isa, locked in 
privacy and individuality until hailed by a scream that is more real than she can know) 
and, in itself, apolitical. But this picture and Froula's claim about functional and poetic 
language cannot both be true. It looks more accurate to claim, on Froula's reading, 
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that poetic language can and does possess political meaning, but it would not do so if 
it were not referred to a prevailing set of real conditions or circumstances, that is, if it 
were not already functional. One cannot even call the newspaper article “real,” if by 
this one means to indicate its factual existence outside the novel, without a distinction 
between functional and poetic language. It appears closer to Froula's actual 
interpretive practice to suppose that, insofar as purportedly poetic language succeeds 
in referring beyond its own self-erected boundaries, it becomes functional. But this is a 
much different claim than Froula's because it fully preserves the distinction between 
poetic and functional language as the distinction between words that refer to specific 
real things and those that do not, or at least those that are meaningful in ways beyond 
direct reference. If, furthermore, we take seriously the privilege that Froula confers to 
the newspaper article, then we cannot even say that poetic language becomes 
functional by itself, because it does so only by being brought into relation with its 
outside, by being located as an individual instance of a more global meaning. This 
entails not that the distinction between poetic and functional has been dissolved, just 
that the poetic has been submitted to the norm of the functional.  
Froula's remarks on the relation between the real world and the artwork (which 
is, for her, internally figured by the relation between Isa and the newspaper article) in 
Between the Acts do not exhaust her valuable analysis of that work, nor indeed of 
Woolf's entire authorship, but her views represent a serious and sophisticated analysis 
of the political meaning of “reality” in Woolf. The examination of her argument has 
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been undertaken in order to complete our picture of the dominant understanding of 
this early passage from Between the Acts, in accordance with the notion that completing 
this picture allows me to show what it has left out or passed over too quickly. If the 
peculiar distinction, observed above, between “fact” and “reality” drawn by this 
passage's narrator has not been commented upon in detail, that is because prevailing 
interpretations, under the sway of two powerful details (Isa's imagined hammer and 
the historical actuality of the newspaper article), have been eager to emphasize the 
inherently political character of Isa's reading of the newspaper. The conclusions that 
these readings propose are useful in more than one respect; among other things, they 
underscore the kinds of issues at stake for understanding the apparent paradox this 
work of literature is simultaneously social and self-enclosed. By focusing on the way in 
which the newspaper article affects Isa's thinking about the world, the interpretations 
thus far examined present in nuce a picture of the formation or action of political 
subjectivity, that is, a description of how it comes to pass that real circumstances 
impinge on a person (in this case, Isa Oliver) in a way that determines his or her 
political motives for political belief or action. On these grounds, for example, we have 
seen Mackay describing Isa's reaction as a “fantasy of violent defense,” and Froula 
focusing on the dynamic between private and public life at stake in Isa's newfound 
desire for public – i.e., political – speech. For these interpretations it is often the case, 
whether implicitly or explicitly, that this model of political subjectivity obtains not just 
within Woolf's fiction but, more generally, within our own social reality. There is 
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accordingly a strongly prescriptive element to this interpretation. The latter implies 
not that Isa's reaction is typical or normal, that Woolf describes just how anyone would 
react, even granted Isa's individuality and unique circumstances; this would make the 
political value of Isa's reaction more difficult to discern, because it would be a 
necessary result of reading rather than a contingent act of decision or resistance. 
There is political value in Isa's reaction because something in it tells us what the 
reaction of anyone in Isa's place ought to be; her reaction is noteworthy to the extent 
that it depicts a favorable change in Isa's relation to the social world. Newly oriented 
away from the confines of her own private life toward very real public issues, Isa 
models the experience of the reader of Between the Acts, who finds her private 
experience of the novel disrupted by the intrusion of real social circumstances that the 
narrative cannot contain. 
In what follows, I will argue for a reading of this passage that connects it with a 
central theme of Between the Acts, which is the problem of relating meaningful form 
with the formless, the shapeless, the fleeting, or the dispersed – a problem which has 
an obviously political aspect. Indeed, Jed Esty has read Between the Acts as exploring, 
“with a sometimes burdensome degree of self-consciousness … the growing historical 
tension between the universal subject of modernism (psyche/myth) and the demands 
of a particularized collective, defined, in this case, by nationhood.”82 For Esty, the 
                                                 
82 Esty, Jed. A Shrinking Island: Modernism and National Culture in England. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2003. p. 
105 
136 
 
pageantplay of Woolf's novel dramatizes the relationship between artist in audience, 
confirming Froula's claim about the real source of meaning: Woolf's vision is of “a 
spontaneous community which is in itself meaning and which therefore renders 
obsolete the modernist artist's gift of form” (Esty 106). My reading of the relationship 
between form and meaning in Between the Acts, on the other hand, will depart from 
these explicitly political and historicist interpretations in its treatment of the novel's 
political meaning as a central but subsidiary aspect of the novel's more general 
engagement with the status and the function of narrative form. This will lead me to 
three general conclusions. First, while the longstanding critical desideratum of 
redeeming Woolf's cultural politics has essentially succeeded, the continued 
dominance of this project has obscured the possibility of understanding the ways in 
which Between the Acts (and, by implication, Woolf's fiction in general) does not submit 
narrativity to extraliterary ends; second, departing from this framework doesn't forbid 
articulating a different way of thinking about the political in Woolf, now understood 
as dependent on the more general category of narrative form; finally, in the passage 
that we have and will continue thinking about, the question of political meaning 
makes itself felt in two related ways – first, in the problem of drawing a distinction 
between action and merely physical event or cause, and subsequently, in the formal 
delineation of the domain of politics from that of the ethical or the merely 
subjectively felt.  
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I have characterized the ambition to provide new politicizations of Woolf’s 
fiction as dominant, but these interpretations are dominant for a reason: they grow 
out of a longstanding debate about Woolf's own politics in particular and the cultural 
politics of modernism more generally. Is Woolf's fiction an ideological apologia to 
bourgeois sensibility? Or does she embrace a social commitment as part of an artistic 
avant garde? Indeed, it is not necessary to rehearse the history of Woolf's early critical 
reception in too much detail in order to establish the uniquely influential influence of 
the image of Woolf as “an immured priestess in the temple of art – dedicated, solitary, 
out of touch with her time.”83 This image (of the Bloomsbury aesthete, the chronicler 
of the bourgeois psyche, the writer whose social concerns never extend far beyond 
the manners and conventions of the elite, and so forth) made Woolf an object of 
scorn on the political Right and Left during her lifetime. She is “quite insulated by 
class,” as Queenie Leavis's notorious 1938 Scrutiny review of Three Guineas puts it, to to 
the extent that she is “not living in the contemporary world.” In a conservative 
version of the same objection, Wyndham Lewis (in Men Without Art) sees Woolf 
engaged in “feminizing” culture, by virtue of her implicit refusal of the sober and 
ostensibly male values of objectivity, materiality, and reality. The charge of 
aestheticism persists in roughly the same form in those critics like Raymond Williams 
or Elaine Showalter who see in Woolf' fiction a reproduction of pernicious social 
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ideologies and a concomitant failure of artistic commitment. But the real influence of 
this portrait of Woolf's intrinsic conservatism or aestheticism is to be found in the 
fact that hardly anyone can be found defending it today; its rejection by the now 
orthodox politically affirmative reading of Woolf, beginning with critics like Toril Moi 
and Jane Marcus, was swift and severe. The summary of the historical and critical 
development of this affirmative reading provided by Alex Zwerdling is thereby 
instructive on several counts:  
“only in very recent commentary on Woolf's work has this sense of her as an 
original and important social observer emerged. The earlier view that she 
fostered what one critic called 'the development of a cult of sensibility, 
inadequately based on the realities of the social situation' has been long adying. 
The impetus for change has come from the contemporary women's movement, 
and particular from its rereading of A Room of One's Own and Three Guineas. A 
closer scrutiny of these works than the Leavises and their disciples had given 
them reveal that Woolf was very much in touch with the historical forces of her 
time...” (Zwerdling 31-2).  
It is, on one level, telling that Zwerdling mentions Woolf's non-fictional writings A 
Room of One's Own and Three Guineas as central impetuses for those undertaking a 
reevaluation of Woolf's fiction. Of course, it is difficult to see how the author of those 
writings could be anything but politically committed (and, furthermore, politically 
committed in distinctly appealing ways for the majority of contemporary literary 
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critics). On the other hand, the practice of establishing a political account of Woolf's 
fiction on the basis of her non-fictional writing (whether in the aforementioned 
publications, the diaries, or the essays) is questionable. The interpretation that I am 
offering proceeds according to the idea that it is desirable to avoid an explanation of 
Woolf's literary practice that subordinates the latter either to exclusively political (or 
philosophical, social, religious) concerns, if only because explanations of that sort run 
the considerable risk of treating fiction as little more than mere means for some extra-
literary end. The approach developed here should be seen as situated within this 
interpretive context; my aim, however, is certainly not to restore credibility to the 
image of Woolf the aestheticist in order to decide whether she is thereby worthy of 
praise or blame. The notion that Woolf's fiction has worldly ambitions, whether 
political or philosophical, is to be taken seriously. The argument pursued here, 
however, will suggest that such ambitions can't be fully assessed if they are not 
understood as part of the more general question about narrative form. If this 
interpretation is plausible, finally, it will entail that we no longer need to adhere to a 
framework that sees Woolf's fiction as either embodying the aestheticist retreat from 
reality or providing an ultimately ornamental conveyance for more fundamental 
political truths. 
 I will begin to establish this approach by recalling that the problem of relating 
an individual, local event (the rape at Whitehall) to a more general set of socio-
historical circumstances that, viewed properly, ought to be otherwise (the subjugation 
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of women) has been explicitly foregrounded in what I have outlined as political 
interpretions of the rape's appearance within the frame of the narrative. In fact, the 
possibility of meaningfully establishing this relation between particularity and 
generality is an essential condition of the political reading. On these grounds, Rebecca 
Walkowitz is certainly correct to argue that a central preoccupation of Woolf's fiction, 
including Between the Acts, is to ask “how [one displays] systemic conditions without 
seeming to ignore the particularity of events or diminish their singular importance.”84 
But it cannot just be a question of “ignoring” the particular, because one can only 
ignore a particular instance of a general circumstance when the existence of a plausible 
and meaningful relation between the two is no longer in question. Otherwise, the 
particular wouldn't be particular, since particularity is defined by its relation to 
generality. At the most abstract level, this relation is implied in any use of concepts; 
we understand a particular sheep as a sheep because we can competently employ the 
general concept that picks out the class of animals called sheep. In the domain of 
history and politics, however, this relation is rather more tenuous; it may well be the 
case that we possess no general framework in which to understand some local event 
as anything beyond itself. What is it that makes the rape at Whitehall meaningful 
beyond its brute, factual occurrence? Certainly we comprehend it as more or less 
immediately enmeshed in a network of legal and moral significations, but to see it as 
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instantiating a less concrete form of generality – the “systematic conditions” to which 
Walkowitz refers – requires further elaboration. This elaboration, I argue, ought also 
to be understood as narration. One main point of the political interpretation is that 
the fiction of Between the Acts performs this function of mediating between the rape as 
this specific crime and the network (perhaps even the cultural logic) that it can be seen 
to exemplify. There is no reason to disagree with this, as long as we understand this 
mediation as an aspect of the more general function of narrative, the basic formal 
operation of which is to synthesize discrete elements into a meaningful shape. 
 Consider another of the novel's thematic concerns: the social effects of 
technological modernity. When the narrator of Between the Acts tells us that, for Isa's 
generation “the newspaper [is] a book” (BA 20), the point of the metaphorical 
transformation of books into newspapers is to epitomize the relation between an 
entire generation – those who, like Isa, shared “the age of the century,” and who 
wondered pointedly “what remedy was there for her at her age … in books” (19) – 
and its technological and informational milieu. How to capture the effects of 
modernization is a recurring, if not dominant, concern in the novel, set in a rural 
village in “very heart of England” (17) that becomes emblematic of historical tensions 
within England itself. Thus “there were absentees when Mr. Streatfield,” the 
venerable clergyman whose very name indicates something of his position, and 
perhaps that of the institutions he could be said to represent, at a boundary between 
tradition and advancing technological change, “called his roll call in the church. The 
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motor bike, the motor bus, and the movies – when Mr. Streatfield called his roll call, 
he laid the blame on them” (75). Again, a minimal metonymic substitution (Mr. 
Streatfield blames the motor bike or the movie, when in fact these modern 
distractions are the merely the means for those of his flock, truly culpable, who decide 
to forsake their Sunday ritual for considerably more earthly purposes) forms part of 
an implicit description of how social and individual life has been affected by 
technological change.  
That the problem of narration will itself be an object of narration is announced 
early in the novel. The narrator's first extended characterization of Isa finds her in her 
chamber, on the morning of the pageant, reflecting on an illicit extramarital desire for 
“the romantic gentleman farmer,” Mr. Haines (14). Isa's inclinations are deeply poetic; 
throughout the novel, she is found talking to herself in verse, composing fragments of 
poetry that she keeps hidden from public scrutiny (a fact that superficially reinforces 
the view according to which the poetic is analogous to the private). Here, realizing her 
“love” for Haines with an admixture of excitement, resignation, and anxiety, she 
struggles to find the right way to express in her poetic language the feeling that Haines 
has provoked in her even in their brief and inconsequential encounters, the secret 
feeling of charged awareness when one's beloved is in the room: 
“In love,” she must be, since the presence of his body in the room last night 
could so affect her; since the words he said, handing her a teacup, handing her 
a tennis racquet, could so attach themselves to a certain spot in her; and thus lie 
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between them like a wire, tingling, tangling, vibrating – she groped, in the 
depths of the looking-glass, for a word to fit the infinitely quick vibrations of 
the aeroplane propeller that she had seen once at dawn at Croydon. Faster, 
faster, faster, it whizzed, whirred, buzzed, till all the flails became one flail and 
up soared the plane away and away... (14-5).  
In one respect, Isa is engaged in the most basic literary project of finding a fitting 
metaphor, if by this we mean that she expresses something literal (if the phrase “in 
love” is indeed literal), however indistinct it may be, in a non-literal fashion. But it is 
furthermore the case that in this passage, what gets figured – the exceptional feeling 
that Isa feels in conversation with Haines, the peculiar way in which his words or his 
presence attach themselves to her, secretly bonding her to him, in short the affective 
or libidinal charge that she associates with him –is narrated as a series of mental acts 
groping towards meaning. It's also noteworthy that this meaning can't preexist in a 
straightforward manner the means of its figuration; consequently, the notion that her 
interior state is just the literal, meaningful in-itself material for an ornamental or 
supplementary act of narration or figuration is called into question. The feeling that 
she wants to name couldn't have been experienced in precisely the same way without 
the memory of watching an airplane take off at Croydon, and, a fortiori, without the 
knowledge that such things as airplanes exist. That technological modernization 
should be reflected in even in a fleeting, private reflection on love is a striking fact; 
more fundamentally, though, we see through Isa's example how the notion of 
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meaningful form articulates different themes at once – Isa's emotional state, 
technology, poetic creation, and so forth. To stay with the example of technological 
modernization, this articulation is accomplished through the narrative production of 
relations between individual instances or events (the declining attendance at church, 
the status of books, or the feeling of love) that epitomize, exemplify, and, in some 
respects, constitute the more general circumstance of modernity. This description is 
not aimed simply at stating the obvious – that Isa's (and Woolf's) generation was 
witness to sweeping technological change – but, in filling in that fact's significance 
even at the most seemingly banal level, it aims to show something about how meaning 
is given to disparate and even insignificant facts. Viewed in this way, we see how this 
description is, for the novel, a formal problem: how is the chaos of life, thought, 
world, and language to be given meaningful form?  
We can start see how the novel itself construes this question about narrative 
and meaning in Isa's search for the right metaphor to describe her feelings for Haines, 
because there it is not only a question of finding adequate expression for an interior 
state, but a narrative about how we give sense to things through memory or how the 
world forces its alien vocabulary – “whizz” and “buzz” – upon us. As Isa herself 
realizes, however, there is always the possibility (and perhaps even the likelihood) that 
her act of figuration might fail to achieve genuine significance. Isa draws the 
distinction between two loves, between the love “in her eyes” (for Haines) and that 
“other love,” signified the ordinary objects of everyday life that surround her, “for her 
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husband, the stockbroker – 'The father of my children,' she added, slipping into the 
cliché conveniently provided by fiction” (14). What is the difference between effective 
forms of narration, which illuminates the significance of the airplane propeller and its 
nameless buzz, and the empty uselessness of cliché? One might be tempted to think 
of cliché as essentially mechanical or repetitive in character, and thus unsuitable for 
Isa's need to achieve authentic, lifelike, self-expression. At first glance, such a 
superficial reading cannot be sustained: after all, Isa's first thought, as she tries to 
name the feeling Haines provokes in her, is of a machine and the seemingly infinite 
quickness of repetition that it evokes. There can at least be no simple opposition 
between the empty mechanism of cliché and some other figure that eludes banal 
convention through hypothetically absolute novelty. Cliché is, nevertheless, a kind of 
aesthetic failure in this scene. Isa self-consciously, perhaps ironically, indulges in a 
cliché about her marriage, but only insofar as the cliché states a mere fact: Giles 
Oliver, her husband, is indeed the father of her children. There is more said about this 
relationship by “the silver boxes and tooth-brushes” on her washstand than by the 
cliché, “the father of my children,” just as there is more said about Isa's love for 
Haines by the exhilarating spin of an airplane's propeller than by the words “in love,” 
even if that is indeed what “she must be” (14).  
This passage demonstrates that the failure represented by cliché results neither 
from a purportedly mechanical, repetitive character nor from factual untruth. But the 
question still stands: in what way does cliché essentially differ from the successful 
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figuration provided by the airplane propeller? This specific difference is more difficult 
to identify than one might initially surmise. There is indeed an opposition between 
cliché and the more meaningful propeller metaphor which, at first glance, seems 
simply to mirror the distinction between Isa's love (by convention) for her husband 
Giles and the novel excitement she feels in the presence of Haines. But the simple 
association of cliché with convention makes this distinction harder to maintain, if only 
for the simple reason that the propeller metaphor, even if it is a novel way of 
expressing Isa's feeling, participates in conventional talk about feelings in order to be 
recognizable as a successful figuration. That is, if it can't be seen as part of a 
distinctive literary tradition, it would in no way distinguish itself as a literary use of 
language. In more straightforward dimension, however, one cannot help but notice 
that this entire scene is in many respects deeply conventional, and the cliché might 
extend beyond Isa's admittedly ironic use of the phrase “the father of my children” to 
encompass the basic constituents of the passage: a wealthy woman standing before a 
mirror and combing her hair, using a “heavy embossed silver brush that had been a 
wedding present” (13) that radiates a powerful sense of domesticity and familial 
obligation, reflecting on a “love” that consists of little more than a handful of 
exchanged words and glances.  
The figure is nevertheless a successful one, even if the boundary between cliché 
and meaningful figure (and thus the source of meaning in the interaction between 
narrative form and that which gives shape) is difficult to place, even if Isa can't 
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ultimately find “a word to fit” the latter's vibrations: “whizzed, whirred, buzzed” 
looks like a list of candidates, but before she can settle on any choice, the plane in her 
memory of that morning Croydon takes off; she can only watch it disappear. A cliché 
is something made banal or trivial by overuse, convention, or tradition; like the 
printing technique from which it etymologically originates, the cliché operates as an 
original for myriad copies, a model reproduced identically and endlessly, each time 
with diminished effect. Isa's suggested replacement, on the other hand, shows 
something else at work. As we have seen, the movement of the propeller is an image 
of the affects associated with falling “in love,” but, even more, it is a figure of 
something passing on before it can be appropriately named. This is true not only in 
the semantic register (especially since “love” seems rather strong as a description of 
Isa's feelings), but in the lived experience of love, and its ephemeral instantiation in 
the world: her love will die, either at some unanticipated moment during her lifetime 
or at its end. The airplane soars away, leaving Isa to mentally compose a couplet 
where the semantic ambivalence of the first person plural, “we,” serves to implicitly 
connect flight to life itself: “'where we know not, where we go not, neither know nor 
care,' she hummed. 'Flying, rushing through the ambient, incandescent, summer 
silent...” (15). (At this point Isa's thought's trail off; the narrative continues with the 
statement that “the rhyme was 'air,' as Isa picks up the telephone to place an order for 
lunch the afternoon's lunch). Combined with the distinction drawn between 
meaningful narration and cliché in the passage, Isa's poetic utterance suggests that 
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love or its associated affects cannot be accurately described in terms of a precise and 
concretely delimited original that gets repeated every time it appears in language. Isa's 
feeling isn't located in some place where language fails to penetrate, in some 
hypothetically ineffable core of her being, where it would be immediately felt but not 
given to meaningful expression. Rather, the literary language she uses is perfectly 
adequate to the impermanent and decidedly human nature of that which she is 
attempting to name. 
The whizz and buzz of Isa's remembered airplane is explicitly mirrored in a 
peculiar fashion at the end of the novel, once the pageant-play has ended and as the 
audience disperses. As the play's director (and overbearing figure of the artist) Miss La 
Trobe laments the evening's variety of difficulties that, at least in her mind, destroyed 
the artistic integrity of her creation, her thoughts of failure are interrupted by a flock 
of starlings landing on a nearby tree (and this almost immediately after another 
narration of Isa's fraught feelings with respect to married life, as she takes angry note 
of her husband Giles walking alongside the overly affectionate Mrs. Manresa, 
muttering once again the cliché, “the father of my children,” this time more like a 
curse [207]):  
“Then suddenly the starlings attacked the tree behind which she had hidden. In 
one flock they pelted it like so many winged stones. The whole tree hummed 
with the whizz they made, as if each bird plucked a wire. A whizz, a buzz rose 
from the bird-buzzing, bird-vibrant, birdblackened tree. The tree became a 
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rhapsody, a quivering cacophony, a whizz and vibrant rapture, branches, leaves, 
birds syllabling discordantly life, life, life, without measure, without stop 
devouring the tree. Then up! Then off!” (209).  
At first glance, it seems straightforward enough to claim that the kind of figurative 
description which we have been attempting to isolate from cliché is thus characterized 
by its ability to poetically evoke life in a more authentic fashion than cliché can 
manage. But, as we've seen in the case of Isa's use of the propeller metaphor, the 
relation between a figure and what it figures should not, like cliché, be understood on 
the model of an original and its copies. The image of the flock of birds mingling 
chaotically in the tree, whose senseless calls stand in for the overwhelming noise of 
life itself, illuminates Isa's poetic description of love, because the figure here (the tree 
overfull with noisy birds as metonymy for life and all living things) also, in a peculiar 
way, figures how a figure should work when it is not a cliché, because it narrates the 
way in which the indistinct, the chaotic, the cacophonous are discordantly concordant 
in narration: its chaotically portrays how all the chaotically distinct fragments of living 
are paradoxically united in the narration of life. But neither love nor life can be 
comprehended by a single model, because they can be said to exist only in their 
instances: in the feeling of our beloved nearby, in a tree black with screeching, living 
things. In that respect, we can see why talk about “love” or “life” is, from the point of 
view of the narrative, a problem of how narration both gives and takes meaning from 
what it narrates. In either case, the problem is to create something general – “love,” 
150 
 
“life,” – from the standpoint of just this instance and no other. The instance 
illuminates the generality with which it is thrown into relation just as much as the 
generality illuminates its instances: as Isa's thoughts about love lead her to poetically 
evoke its inability to persist or endure as “we” rush, as if in flight, through our lives, 
the birds evoke the senselessness and chaos of life, even human life. As when 
swallows had earlier on seemed to the narrator to “make a pattern,” as they were 
“dancing, like the Russians, only not to music, but to the unheard rhythm of their 
own wild hearts” (65), narration imposes form or pattern, and thus sense, on 
something intrinsically patternless. But there is also a way in which the patternless (a 
flock of birds) or the repetitive (the propeller's buzzing rotation) by themselves 
suggest the sorts of meanings that narration can give them. What the novel leaves us 
with, I want to suggest, is a certain ambiguity about the exact point where meaning 
lies in the narrative shaping of its shapeless elements. There is certainly a distinction 
between significant form and the matter of plot and character or event and action that 
are made meaningful by narrative acts of ordering, presenting, and figuring. Exactly 
where to draw this line, though, is left open. And if this insight is overlooked, the 
political character of Isa's reading practice might not be as clear a rectification of the 
novel’s aesthetic labor as Froula and others have suggested. 
How might the passage with which we began be understood within my 
argument about the status of narrative form? It should be noted that it is difficult to 
deny what the political interpretations surveyed above no doubt implicitly claim: that 
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without attention to the explicitly political content of the scene in question, this 
passage cannot be understood. One might argue that the girl's rape is an immediately 
political fact. That was certainly the case, historically; in the novel, however, the 
immediacy of the political character of Isa's reaction to the newspaper description is 
complicated by its narrative framing. Unusually, what Woolf’s narrator foregrounds is 
the act of reading. The narrator shows Isa reading word for word; indeed, the 
narration of this event takes longer than the event itself in narrative time, as the 
narrator gauges Isa's reaction, and her continual revision of the latter, as she reads. 
Finding that no book can stop her toothache – which, given our detailed examination 
of Isa's earlier reflections on Haines, we can now better understand as the feeling of 
raging distraction from daily life, the mental impediment to carrying on as normal, 
according to convention – she turns to the newspaper dropped by her father-in-law 
Bart: “she took it and read: 'A horse with a green tail...' which was fantastic. Next, 
'The guard at Whitehall...' which was romantic and then, building word upon word, 
she read: 'The troopers told her the horse had a green tail; but she found it was just an 
ordinary horse. And they dragged her up to the barrack room...” (20). The reality that 
Isa identifies with her abrupt “that was real” is not reality outside Isa's mind, outside 
Pointz Hall, or outside the novel; we see here that Isa's use of this word does not 
stand alone, but forms a triad along with “fantasy” and “romance.”  
Before Isa's reading can be understood in immediately political terms, especially 
if that understanding is guided by the idea that a reality beyond the novel is the source 
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of political meaning, this contrast between reality, fantasy, and romance – that is, the 
Isa's use of “reality” as an essentially generic qualifier, must be taken into account. 
Fantasy and romance, we might say, belong among the clichés provided by fiction: the 
uniformed solider or the colored horse easily evoke conventions of genre without by 
themselves meaning anything in particular. But that doesn't mean that “reality” here 
corresponds to non-fiction. “Reality” is what plunges Isa into a distinctly unreal vision, 
a vision explicitly contrasted with the meaningless, factual existence of the door upon 
which she mentally projects the terrible scene of rape. The distinction between reality 
and fact in this passage, like the distinction between cliché and meaningful narration, 
cannot be made to correspond to the distinction between fiction and non-fiction or 
between truth and falsity. Accordingly, there is no relevant distinction to be made 
between the historical actuality of the newspaper article and the fictional artifice of its 
narrative framing: from the standpoint of the novel, there is nothing but fictional 
narrative. The first question this passage asks is: what does it feel like to read 
something so strikingly real that you forget you are reading anything at all? How can 
this encounter erase the very act of “building word upon word,” in order to see a 
jumbled collection of sounds and images as something coherent and significant in 
itself?  
Such questions are the necessary but not sufficient conditions of the affirmative 
reading of Woolf's politics. In order to read this passage prescriptively, most 
commentators have wanted to make Isa in some way or other the model of political 
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subjectivity – that is, they see in Isa a way of thinking or acting that one ought in some 
if not all respects emulate. Indeed, they rely on the idea that when the phrase “she 
screamed and hit him about the face with a hammer” passes through Isa's mind, the 
insertion of the hammer is an action in a robust sense: recall that it is described as part 
of a “private struggle” (Froula), as “fantasy of violent defense” (Mackay), or 
emblematic of “active critical reading skills” (Westman). But what evidence does the 
passage give us to think that the hammer's reappearance in Isa's thoughts, “beneath 
the chime” (22) of the monotonously repeated conversation between Mrs. Swithin 
and Mr. Oliver, is the result of a consciously willed decision on Isa's part? If it is true 
that she metaphorically “hears” a sort of inner voice, it seems at least consistent to 
suggest that Isa passively receives the lingering image of the girl along with the 
hammer that interrupted her reading. After all, the “realism” of the passage is what 
impinged upon her so strongly, forcing her to distraction. This reading of Isa's 
reaction is, I think, consistent with a view that sees in Woolf's fiction more generally 
the attempt to capture in literary language the fleeting moments of subjective life, the 
various “atoms” at all times passing through consciousness. As Jonathan Kramnick 
has recently remarked, an “important property of actions” is that they “extend the 
mind into the world”85; here, though, the reverse could be said to take place: the 
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world (at least, the words of the newspaper and the hammer wielded by Mrs. Swithin) 
gives new shape to Isa's interior life.  
In light of the reading of the problem of narrative form that I've provided here, 
however, I think it is justified to propose a third option – one that would not rely on 
deciding with certainty whether Isa's reaction is active or passive, a willed choice or a 
merely subjective event. This is because the very distinction between action and mere 
event requires narration: attributing to Isa an action means giving a coherent and 
meaningful shape to the various elements of Isa's mental life, telling a story about how 
a motive was expressed in a decisive action, and so on. It is consistent with my 
analysis, though, to suggest that the passage in question leaves ambiguous the exact 
distinction between action and a physical event like affect. This, of course, re-orients 
the sorts of political motivations we can attribute to Isa or (and, by extension, to 
Woolf), but it doesn't mean that all political questions are thereby foreclosed. Indeed, 
I suggest that the passage poses an implicit question: what is the difference between 
meaningful action and unwilled reaction, behavior, convention, habit, or fantasy? One 
way of answering this question, Between the Acts shows, is through narrative. Isa’s 
dawning political consciousness is neither purely active nor purely passive, and the 
aesthetic formation of her mind in relation to her world is necessary to understanding 
this relation as such. This formation likewise asks us to consider the specific 
difference of the political domain as it is constructed in Between the Acts: the sort of 
meaningful action it implies and investments it reveals, as distinct from ethical, moral, 
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or religious thought as it is from revulsion, despair, or outrage. This question gets 
worked out as part of reflection on forms of narration, not on a terrain dictated by a 
priori decisions about the political ambitions of Woolf's art – but its possible answers 
might be at least as radical as those readings proposed by Woolf's politically engaged 
admirers. This is especially the case if the politics of literature can only be the politics 
of literature’s self-destruction: “rending the veil” of fiction may indeed have as its 
effect the laying bare of history, but at the same time it risks eradicating the novel’s 
image of the intricately mediated relation between politics and modern subject. In this 
it makes Isa a sheer device, a means of reporting the news, no different from the 
newspaper that provokes in her the thought of political reality.  
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CHAPTER 4 
JOYCE’S “ITHACA.” THE MATTER OF NOTHINGNESS 
 
Up to this point, my argument has focused its attention almost exclusively on 
the fiction of Virginia Woolf in an effort to demonstrate and explain the complex 
literary and aesthetic significance of materialism in the modernist novel. Over the 
course of this demonstration, we have seen the transformation of materialism from 
being either a philosophical doctrine or a scientific stance into a uniquely literary and 
aesthetic problem, at once an obstacle to and an opportunity for the expression of 
modernism in the novel. Clearly, though, if I have appealed to such general (and 
perhaps vague) categories as “the modernist novel,” then my ambition must in part be 
to warrant its broader explanatory applicability. Woolf’s novels have been exemplary 
because she makes the refutation of novelistic materialism the explicit aim of any 
fictional enterprise that wishes to entitle itself to the claim of being “modern.” Over 
the course of the last two chapters, however, my argument has systematically 
undermined any simplistic interpretation of Woolf’s correlation of modernity and the 
non- or anti-materialist novel which makes the full expression “life” its unique subject 
matter: the “thing itself before it has been made anything,” as Lily Briscoe memorably 
and paradoxically describes the object of her artistic ambition. In the broad terms, this 
approach unfolded in three stages: first, it showed how the language of materialism 
enters Woolf’s vocabulary via an acquaintance with a philosophical concern to 
157 
 
develop a theory of knowledge in the face of rapid scientific discovery and 
technological innovation, especially in the writings of her father Leslie Stephen and in 
the intellectual scene associated with Cambridge and Bloomsbury. I argued, though, 
that Woolf’s deployment of the idea of materialism is poorly understood if the latter is 
assumed to constitute just one theme among others that appears in Woolf’s work; 
rather, I showed how Woolf’s conception of literary and aesthetic form is deeply 
though ambiguously tied to the deadness of materiality that is only really recognized 
by a view from no one – a kind of vision emptied of sense, memory, and subjectivity.  
 In one respect, then, the interpretation of Woolf’s fiction carried out over the 
last two chapters reached conclusions that pertain specifically to Between the Acts and 
To the Lighthouse. That interpretation certainly endorses, but leaves implicit, the claim 
that its understanding of materialism vis-à-vis form, theme, and image would be 
amplified by incorporating a great many examples of Woolf’s long and short fiction, 
including the major works Mrs. Dalloway and The Waves. This is, of course, natural and 
to be expected – all such readings inevitably produce insights that pertain uniquely to 
single authors or even to single representative works, even if they operate with general 
assumptions about, say, the historical, conceptual, and textual relations between 
novels and their intellectual and cultural milieus. But in this chapter my argument will 
take a further step by extending its analysis to a far more complicated object: James 
Joyce’s 1922 Ulysses, perhaps the most emblematic instance of radical modernist 
experiment with the novel form (which experiment provides, at the same time, a 
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recapitulation of traditional European letters: Wyndham Lewis noted early in the 
history of its inception that Ulysses was “an encylopaedia of English literary technique, 
as well as a general-knowledge paper,”86 and Karen Lawrence has described in detail 
the work’s “odyssey of style”87). In this chapter, which will focus on the novel’s 
penultimate 17th episode, “Ithaca,” I will pursue the same line of inquiry with respect 
to Joyce as I have with Woolf. That is, my reading of “Ithaca” will lend further 
support to one of the general claims of the dissertation as a whole – that is, that the 
modernist novel’s efforts at a figuration of materiality (a) must be understood, in a 
sense contrary to intuitions about the meaning of “materialism,” to be most emphatic 
in conjunction with the imagination of a “view from no one” that tends towards the 
annihilation of both subjectivity and physical existence and (b) that this figuration is 
most visible in moments where the novel can be seen reflecting on its own formal, 
material/technical, and historical limits. One consequence of this approach, which has 
been fleshed out over the course of the dissertation and which will be made explicit as 
one of its main conclusions, is that the whole category of “materiality” is both alluring 
and provocative for artistic and especially literary modes involved in intricate forms of 
self-description. It offers useful – perhaps essential – ways of arriving at a formal 
understanding of modernism in general, which might see this self-description as 
relying, in increasingly explicit ways, on the artistic presentation of materiality and the 
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processes of its transformation, as in Clement Greenberg’s account of pictorial 
modernism. But to the extent that this is so, the idea of a literary or aesthetic 
materialism clearly undermines itself: or, what amounts to the same thing, it accesses 
not an extra-aesthetic reality or materiality or history to which the work is granted 
privileged contact or community, but instead enshrines what may be thought of as the 
aesthetic as such.  
 Writing about Joyce, and a fortiori about his most important and most studied 
work, presents unique difficulties that ought not be passed over without some 
comment, even if the latter effectively only rehearses the critical anxieties of most 
Joyce scholars who find themselves confronted by an ever-proliferating body of 
scholarly literature on the text and the history of Ulysses. It has been sixty years at least 
since the unprecedented accumulation of Joyce criticism has itself become a meta-
theme of Joyce criticism; it’s now not only a truism but an outright cliché to refer to 
the (still alive and well) Joyce “industry,” or to remark that only Shakespeare has 
garnered more citations in the secondary literature. This leads to a peculiar critical 
situation; as Joseph Brooker remarks with respect to the genre of meta-criticism that 
has emerged around some major figures of recent literary history, “the sheer mass and 
accompanying intellectual or ideological pressure of preexisting commentary make it 
necessary for criticism to perform a backflip and survey its own history.”88 And given 
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this apparent necessity, the scholarly reader of Joyce must be prepared to recognize 
“the contingency of [her] own views” (Brooker 4). If there are so many critical and 
historical interpretations of Joyce’s work (15,000 bibliographical entries – 
“monographs, articles, theses, translations, and editions” – according to a count 
already five years old89), each adopting their own idiosyncratic methodologies or 
championing their preferred theory or interpretive discourse, then a reader who would 
add their own voice to the cacophony cannot but acknowledge that it has no special 
claim to any sort of mastery of the text. More readings will be produced, under-
examined themes and unknown sources will come to light, and new theoretical vogues 
will arrive: the Joyce critic is equally crushed by the weight of the past and vulnerably 
exposed to an all-consuming future. Perhaps, appropriately enough, the time of Joyce 
scholarship is circularly Viconian, and readers of Ulysses will endless re-stage their own 
modernist break with the critical orthodoxies of the past.  
More seriously, though, it suffices to observe that the history of critical 
approaches to Ulysses lays bare the history of critical theory in the twentieth century 
more generally (a fact which is also the subject of book-length studies, as in Geert 
Lernout’s The French Joyce (1990)90 and Jeffrey Segall’s Joyce in America: Cultural Politics 
and the Trials of Ulysses (1993)91, both cited by Brooker). Modern theories of the novel 
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are clearly obliged to explain one of that genre’s most notorious exemplars, and so the 
history of theoretical approaches to Ulysses naturally contains in nuce the history of 
“theory” in general. In the briefest of sketches, this trajectory contains the early years 
of formalist, literary-historical, and biographical criticism (e.g. Harry Levin, Richard 
Ellmann, and Hugh Kenner), covers the dramatic entrance of theory into the Joycean 
institution (from Fredric Jameson’s idiosyncratic Marxism to such “post-
structuralists” as Colin MacCabe and Derek Attridge, from the feminism of such 
writers as Bonnie Kime Scott to psychoanalytic studies by Luke Thurston and Shelly 
Brivic), and finally reaches the present-day interest in a post-colonial Joyce, genetic 
textual studies, Irish identity politics, and forms of radical historicism. Each of these 
approaches suggest that fresh perspectives on Ulysses will continue to appear as our 
language for describing the form, techniques, ideologies, and histories of the novel is 
refined. How and whether these approaches are justified in seeing themselves 
reflected in the language of Ulysses, meanwhile, can only be settled with respect to 
individual cases.  
Of course, this is a situation generated by Ulysses itself in its encyclopedic 
ambition, or what Lewis initially mocked as its resemblance to a “general-knowledge 
paper.” No less confident a reader than Jacques Derrida recognized this even while 
feeling compelled to advertise his own anxieties about critical competence when 
addressing the International James Joyce Symposium thirty years ago, at the invitation 
of Jean-Michel Rabaté. Speaking to the gathered Joyceans (admitting, if somewhat 
162 
 
facetiously, that “nothing intimidates me more than a community of experts in 
Joycean matters”), he makes certain to emphasize the difference between himself and 
his expert colleagues: “that is the difference of competence. All of you are experts, 
you belong to one of the most remarkable of institutions.”92 Derrida goes on to 
describe this institution of Joyce critics as “a reading machine” made both 
indispensable and impossible by Joyce himself. And so “the intimidation amounts to 
this: Joyce experts are the representatives as well as the effects of the most powerful 
project for programming over the centuries the totality of research in the onto-logico-
encyclopedic field … a Joyce scholar has the right to dispose the totality of 
competence in the encyclopedic field of the universitas. He has at his command the 
computer of all memory, he plays with the entire archive of culture,” and so on 
(Derrida 281). While a more detailed explanation of Derrida’s passing reference to 
“the onto-logico-encylopedic field” might be productive, it would have but limited 
relevance to the analysis that this chapter will pursue. It is enough to briefly note that 
the encyclopedia – a written compendium of all knowledge produced in every 
discipline (i.e., the university) – was envisioned by Diderot as a transmission to future 
generations for the preservation of knowledge after death;93 in other words, it is or it 
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aims to be a total memory trace that encodes and enshrines the adequacy of words to 
things. This is a fitting analogy, since Joyce’s ambition was notoriously for Ulysses to 
accomplish exactly the same function: he wrote to Frank Budgen that he wanted “to 
give a picture of Dublin so complete that if the city one day suddenly disappeared 
from the earth it could be reconstructed out of my book.”94 Meanwhile, Derrida 
effectively imagines how Ulysses constructs its ideal reader, the “reading machine” 
adequate to this finally completed picture. De-personalized, lacking subjectivity 
because reduced the function of processing bits of textual information, a 
“hypermnesic” repository of all memory disconnected from this or that body: this 
“reader” is in itself no one, a mindless input/output machine equipped only to 
recognize and express the encyclopedic whole of the novel. The erasure of sense, 
meaning, and subjectivity that haunts this image of the “reader” (and other versions of 
Joyce’s reader, conspicuously already created and anticipated by Finnegans Wake, where 
“that ideal reader suffering from an ideal insomnia” makes a literal appearance) will be 
clarified in what follows.95  
 Before taking the first steps in my investigation of materialism in “Ithaca,” I 
will briefly pause to anticipate and explain my approach to the interpretation of Ulysses 
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given the peculiar critical situation which I’ve just characterized. How should the 
question of materialism in Joyce be situated with respect the enormous and 
sophisticated body of secondary literature addressed to Ulysses alone? In fact, I will 
eventually argue that it is a common but serious mistake to continue to associate 
Joyce’s novel with materialism without first engaging in careful reflection on the usage 
and justification of that notoriously vague terminology. At the same time, the critical 
situation suggests that the idea of real “progress” in producing new readings of Joyce 
is utterly misplaced; if it doesn’t commit the theoretical sin of presupposing the telos of 
a last word on Ulysses, then it at least hubristically neglects the irredeemably contingent 
and transitory character of reading in the face of all we know about the history and 
the future of the novel’s reception. It likewise reveals the discomforting possibility 
that Ulysses is ultimately only a mirror for those many theories of the novel or of 
literature tout court, which have therefore seen in it really only their own reflection.  
This is not idle anxiety about the possibility or impossibility of saying anything 
new, because it bears in a specific way on the position of Joyce in the argument of this 
dissertation, with respect to both Virginia Woolf and to modernism at large. I have 
already emphasized that many of the conclusions I drew with respect to To the 
Lighthouse and Between the Acts are specific to Woolf and to a lesser extent her 
intellectual and cultural climate. Unlike Joyce, Woolf explicitly builds a literary 
doctrine out of the rejection of materialism in the novel; while it’s a noteworthy clue 
that she saw a potential ally on the side of “life” against materialism in what she had 
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initially read of Ulysses96, this obviously tells us more about Woolf than it does about 
Joyce. When she says that “Mr. Joyce is spiritual; he is concerned at all costs to reveal 
the flickerings of that innermost flame which flashes its messages through the brain,”  
and so on, it is not a dramatic stretch to see in her commendation a bit of self-
advertisement, if not outright self-description. And when she archly concludes her 
brief on Joyce with the claim that “if we want life itself” then it’s surely to be found in 
Joyce’s “scene in the cemetery” (Woolf 1984, 151) – i.e., the “Hades” episode – we 
should not let the irony pass without notice (a sentiment confirmed privately in a diary 
entry from August 1922, where Woolf writes that she “dislike[s] Ulysses more and 
more,” that she finds it “more and more unimportant,” and finally that she no longer 
“trouble[s] conscientiously to make out its meanings”).97 Woolf’s published and 
private judgments have the important consequence, for my argument, of relatively 
downplaying the influence of Joyce on Woolf. The organization of the dissertation 
reflects this: by going chronologically backwards, it aims at the specificity of the 
problem of materialism in the work of both writers even while it hopes to produce a 
conclusion that situates the two writers on the same terrain vis-à-vis materialism and 
the novel form. How ought the question of Joyce’s relation to materialism be posed, 
                                                 
96 The revised edition of “Modern Fiction” was appeared in The Common Reader in 1925, obviously after the 
publication of Ulysses; an earlier version entitled “Modern Novels” was published in TLS in 1919, so Woolf’s 
references to Ulysses in the later revision only reflect a reading of the available chapters of Ulysses which were 
serialized in The Little Review between 1918 and 1920.   
97 Bell, Anne Oliver, ed. The Diary of Virginia Woolf, Volume Two: 1920-1924. New York and London: Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich, 1978. pp. 195-6.  
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then, while both preserving the specificity of this question with respect to Ulysses and 
justifying the comparison between Woolf and Joyce that is an implicit ground of the 
argument as a whole? This is a central methodological problem that the analysis to 
follow will have to resolve.  
Taken as a whole, the entire preceding explication of the peculiarity of the 
Joycean critical situation, both in general and in this dissertation, functions not just to 
exacerbate authorial hand-wringing about the stakes of intervening in such a well-
established sub-discipline of English literature and of modernist studies in general. On 
the contrary, these remarks situate and preface the following, somewhat astonishing, 
claim: that while the implicit or explicit association of Joyce’s fiction with materialism, 
in one form or another, is both long-standing and familiar, very few Joyce scholars 
have made the theme or the concept of materialism an explicit object of critical or 
theoretical interrogation. There are no book-length monographs in English that make 
Joyce’s materialism – or failing that, Joyce’s expressed or endorsed attitude toward 
materialism – a dominant theme worthy of detailed elaboration, and there are but a 
smattering of article-length studies that make materialism a primary object of critical 
attention and concern.98 It is surprising, to say the least, that this is true in an 
institutional and intellectual atmosphere in which it is easy to take at face value the 
claims that Joyce is somehow a materialist, that failing that he is sympathetic to 
                                                 
98 The best example I’ve found is Platt, L.H. “If Brian Boru Could But Come Back and See the Old Dublin Now: 
Materialism, the National Culture, and Ulysses 17” in Joyce’s “Ithaca” (European Joyce Studies 6). Ed. Andrew 
Gibson. Amsterdam: Rodolpi, 1996.  
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philosophical materialism, or finally that his work enshrines and privileges 
“materiality” in a unique and uniquely significant way. The notion of materialism 
makes frequent appearances in the literature on Ulysses, even though few critics have 
troubled to offer a sustained explanation or appreciation of why materialism is 
evidently such an appealing description for Joyce as a writer or Ulysses as a novel. It’s 
not as if such explanations aren’t available, and it’s not as if critics are so naïve to 
employ the related concepts of materialism and materiality when describing, say, the 
theme and the imagery of the human body in Ulysses. Rather, it’s the fact that the use 
of these terms often seems so unremarkable – literally not deserving further remark – 
that stands out so starkly. It’s in no small part the unremarkable status of materialism 
in Joyce that this chapter aims to rectify.  
Where has the idea of materialism appeared explicitly in Joyce? It was suggested 
above that while “materialism” as an object of explicit approbation makes very visible 
appearances in Woolf, this is not exactly the case in Joyce’s writing: there’s no 
especially compelling reason to think that “materialism” was one of Joyce’s words. It 
does appear infrequently in his critical and occasional writing. In a brief review of the 
Scottish classicist John Burnet’s edition of Aristotle on Education that appeared in 
Dublin’s Daily Express in 1903, for example, a young Joyce wrote that the book’s value 
was tied not to its negligible contribution to contemporary philosophical literature but 
instead to the salutary reminder of Aristotle’s thought “at the present time, when the 
scientific specialists and the whole cohort of Materialists are cheapening the good 
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name of philosophy.”99 It’s possible to pinpoint various sources for the indictment of 
science and materialism with which Joyce concludes his brief review, some of which 
will be discussed below. In general, though, the sentiment gives the impression of 
being extremely conventional for an educated young man who was aware of 
fashionable ideas in Dublin literary and intellectual circles, particularly those of Yeats 
– who saw in the freshness of British and European “symbolism” a quasi-Romantic 
rejection of “nineteenth-century materialism.”100 But that is by no means evidence for 
thinking that the use of “materialism” in his Burnet review is the mark of an incipient 
aesthetic or literary doctrine: apart from its defense of philosophy from the 
encroachment of science (and presumably above all from the science of the body that 
ostensibly threatens to collapse “spirit” into an occult quality), it stands out only for 
being fairly unremarkable.  
Further reference to “materialism” appeared in Joyce’s writing ten years later, in 
the spring of 1912. Joyce, then living in Trieste (at the time located in Austria-
Hungary), attempted to gain certification from the Italian government to teach in 
public schools in Italy. The attempt was ultimately blocked by Italian officials due to 
concerns, no doubt exaggerated, about Joyce’s Irish degrees. Before that, though, 
                                                 
99 Joyce, James. Occasional, Critical, and Political Writings. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2000. p. 80. Cited hereafter as 
OCP.  
100 Which is not to say that Joyce explicitly endorsed Yeats’s ideas (see, for example, Yeats’s own account of his 
first meeting with Joyce in October 1902, originally intended for publication in Ideas of Good and Evil, and 
reproduced in Ellmann’s seminal biography. (Ellmann, Richard. James Joyce (revised ed.). Oxford: Oxford UP, 
1959 [rev. 1982]. pp. 101-3. Cited hereafter as JJ. ) 
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Joyce traveled to Padua for examinations at the Università degli Studi; this would 
serve to establish his competence in speaking, writing, and translating English and 
Italian.101 Joyce composed and submitted two examination essays for the university in 
Padua: one on Dickens (1912 was the hundredth anniversary of his birth) and one on 
“L’influenza letterario universal del rinascimento,” that is, “The Universal Literary 
Influence of the Renaissance.”102 The latter essay, written during a period when Joyce 
was in urgent search of a publisher for Dubliners, fleshes out in only slightly more 
detail the indictment of materialism found in the Burnet review. Given the 
circumstances of this essay’s composition, it’s difficult to say exactly what sorts of 
claims it may warrant, but there’s no reason to think that it doesn’t present some 
glimpse of Joyce’s considered views on European art and culture of the day. 
Furthermore, even though the essay focuses primarily on the consequences of the 
historical Renaissance, it may not be inappropriate to see in this inquiry a sotto voce 
appraisal of both the prospects for  and the meaning of cultural renewal in the 
twentieth century. And if this is to be found, it’s because Joyce is quite skeptical about 
the influence of the actual Renaissance on the present (if indeed we find disapproval 
in the claims that “the Renaissance … has placed the journalist in the monk’s chair” 
or that Shakespeare is “to a certain extent responsible for modern cinematography” 
[OCP 188]. Joyce opens the essay by characterizing the technological advances 
                                                 
101 Cf. JJ 320-1. 
102 OCP 187-190 
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accomplished by the age, visually evident “on the street of a large modern city: the 
electric tram, telegraph wires, the humble and necessary postman,” (187) and so on. 
“But in the midst of this complex and many-sided civilization the human mind,” he 
continues, “almost terrorized by material greatness, becomes lost, denies itself and 
grows weaker.” With that thesis, he arrives at the guiding question of the essay as a 
whole: “should we then conclude that present-day materialism, which descends in a 
direct line from the Renaissance, atrophies the spiritual faculties of man, impedes his 
development, blunts his keenness?” (ibid.).  
Joyce answers essentially in the affirmative, lamenting the “degeneration” of 
Renaissance intellectual and aesthetic virtues into “frenetic sensationalism” (ibid.). In a 
memorable formula, he says “of modern man that he has an epidermis rather than a 
soul” (188-89). Joyce depicts a culture and an art fixated on the minutiae of detail and 
of circumstance, and decries the “literary jargon” that “speaks of nothing else than 
local colour, atmosphere, [and] atavism,” the sources of a “the restless search for what 
is new and strange, the accumulation of details that have been observed or read, the 
parading of common culture” (ibid.). Already we see that, despite the unusual 
circumstances in this essay was composed and the fair assumption that it was never 
intended for publication, the appearance of “present-day materialism” here is much 
more significant in connection with a literary and aesthetic doctrine. Joyce’s rhetorical 
associations with materialism are both deeper and more revealing: the latter seems to 
be able to stand for the loss of morality, the weakening of imaginative creativity, the 
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value of the ideal as opposed to the accumulation of fact or sheer data, the 
technological transformation of everyday life in bourgeois society, and scientific forms 
of knowledge. While the idea that materialism might successfully encode all of these 
negative values is telling, the associations that Joyce produces remain in and of 
themselves fairly conventional. What is notable is role of literature in both reflecting 
and producing these social and intellectual ills. The aesthetic heart of the essay arrives 
with the apparent repudiation of the “most characteristic works that we possess,” 
which are “simply amoral” (ibid.). Maurice Maeterlinck, Anatole France, and Ivan 
Turgenev are given as examples, but the climax of the argument is the comparison 
between Wagner and Dante that concludes: “one is the art of circumstance, the other 
is ideational” (ibid.). Wagner inevitably suffers in comparison with the author of the 
Inferno, in whom Joyce sees an image of the atlas-maker of the Middle Ages inscribing 
“hic sunt leones” on the unknown areas of the world: “the idea of solitude, the terror of 
strange beasts, the unknown were enough for him. Our culture has an entirely 
different goal: we are avid for details” (ibid.).103 Materialism, in other words, is not just 
a vague malady of the present age, but a compositional and aesthetic principle refined 
by most revered and exemplary artworks; equally remarkable is the image of artistic 
“ideation” that Joyce opposes to aesthetic materialism. Where the latter seeks the 
                                                 
103 Joyce’s professed distaste for Wagner is well-documented, so his disparagement of Tristan and Isolde is not 
unexpected; however, cf. Martin, Timothy. Joyce and Wagner: A Study of Influence. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
1992. Martin says, for example, that “Joyce’s denigration of Wagner … implies much more than simple iconoclasm, 
for it represents a general antagonism toward the cultural authorities of his day,” (166) but that “even the quickest 
glance … shows the extent to which Joyce’s work takes up the Wagnerian gauntlet” (188).  
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accumulation and multiplication of sense data (as in the Wagnerian reproduction of 
“every pulsation, every tremor, the lightest shiver, the lightest sigh” [ibid.] experienced 
in love and in accord, certainly, with the ongoing refinement of technologies for 
isolating and measuring the mechanisms of sensation104), the art of ideation 
encounters a moment of sheer creation. When the atlas-maker inscribes the void, he 
makes a figure for a reality inaccessible to ordinary vision; where this vision fails at the 
edge of the known world, a pure creation is demanded: hic sunt leones. A comparison 
with Nietzsche – Joyce contra Wagner – might strongly suggest itself.  
I will return to these passages and this image of the (Dantean) atlas-maker 
inscribing the void in some of what follows, but at this point there is sufficient 
evidence for the claim that materialism is not an especially important concept or 
category for the historical Joyce. Where it does appear, it has a conventional and 
unremarkably negative connotation. Indeed, what’s most important about the 
appearance of “present-day materialism” in the examination essay on the Renaissance 
is its rhetorical association with what Joyce perceives as a failed “art of circumstance.” 
It produces an image of the aesthetic implications of materialism, particularly in its 
imagination of the encounter with the conceptual void of unknown territory105, that 
                                                 
104 Regarding this second point, the scholarship of Jonathan Crary is especially valuable for its historical and 
philosophical interpretation of “the division and fragmentation of the physical subject into increasingly specific 
organic and mechanical systems” (81) and related technological, physiological, and philosophical developments in 
the nineteenth century (Crary, Jonathan. Techniques of the Observer: On Vision and Modernity in the Nineteenth 
Century. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1992.). See also Crary, Jonathan. Suspensions of Perception: Attention, 
Spectacle, and Modern Culture. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1999.  
105 It is easy to imagine, here, how the image of the atlas-maker would likewise be incorporated into arguments 
about the post-colonial Joyce.  
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will inform my reading of “Ithaca,” but it likewise suggests a distinct sense of 
resentment directed at more esteemed peers by a writer who was still struggling to 
find a publisher for his collection of short stories. In other word, it stands for polemic 
as much as doctrine.  
At any rate, this brief reading of the anti-materialism of the young Joyce is 
designed to set up a second and rather important question. That is: on what basis do 
scholars and readers of Joyce find such compelling reason to think of him either as a 
materialist or as a writer who enshrines materiality in some unique way (allowing that 
these two descriptions may coextensive), particularly given Joyce’s own conventional 
and generally negative attitude on the subject? The short answer and insufficient 
answer, of course, is that they base such claims on the interpretation of his work, and 
there is no good reason to suppose that reading an author’s work “against” his or her 
actual or hypothetical interpretations of the latter is in principle illegitimate. In order 
to understand how and why the concept of materialism has been apparently so 
alluring a description of Joyce, then, we need to look at the sort of interpretive labor 
that it has been thought (or assumed) to perform.  
It turns out that this labor is great indeed, appropriately enough for a novel and 
a body of scholarship that bears such encyclopedic ambitions. Critics have discerned 
either an explicitly materialist dimension or the theme of philosophical materialism in 
play in (at least) six, sometimes related or overlapping, thematic areas of Ulysses. These 
dimensions, in summary form, are as follows: (a) the human body (or sometimes its 
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products); (b) Dublin and turn of the century urban life; (c) the philosophy of thinkers 
like Aquinas and Aristotle; (d) science; (e) language, either represented thought and 
speech or the text’s narrative discourse; (f) theosophy and/or the Irish literary revival. 
Clearly the purview of materialism as an explanatory device (or as a rhetorical tool) is 
vast, since this brief list is coextensive with many of the great themes of Ulysses as a 
whole. An effort to catalogue with exactitude the invocation of materialism in all of 
these areas would be the goal of a much larger study than the present one; it is 
necessary, however, to get a sense of how the ostensibly materialist dimension of 
Ulysses has been evoked and described, especially before setting out to correct that 
evocation in my reading of “Ithaca.” For that reason I will expand very briefly on 
relevance of materialism for each of the thematic dimensions outlined above, and will 
give more sustained critical attention to what is perhaps the most exemplary of the 
“materialist” dimensions of Ulysses, i.e., the latter’s discourse on the body.  
In fact, the idea that Ulysses ought to be understood in terms of its putative 
materialism is a much older one than might be suspected. Theoretically revisionary 
accounts of modernist texts have multiplied under the contemporary fascination with 
textual and cultural materiality, and recent modernist studies have rectified the 
standard interpretations of literary modernism in terms of its inward turns, 
intensifications of subjectivity, and so on. This background of recent interpretive 
trends is visible in, for example, Sara Danius’s recent claim that “Joyce’s great 
achievement is to have taken literary materialism to a wholly new level, that is, to the 
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basest level possible: he introduced money, sex, and snot into serious literature.”106 In 
fact, according to Danius, he did accomplished this great achievement “without 
fanfare” (ibid.). This second claim is a hyperbolic, to say the least. Certainly the 
censorship of Ulysses in the United States after the publication of the “Nausicaa” 
episode (and Bloom’s masturbatory response to Gerty McDowell’s exhibition of her 
knickers) in The Little Review testifies to Ulysses’s early reputation for baseness and even 
pornographic obscenity (indeed, the critical fixation on bodily substance extends even 
to Judge Woolsey, whose decision in 1933 finally allowed Ulysses to be printed in the 
U.S.: “whilst in many places the effect of Ulysses … undoubtedly is somewhat emetic, 
nowhere does it tend to be aphrodisiac” (JJ 667).  
Besides recent theoretical interventions and that infamous episode in the 
novel’s publication history, the centrality of the human body to the novel has been 
visible from the start. Richard Aldington wrote (already in 1921) that Ulysses was 
“disgusting with a reason;” this was no complement since it predicted a pernicious 
influence on future writers, who were in Aldington’s eyes granted license to be 
“disgusting without reason” (Deming 188).107 Aldington laments Joyce’s missed 
potential, wishing he had not “returned to the bastard genre of the Naturalistes who 
mingle satire and tragedy,” and that he “had hoped to see [Joyce’s] characters emerge 
                                                 
106 Danius, Sara. “Joyce’s Scissors: Modernism and the Dissolution of the Event.” New Literary History 39.4 
(Autumn 2008). p. 1007.  
107 Aldington, Richard. “The Influence of Mr. James Joyce.” English Review xxxii (April 1921): pp. 333-41. 
Excerpted in Deming, Robert (ed.). James Joyce: The Critical Heritage. Volume I: 1907-27. London and New York: 
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176 
 
into a clearer air from the sordid arena in which they were subdued by Fate in a debris 
of decayed vegetables and putrid exhalations” (187-88). It’s hard not to see in 
Aldington’s repudiation of Joyce’s “influence” a pun; certainly he fears a generation of 
young writers who will pick up Joyce without appreciating the various (ostensible) 
failures of its form and style, but at the same time he hints at a more literal influence – 
that is, the flow of sordid matter – through the novel’s pages.  
Soon after the initial reception of Ulysses had been formulated, Wyndham Lewis 
made this double influence even more explicit in his peculiar treatise (a combination 
of philosophy, literary criticism, and polemic) on Time and Western Man. Where 
Danius’s remark seems to make “literary materialism” primarily a matter of the novel’s 
content, Lewis evokes more explicitly the Ulyssean formal “influence” In a well-
known attack, Lewis identifies the “stupendous outpouring of matter, or stuff” in 
Ulysses, expressing the readerly wish “to be transported to some more abstract region 
for a time, where the dates of the various toothpastes, the brewery and laundry 
receipts, the growing pile of punched ‘bus-tickets, the growing holes in the baby’s 
socks and the darn that repairs them, assume less importance” (Lewis 89). Lewis 
constantly has recourse to metaphors of digestion and excretion in his critique the 
Ulyssean “glut of matter.” The “movement of the narrative” in which a “dense mass 
of dead stuff” is collected induces “constipation;” (ibid.) Joyce had “an appetite that 
certainly never will be matched again for the actual matter revealed in his composition” 
(90). Finally, revoltingly, Lewis sees in Joyce the inheritance of a “nineteenth-century 
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naturalism” (repeating Aldington’s judgment), which in Ulysses is like “the voluminous 
curtain that fell, belated (with the alarming momentum of a ton or two of personally 
organized rubbish), upon the victorian scene. So rich was its delivery, its pent-up 
outpouring so vehement, that it will remain, eternally cathartic, a monument like a 
record diarrhoea” (ibid.). The novel “collects like a cistern … the last stagnant 
pumpings of victorian anglo-irish life” (ibid.).  
Despite Lewis’s vivid and unappetizing image of Ulysses as a cistern for the 
nineteenth century, his account at least has the virtue of constructing the ostensibly 
materialist element of Joyce in a manner that in some ways contravenes the implicit 
notion of a “literary materialism” such as Danius describes it. In that description, the 
“glut of matter” on display in Ulysses seems to be by itself sufficient evidence for the 
latter’s materialism. Danius writes, for instance, that Joyce “effected a kind of 
neutralization of the content” (1007). This so-called neutralization is partially an effect 
of the putative leveling of the relative importance of events or other objects of 
narration in Joyce, since they are all equally accorded their place in the record of a 
single day. The narration of Bloom’s outhouse activities (in “Calypso,” the morning 
episode that introduces Bloom, for example, when the latter relieves himself while 
reading the periodical Tit-bits: “Quietly he read, restraining himself, the first column 
and, yielding but resisting, began the second. Midway, his last resistance yielding, he 
allowed his bowels to ease themselves quietly as he read, reading still patiently that 
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slight constipation of yesterday quite gone” (U 4.506-09)108 – here it’s clear where 
Lewis found inspiration for his excretory motif) is from Danius’s point of view 
“neutral” in relation to any other narrated action, event, or object. According to 
Danius, this neutralization of content has as its corollary the highlighting of linguistic 
form, and so Bloom’s defecation becomes in this sense a “linguistic event” (Danius 
1007). This seems extremely inconsistent with the idea that Joyce’s writing represents 
a “literary materialism,” however, because it (a) makes no distinction at the level of 
content between the representation of material, physical objects or bodies and any 
other novelistic content and so it (b) subordinates the putatively material – say, the 
unremitting and unflinching incorporation of mundane bodily existence into the 
tradition of literary realism – to the character of its representation in language or its 
quality as a “linguistic event.” When Danius says of Joyce that “he told a tale that 
ultimately explodes the realist novel from within – precisely by taking realism to 
extremes” (1009) in the scandalous narrative accumulation of detail, she arrives at a 
point that weakens the rhetoric of materialism even further.  
How is this so? Just as Lewis’s account suggests, what we recognize as a 
scandalous and materialist fixation on the body (and on the influence of dead things) 
is emphatically a willed negation of nineteenth-century codes and conventions, not to 
mention social and cultural mores. Certainly the narrative selection and depiction of 
                                                 
108 Joyce, James. Ulysses. Hans Walter Gabler (ed.). New York: Vintage Books, 1986. Hereafter cited in text as U, 
with the conventional citation by episode and line number.  
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bodily functions shatters the division between public and private that the realist novel 
had conventionally erected. According to such conventions it is practically impossible 
to imagine the length and richness of narrative interest devoted to Stephen’s visual 
attention and internal monologue, walking on Sandymount Strand in the “Proteus” 
episode, to a wandering dog sniffing at its fellow’s corpse, urinating, and rooting in 
the sand: “the carcass lay on his path. He stopped, sniffed, stalked round it, brother, 
nosing closer, went round it, sniffling rapidly like a dog all over the dead dog’s 
bedraggled fell (U 3.348-50) … Along by the edge of the mole he lolloped, dawdled, 
smelt a rock and from under a cocked hindleg pissed against it. He trotted forward 
and, lifting again his hindleg, pissed quick short at an unsmelt rock. The simple 
pleasures of the poor. His hindpaws then scattered the sand: then his forepaws 
dabbled and delved” (U 3.356-60). Here Stephen’s recognition of the “simple 
pleasures of the poor” in the dog’s urination on the strand even makes explicit the 
norms of privacy that the passage plays a role in negotiating, since they find in the 
animal’s unashamed daytime excretion a “simple pleasure” that is presumably 
available to Stephen only behind closed doors. But it is the formal power of the 
narrator to open all such doors, and so to elevate the intricate banalities of daily life 
and its attendant “glut of matter,” bodily and otherwise, to public view via narration. 
It’s in this way that social and even anthropological rules, mores, and structures that 
govern the distinction between the public and private intersect with both the basic 
distinction of narrative as a form (that is, between “story” and “discourse” or the 
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material of the plot and the order and mode of its presentation in the narrator’s 
discourse) and with the historical unfolding of that form (in conventions that establish 
what story elements require or deserve presentation).  
Subsequently, Stephen is given the chance to indulge in this “simple pleasure” 
of the dog, in a setting that once again stages the boundary between the public and 
the private – close to dawn in Bloom’s back garden, standing next to Bloom while 
both men urinate and shield their genitals (in the latinate scientific and medical 
language of the parodically “objective” narrator of “Ithaca,” their “organs of 
micturition”) from view. Bloom and Stephen have returned to Bloom’s house at 7 
Eccles Street after the day’s activity, to have a cup of cocoa. Eventually the pair enter 
the garden in the back of the house. The impersonal narrative of the catechism gives 
this egress a comically Biblical connotation: “with what attendant ceremony was the 
exodus from the house of bondage to the wilderness of inhabitation effected?” (U 
17.1021-22). After perhaps the most explicitly poetic and blatantly figural use of 
language in the entire episode (in a passage that has been widely remarked upon and 
will be discussed below; in connection with this discussion, it’s worth noting the 
rapidity with which the narrative gaze and interest shuttles between beauty and 
baseness: “What spectacle confronted them when they, first the host, then the guest, 
emerged silently … into the penumbra of the garden? The heaventree of stars hung 
with humid nightblue fruit” [U 17.1036-39]), and the respective contemplation of the 
cosmic spectacle of the night sky above Dublin, Bloom and Stephen do not remain 
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“indefinitely inactive” (U 17.1185); instead, “at Stephen’s suggestion, at Bloom’s 
instigation both, first Stephen, then Bloom, in penumbra urinated, their sides 
contiguous, their organs of micturition reciprocally rendered invisible by manual 
circumposition, their gazes, first Bloom’s, then Stephen’s, elevated to the projected 
luminous and semiluminous shadow” (U 17.1186-90). This time, however, Stephen’s 
thoughts turn not to the pleasures of sheer corporeality but instead to questions about 
Catholic doctrine concerning the body of Christ. The fact that “invisible audible” (U 
17.1200) urination of Bloom provokes in Stephen the imagination of theological 
disputes about the nature limits of divine embodiment – i.e., in general, the thought of 
the dead matter of the body as a sign – is a perhaps a predictable illustration of the 
imagery that dominates so much of the young lapsed Catholic’s imaginative life. But 
it’s not only typical that the “problems presented” (ibid.) to Stephen at the sound of 
Bloom’s urination include “the problem of the sacerdotal integrity of Jesus 
circumcised … and the problem as to whether the divine prepuce, the carnal bridal 
ring of the holy Roman catholic apostolic church, conserved in Calcata, were 
deserving of simple hyperduly or of the fourth degree of latria accorded to the 
abscission of such divine excresences as hair and toenails” (U 17.1203-09) (or, in 
other words, whether the foreskin of Christ warranted the veneration [latria] properly 
accorded to God or only that accorded to Mary [hyperduly]). The theological question 
about whether these excresences sufficiently present or represent divinity anticipates 
and mirrors the critical effort to read meaning into contingent, seemingly extraneous 
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matter, an effort that Ulysses seemingly invites at every turn. The imagery of the 
remains and relics of a dead god is likewise an image of the novel. It’s noteworthy that 
this invitation comes at a moment of apparent sacrilege but also in a scene and 
episode where the artificiality of narrative convention is on brazen display. The 
narrator’s question about which problems were “presented” to Bloom and Stephen in 
reaction to the sound of urination, and the indirect discourse of the response, makes 
no attempt to hide the novelistic convention of making thought or interior life 
transparent to the reader: while Stephen’s thoughts turn to parts abscised from the 
body of Christ, Bloom’s are more earthly and are presented in the form of a list – 
typically of “Ithaca,” there’s no narrative effort at an exactingly realistic stream of 
consciousness or monologue interieur to be found in Bloom’s precise but indistinct 
thoughts of “irritability, tumescence, rigidity, reactivity, dimension, sanitariness, and 
pilosity” (U 17.1201-02).  
There are many available ways to understand these scenes of uncultured 
animality and bodily discharge, but it is at the very least an exaggeration to say that  
don’t uniquely make themselves dramatically visible by contravening some principle 
of literary decorum as well as established conventions guiding the narrative selection 
of material for representation. And to the extent that this is true, the celebration of 
their putative materialism either misses the mark or empties out the notion of 
materialism: if the representation of bodily matter and the vicissitudes of embodiment 
are supposed to contest or stand in recalcitrant opposition to ideality and the 
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abstraction of the subject,109 then the blatant historical and generic mediation of such 
representation only reinstates a subject of history and generic convention. They 
propose a reader able to recognize in them a simultaneous negation and exacerbation 
of the techniques of literary realism. Ezra Pound’s remark to the American lawyer and 
patron of modernism, John Quinn, early in the history of the composition of Ulysses 
(after Joyce had circulated the Telemachiad or first three episodes) is instructive in this 
regard. After, Ellmann notes, Quinn was “taken aback” by the language of 
“Telemachus” (perhaps Buck Mulligan’s revision, looking out onto the Irish Sea, of 
the Homeric “winedark:” “a new art colour for our Irish poets: snotgreen. You can 
almost taste it, can’t you?” [U 1.73-74]), “Pound had to write him on April 3 [1918] a 
vigorous defense: ‘I can’t agree with you about Joyce’s first chapter. I don’t think the 
passages about [Stephen’s] mother’s death and the sea would would come with such 
force if they weren’t imbedded in squalor and disgust” (JJ 421). Whether or not we 
agree with Pound’s defense in exactly these terms, the general point stands: the more 
                                                 
109 This argumentative strategy has been adopted by Christine van Boheemen-Saaf, and I suggest it guides Danius’s 
affiliation of the “base” level of bodily fluids and naked sexuality – e.g., Bloom’s onanism in “Nausicaa” – with the 
domain of a “literary materialism.” Boheemen-Saaf’s account focuses on the climactic “Penelope” episode and its 
implicit and explicit contestation, via its emphasis embodiment and the female body in particular, of the 
conventional conclusions of philosophical idealism. Boheemen-Saaf’s essay, “Joyce’s Answer to Philosophy: 
Writing the Dematerializing Object” (in Joyce, “Penelope,” and the Body (European Joyce Studies 17). Ed. Richard 
Brown. Amsterdam: Rodolpi, 2006) is another exemplary interpretation of Joyce’s ostensible materialism and 
Joycean materiality. Boheemn-Saaf argues, for example, that “the hyper-real … physicality of Joyce’s ‘Penelope’ 
embodies a response countering the Enlightenment construction of the bodiless subject,” (32-33); following Joyce’s 
provocative suggestion to editor and patron Harriet Shaw Weaver that he “rejected the usual interpretation of her as 
a human apparition (…). In conception and technique I tried to depict the earth which is prehumen and presumably 
posthuman” (Ellmann, Richard, ed. Selected Joyce Letters. New York: The Viking Press, 1975 [1957]. p. 289), 
Boheemen-Saaf proposes that “Penelope” generally and the body of Molly Bloom in particular “represents 
materiality or physicality as a timeless presence,” (34) and ultimately concludes that Joyce’s writing, especially his 
obscenity, represents a “fantasmatic attempt to rematerialize the body as the shape and figure of the primal object: a 
Penelope mythically fertile” (46).  
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emphatically obscene or unflinchingly base the content, the more it stands out as a 
comment on and departure from a tradition (and one that is in some sense not 
absolutely given qua tradition etched in stone, but constructed by this comment and 
this departure); the more the effort at a figuration of ostensibly sheer materiality is in 
evidence, the more the formal and technical apparatus for presenting this figuration 
comes into view.  
In a different context, Danius has argued that Ulysses participates in a distinctly 
modernist “shift from idealist theories of aesthetic gratification to essentially 
materialist ones” which conceive “aesthetic experience [as] based in a notion of the 
immanence of the body.”110 It does so, according to Danius, primarily by way of its 
stylistic and grammatical autonomization and reification of hearing and eyesight. As 
she says, “to explore how acts of perception are staged … is to uncover a powerful 
stylistic tendency that, on the level of the sentence, pulls toward differentiation and 
autonomization” (153). Danius underlines many instances where what she calls 
Joyce’s “aesthetics of immediacy” is on view, and makes a compelling case for the 
idea that Ulysses both responds to and enacts a historical disarticulation of the senses 
that accompanies, for example, the new modes and techniques of recording and 
measuring perception (photography, cinematography, phonography, and telephony 
being only the most notorious examples; in this her account is clearly influenced by 
                                                 
110 Danius, Sara. The Senses of Modernism: Technology, Perception, and Aesthetics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 2002. 
p. 194.  
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the work of media theorists like Friedrich Kittler and Jonathan Crary, and one of her 
main ideas that “Joyce’s aesthetics comes into being as a solution to a historical 
problem – how to recover and represent the immediacy of lived experience in an age 
when modes of experience are continually reified by, among other things, the 
emergence of technologies for reproducing the visual and audible real” [192] draws its 
language from Fredric Jameson’s notion of literary form as ideological “solution” to 
historical contradiction). Examples of this autonomization or disarticulation can be 
found across Ulysses, as Danius shows. In “Lotus Eaters,” Bloom has paused while 
walking down Westland Row on the south side of Dublin, looking into the window of 
the “Belfast and Oriental Tea Company” (U 5.17-18); here is the narration of Bloom’s 
reading of the “leadpapered packets” (U 5.18) of tea: “while his eyes still read blandly 
he took of his hat quietly inhaling his hairoil and sent his right hand with slow grace 
over his brow and hair … under their dropped lids his eyes found the tiny bow of the 
leather headband” (U 5.20-24). Danius observes here that “Bloom’s body appears as 
an assemblage of independently operating parts, each differentiated, autonomous, and 
functionalized” (Danius 162). Even richer examples can be found in the “Nausicaa” 
episode (which according to the so-called Gilbert schema is categorized by the organ 
of the eye), when Bloom’s erotic encounter with Gerty McDowell is mediated 
exclusively by vision. There – in a public setting on the Sandymount Strand while the 
visual attention of Gerty’s friends is drawn skyward to evening fireworks – the 
direction of Bloom’s gaze is focalized through Gerty:  
186 
 
 
“and she saw a long Roman candle going up over the trees, up, up, and, in the 
tense hush, they were all breathless with excitement as it went higher and 
higher and she had to lean back more and more to lok up afer it, high, high, 
almost out of sight, and her face was suffused with a divine, an entrancing 
blush from straining back and he could see her other things too, nainsook 
knickers, the fabric that caresses the skin … and she let him and she saw that 
he saw,” (U 13.719-726) 
and so on. This is of course a widely scrutinized scene, leading as it does to Gerty’s 
departure and the scandal of Bloom’s masturbation; Danius’s remarks focus on the 
significance of Bloom’s and Gerty’s eyes assuming an agency that is integral to the 
story as such. “In effect,” she writes, “eyes in Ulysses emerge as characters in their own 
right, appearing to operate independently of the human consciousness to vision is 
nevertheless related. Eyes claim autonomy for themselves, not just from the other 
senses and the human body at large but also from a central processing instance, the 
hermeneutic switchboard called the brain” (Danius 160).  
In general, the evidence that Danius marshals in support of her claim about the 
disarticulation of organs of perception throughout Ulysses, in relation to the 
emergence of new techniques for isolating, recording, and reproducing sound and 
vision, appears favorable to the lucid and suggestive interpretation that she lends it. 
But the extent to which Joyce’s ordering and representation of aisthesis can be 
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identified with a strictly materialist aesthetic theory grounded on the “immanence of 
the body” (194) or that is “enabled and inscribed by a historically specific discourse 
where the materiality of the body has become the privileged site of aesthetics and 
where perception is an aesthetically gratifying activity in its own right” (196) ought to 
be disputed. Certainly Danius admits that “Joycean visuality and aurality have to rely 
upon the eye – an eye that translates the diverse representations of sight and sound 
into mental sensations to be seen or heard in the silent interiority of the reader” and 
that “the immediacy of visuality and aurality require mediation” in print, an irony that 
is both “irreducible and inescapable” (185). If it’s true that the visible linguistic matter 
of the written word relentlessly undermines the text’s efforts at a depiction of 
immediacy or physiological immanence through formal and conventional means of 
“translation,” then how much credence can be given to the conception Danius offers 
of Joyce’s materialist aesthetic when the latter relies so heavily on ideas of either 
immediacy or the ostensible purification of perception in bodily immanence? First, 
Danius’s perpetual insistence that Joyce’s “aesthetics of immediacy” bears most 
explicitly on the representation of everyday life– e.g., in the claim that “Joyce’s 
modernist artifact seeks to transcend the domain of literature, even the domain of art 
as such, attempting to capture the experience of everyday life in its lived immediacy” 
(187) – rings false. While there indeed appears to be a consensus that everyday “lived 
experience,” a phrase which entered common usage as an approximate translation of 
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the German Erlebnis, is characterized by immediacy, Ulysses is if anything a monument 
to the unremitting mediation of ordinary conscious experience.  
Warrant for this claim can be found on virtually every one of the novel’s pages: 
the fact that Stephen’s thoughts turn to theological disputes about the body of Christ 
just at the sound of Bloom’s urination and the image of his circumcised penis is a 
proximate example but is no more emphatic in nature than all such depictions of the 
panoply of mediating forces acting on sheer perception in Ulysses; in another example 
from “Ithaca” that makes its (quasi-) narrative technique for the linguistic 
representation of sight and hearing even more explicit, the historical and temporal 
mediation of putatively sheer sensation is neatly distilled. In this scene Steven and 
Bloom are engaged in a linguistic comparison of “ancient Hebrew and ancient Irish” 
(U 17.724). The narrator here puts not only translation but the peculiar formal 
elements of written language on display (Stephen and Bloom perform an ad hoc 
“glyphic comparison of phonic symbols” (U 17.731) of Hebrew and Irish by written 
“juxtaposition … on the penultimate blank page of a book of inferior literary style” 
(U 17.733-34); their comparison is licensed, the narrator notes in academic style, by 
general “points of contact” between the two languages such as “the presence of 
guttural sounds, diacritic aspirations, epenthetic and servile letters,” “their antiquity” 
and “their archaeological, genealogical, hagiographical, exegetical, homiletic, 
toponomastic, historical and religious literatures,” and so on [U 17.745-753]). This 
brief but dense comparison (because formal, historical, cultural, and also political, 
189 
 
since the narrator draws attention to the parallel or “point of contact” between “the 
restoration in Chanah David of Zion and the possibility of Irish political autonomy or 
devolution” [U 17.759-60]) culminates in a depiction of sensation that is anything but 
pure or autonomous. The question “what was Stephen’s auditive sensation?” (U 
17.776) might invite a response that tried to capture in language the felt quality of 
hearing in such a manner that strategically emulates, say, the recording capacities of 
the phonograph. Instead, Stephen “heard in a profound ancient male unfamiliar 
melody” – Bloom chanting a half-forgotten anthem in Hebrew (U 17.763-64) – “ the 
accumulation of the past” (U 17.777-78); likewise, Bloom’s “visual sensation” (U 
17.779) is of “a quick young male familiar form the predestination of a future” (U 
17.780). The least that one can say about this figuration of sensation is that is 
mediated by language, and not in any abstract sense of the latter. By staging sensation 
and conscious awareness alongside the inscribed juxtaposition of ancient languages, in 
a manner that explicitly affirms the coincidence of form, history, and politics, (and 
even, comically, of superior “literary style”), this scene provides a compelling and 
distilled image of Ulysses as a whole.  
This point leads to a broader one about the coordination of “materialism” and 
aesthetics which is the object of Danius’s reading of Joyce and the subject matter of 
this dissertation as a whole. Putting skepticism about claims to immediacy aside, I 
want to transition to an argument about the appearance of this theme in “Ithaca” with 
a final remark about the idea of a materialist aesthetics in general. It’s worth noting in 
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this regard – though it cannot be the decisive word on the subject – that the young 
Joyce himself, freshly arrived in Paris in early 1903, recorded his quasi-Aristotelian 
thoughts on aesthetics in a journal that survives as the “Paris Notebook.” These are 
notes for a work on aesthetic theory that at that time he still hoped to write and which 
coincidentally or not he predicted would appear in print around 1922.111 The notes 
themselves are brief and distinctly Aristotelian, having been written during a time in 
which Joyce spent his days at the Bibliothèque Nationale reading Victor Cousin’s 
translations of Aristotle alongside the plays of Ben Jonson (JJ 120). Of primary 
interest in these notes is Joyce’s formalist effort at defining the artwork in relation to 
“sensible or intelligible matter” (OCP 104). “Art,” Joyce records, is the human 
disposition” of the latter “for an aesthetic end” (ibid.); on these terms, art can be 
formally distinguished from other kinds of physical objects as well as other means of 
producing or transforming matter. Hence “excrements, children, and lice” are not 
works of art even though they are “human dispositions of sensible matter,”112 because 
“their end is not an aesthetic end” (ibid.). The same considerations can be devoted to 
other categories of objects; interestingly, the young Joyce considers it impossible for a 
photograph to be a work of art in the strict sense because, while it may have an 
                                                 
111 It is widely known that he wrote to his mother in March of 1903 announcing that “my book of songs will be 
published in the spring of 1907. My first comedy about five years later. My “Esthetic” about five years later again” 
(The Letters of James Joyce [Vol. 2]. Richard Ellmann, ed. London: Faber, 1966. p. 38; cited  at OCP 311).  
112 The inclusion of “lice” among children and excrement as human dispositions of sensible matter is more evidence 
of the young Joyce’s Aristotelian influence; Aristotle adduced a theory of the spontaneous generation of fleas and 
lice from excrement, perspiration, and unclean flesh. Cf. The History of Animals 556b25-28 et. passim. Though the 
idea of spontaneous generation would have a lengthy subsequent history, it was essentially invalidated by the middle 
of the nineteenth century.    
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aesthetic end, it is a mechanical and not a human disposition of matter. A man 
“hacking in fury at a block of wood” may spontaneously create a mimetic sculpture – 
“an image of a cow (say)” – has the precisely the same formal status as excrement or 
children, i.e. a human disposition of sensible matter for no aesthetic end, and 
therefore cannot be considered art even if it resembles an artwork in every other 
respect (ibid.). And finally functional objects like “houses, clothes, furniture, etc.” 
present a limit case – they are only works of art “when disposed for an aesthetic end,” 
and so they at least raise the question of the artistic status of ornament. For the young 
Joyce this presents no apparent problem; such objects are “not necessarily” works of 
art, only when their matter is arranged, once again, for an aesthetic end (104-05).  
We shouldn’t necessarily give these youthful formulae much explanatory 
credence, particularly insofar as the fundamental concept of an “aesthetic end” seems 
hopelessly circular unless Joyce can define it such that it doesn’t already contain the 
concept of “art;” otherwise the claim that “art is matter that a human has intentionally 
organized with the purpose of making it art” clarifies little. What we should 
emphasize instead is Joyce’s early recognition of the artwork as a site of convergence 
between materiality and (some notion of) the aesthetic; I aim below to clarify this 
relation in “Ithaca.” Danius’s account of Joyce’s ostensibly materialist aesthetics is by 
no means “reductive” in the sense that this epithet often receives in critical and 
literary-theoretical practice (where it typically connotes negation, elimination, or even 
rhetorical denigration), but her conception of a materialist or physiological theory of 
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the aesthetic, which she attributes to the Joyce of Ulysses, is avowedly reductive in the 
sense that it supposes that the definition and explanation of the aesthetic requires no 
other resources than an understanding of bodily matter (and its technological 
prostheses). Danius disputes the “idealist” notion – which she associates principally 
with Hegel’s aesthetics – that “the work of art is an ideal site where spirit and matter 
intersect” (194) because in her view the ideality of sensation is disrupted by the 
technological and historical milieu in which sight and sound are exposed to 
meaningless mechanical reproduction. While Danius is no doubt correct to argue that 
“the ever-closer relation between the sensuous and the technological traverses the 
question of aesthetics” (ibid.), her appraisal of this traversal fails to assess the 
inextricability of the aesthetic and ideality (“spirit,” in the Hegelian terms she 
denounces), which is in this sense properly irreducible. A full explanation and defense 
of this claim is outside the scope of the current argument, but my reading of “Ithaca” 
will develop it further in the context of Joyce’s fiction. For now it is sufficient just to 
indicate that the thought of the immanence of the body and the disarticulation of eye 
and ear that Danius praises for its materialist refusal of spiritual mediation is not such 
a radical departure from the purview of philosophical aesthetics in a more 
recognizable form. The appeal to disarticulation of perception and of the immediate 
physical materiality of the body is intelligible only against the background of a subject 
of perception or of embodiment, and especially that subject’s efforts and failures to 
both conceptualize and to make communicable the particulars of sensible 
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experience.113 This is not to say that the aesthetic is submitted entirely to the general 
rule of the concept, but it is characterized by an encounter between the matter of 
perception and the various efforts to communicate it, represent it, conceptualize it, 
purify it, and so on. It’s possible to see in the techniques of Ulysses for representing 
the immediacy of visual or aural perception (which Danius locates again and again) 
not the enshrinement of sheer disarticulation of the senses but an effort at 
communicating and making that disarticulation both historically and artistically 
intelligible; it stages, in other words, not materiality but the latter’s aesthetic destiny. 
The effort at rendering immediacy cannot be the end of the story that Danius is 
telling, especially when that effort ironically translates and makes communicable the 
matter of the novel.  
In what follows, then, I aim to extend these considerations to an episode of 
“Ithaca” that dramatizes, in absolutely idiosyncratic form, not only the various means 
and modalities of perception and purportedly immediate conscious awareness (such as 
we have already seen in the extended example of Stephen and Bloom urinating in the 
                                                 
113 In this respect it is revealing that Danius concludes her account of a materialist aesthetics with a commendation 
the later work of Roland Barthes on photography, Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography (trans. Howard. 
London: Fontana, 1982). According to Danius, Barthes’s notion of the punctum, which she says is a singular 
aesthetic experience located in the physiological immanence of the body and existing prior either to language or to 
cognition, “inverts the hierarchy of body and mind inherent in Western philosophy, including its theories of the 
aesthetic: ‘I wanted to explore it ... not as a question (a theme) but a wound: I see, I feel, hence I notice, I observe, 
and I think’” (Danius 196). She argues that this exemplifies Barthes’s putative view that “perception, grounded in 
the body, is thus anterior to reflection. Ergo: I exist not so much because I think, but rather because I perceive,” 
(ibid.) and so on. What Danius symptomatically fails to recognize in this instance, despite its repetition, is the “I” to 
which seeing, feeling, noticing, observing, and thinking belongs in Barthes’s formulation. There is no evidence to be 
found here for a supposed “anteriority” of perceiving to the unity of a self – i.e., the self that attributes such 
perception to an identical “I.” The disruption of the Cartesian problematic of the self is far more demanding than 
Danius suggests.    
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back garden of 7 Eccles Street) but, crucially, of their destruction, erasure, or 
negation. What I aim to show is that the oscillations on display in “Ithaca” between 
sensibility and insensibility, between the intimate world of selfhood and its absolute 
others, and between matter and thought form an important site for the novel’s image 
of itself not as the fatally ironic depiction of sheer materiality but instead as the latter’s 
necessary but incomplete idealization. What can be found in this image is not the 
enshrinement of matter for its own sake but a staging of a certain conception of the 
aesthetic and its limits.  
This idealization is presented in multiple ways in “Ithaca.” Two examples are 
particularly revealing become of how they invoke the flow or influence of matter that 
we have addressed above; where the Lewisian reading of Ulysses sees the entire novel 
as a sordid receptacle for a glut or flux of dead matter, the tendency toward 
idealization in “Ithaca” presents a different formal dynamic, according to which dead 
matter is given structure and meaning in literal and symbolic systems of circulation 
and exchange. It is accordingly justifiable to see these systems of circulation as 
allegories for the structuring and ordering work of the narrator. In the first of these 
examples, Bloom has reclined in his living room after Stephen’s pre-dawn departure. 
He engages in a lengthy and intricately detailed fantasy of his “ultimate ambition” (U 
17.1497), which is “not to inherit by right of primogeniture, gavelkind or borough 
English …. but to purchase by private treaty in fee simple a thatched bungalowshaped 
2 storey dwellinghouse” (U 17.1499-1505). The insistence that Bloom makes, even in 
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fantasy, that this country estate (which Bloom imagines might possibly be named 
“Bloom Cottage,” “St. Leopold’s,” or “Flowerville” [U 17.1580])be acquired in 
bourgeois fashion by private, contractually secured purchase rather than through 
feudal laws of property inheritance (i.e., primogeniture, gavelkind, or “borough 
English” or ultimogeniture) is stands out as unusual; it’s not the (perhaps more 
typical) fantasy of an unexpected windfall or inheritance arriving out of nowhere. 
Bloom’s imagination includes not only an exhaustive account of his future estate’s 
features and accomodations, attractions, possible improvements, and nearby means of 
transportation but also a carefully documented plan of payment (cf. U 17.1657-1671). 
What accompanies the necessity of a substantial payment plan, finally, is the thought 
of possible “rapid but insecure means to opulence” that “might facilitate immediate 
purchase” of Bloom’s Flowerville? (U 17.1672-73); it seems that an important part of 
the fantasy, in other words, is not just the ownership of the estate but the 
construction of schemes and scenarios that involve the rapid accumulation of wealth 
that could make its acquisition a reality. And Bloom’s proposed schemes are often 
fascinating. The first involves an exploitation by means of telegraphy of the delay 
between Greenwich time and Dunsink (Dublin) time in order to lay bets in Ireland on 
horse races that had already ended in England; related ideas include attempting to 
“break the bank at Monte Carlo” by way of a “study of the laws of probability” (U 
17.1695) or winning a million-pound award for squaring the circle (“a solution of the 
secular problem of the quadrature of the circle” [U 17.1696-97]).  
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But besides these gambling schemes and other such hopes for the quick 
accumulation of large amounts of money, the narrative asks whether “vast wealth 
[was] acquirable through industrial channels” (U 17.1698). Indeed there are, one 
avenue being:  
“The reclamation of dunams114 of waste arenary115 soil, proposed in the 
prospectus of Agendath Netaim116, Bleibtreustrasse, Berlin W. 15, by the 
cultivation of orange plantations and melonfields and reafforestation. The 
utilization of waste paper, fells117 of sewer rodents, human excrement 
possessing chemical properties, in view of the vast production of the first, vast 
number of the second, and immense quantity of the third, every normal human 
being of average vitality and appetite producing annually, cancelling byproducts 
of water, a sum total of 80 lbs. (mixed animal and vegetable diet), to be 
multiplied by 4,386,035, the total population of Ireland according to census 
returns of 1901” (U 17.1699-1708).  
Refracted through the young Joyce’s question about the nature of the artwork and its 
aesthetic ends (specifically the necessity Joyce recognized of finding a formal 
                                                 
114 “A measure of land, used esp. in Israel, equal to 1000 sq. metres or about a quarter of an acre” (OED, “dunam,” 
n.)  
115 “Of or belonging to sand or gravel” (obs.) (OED, “arenary,” adj.). Etymologically related to “arena,” from the 
Latin “harena” or sand.  
116 “Hebrew: ‘a company of planters’ …, an advertisement for a Zionist colony” or a model farm established in 
Palestine in 1905. Gifford, Don. Ulysses Annotated: Notes for James Joyce’s Ulysses, revised ed. Berkeley, CA: U 
of California P, 1988. p. 74 (the annotation is for an earlier appearance of Agendath Netaim in the first Bloom 
episode, “Calypso.” Cf. U 4.191-92.  
117 “The skin or hide of an animal” (OED, “fell”, n.1) 
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differentiation between the matter of art and the matter produced by the body), as 
well as through the Lewisian image of Ulysses of the catastrophic outpouring of dead 
matter resulting from the digestion of the nineteenth century, this literal calculation 
and tallying of the amount of excrement produced in Dublin in the year 1901 – just 
under 351 million pounds, to be exact – forms a comic self-narration. Significantly, 
this narration culminates in the entry of matter into systems of circulation and 
exchange; as it moves from the sewer to the fertilized field, it becomes a commodity, 
gaining value in an economic system of goods, at the same time that it becomes a 
means for the production of yet more commodities, i.e., citrus fruits to be consumed 
and presumably recycled in similar fashion. This conversion of putatively sheer, dead 
matter into a means of self-reproduction and a value for a system of exchange (an 
economy) presents an idealization of the sort that I take to be significant for the 
aesthetic concerns of “Ithaca,” and by extension Ulysses, as a whole. This is not 
because it’s an imagined plan for accruing industrial wealth that unfolds only in 
Bloom’s fantasy of a dream estate, and neither does it mean that the matter involved 
is rendered somehow unreal or made into a metaphysical shadow of mind or 
language. On the contrary, it is invested (both literally and figuratively) with a meaning 
or function that is not strictly reducible to, for example, its “chemical properties” (U 
17.1703).118 The fact that Bloom’s imagination locates the orange and melon 
                                                 
118 I should here note that while this analysis skirts the crucial analysis of the commodity and exchange-value to be 
found in Marx’s Capital Volume 1 et. passim. I am at this stage aiming at a broader point about how matter and its 
ostensible exemplars are represented, imagined, idealized, and ultimately destroyed in “Ithaca.” Accordingly, the 
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plantation specifically in Palestine as part of a nationalist and capitalist effort to 
demonstrate the validity of a Zionist state119 – that even the imagination of space and 
measurement demonstrates a local and historical form of measurement (the dunam, 
which is associated with Israel and before that the Ottoman Empire) is further 
evidence for the ideal nature of this investment.   
 Two important aspects of Bloom’s fantasy of industrial wealth need to be 
emphasized with respect to this idealization. First, the transition from ordinary 
(though fantasized) object consciousness to the hypothetical point of view that grasps 
the city as a whole is a species of the “view from no one” that we have sought to 
describe and clarify. It makes Dublin over the course of a year – an object unavailable 
to the senses as such – the object of a disembodied memory that recollects in 
probabilistic form a year’s worth of material flow out over 4 million distinct 
individuals and constructs out of that recollection an image that is both real and 
imagined at the same time. Second, Bloom’s fantasy of the conjunction of matter and 
economy is decisively exposed to the possibility of absolute crisis. The sequence of 
fantasy about the country estate and the accumulation of wealth that is the condition 
of the latter’s acquisition terminates with the narrator’s question: “what eventuality 
                                                 
point I want to make about “idealization” is neither intended as an interpretation nor as a refutation of, say, the 
analysis of the commodity, the labor theory of value, and so on that Marx and his successors have carried out in 
stricter terms and in more rigorous fashion. In my argument, the transformation of human excrement into a 
commodity and its concomitant entry into a system of exchange and social valuation is only exemplary of a more 
general movement or oscillation between matter and its idealization.  
119 Cf. Gifford 73, 74.  
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would render [Bloom] independent of such wealth?” The only response here, despite 
the fact that it is surely possible to generate any number of scenarios in which Bloom 
loses his fortune (in parallel, that is, with the numerous proposed or fantasized 
scenarios for gaining it), invokes “the independent discovery of a goldseam of 
inexhaustible ore” (U 17.1752-53). With brutal simplicity, Bloom’s dreamed economy 
is eradicated and the system of value and exchange is theoretically neutralized: in this 
instance we can see the incompleteness in the idealization imagined by Bloom and by 
Joyce. 
 The second example is one of the most widely-cited examples of the 
idiosyncratic narrative style and point of view found in “Ithaca.” Shortly after Bloom 
and Stephen have returned to Bloom’s house in the early hours of the morning 
(entering by Ulyssean “stratagem” [U 17.84]), the narrator first draws attention to the 
minutiae of sensation in a fashion that is by now familiar (e.g., “what discrete 
succession of images did Stephen … perceive?” [U 17.108]; “what did Bloom see on 
the range?” [U 17.157]), Bloom removes an iron kettle from the stovetop in order to 
fill it with water at the sink, in order to make cocoa for the pair. Once Bloom turns 
the faucet, the narrator interjects the question “did it flow?” [U 17.163]. The response 
to this seemingly undemanding question sets the tone for the subsequent proliferation 
of apparently minor details, especially since it is the first dramatic expansion of the 
purview of story matter on display in “Ithaca.” No simple affirmative or negative 
response is forthcoming; rather, the narrator provides (in another disembodied view 
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of the city and its systems of circulation) a rigorously literal 234-word account of the 
journey of water from reservoir to tap which includes recent municipal efforts at 
water conservation in light of summer drought and the massive daily consumption 
needs of Dubliners:  
“Yes. From Roundwood reservoir in county Wicklow of a cubic capacity of 
2400 million gallons, percolating through a subterranean aqueduct of filter 
mains of single and double pipeage constructed at an initial plant cost of $5 per 
linear yard by way of the Dargle, Rathdown, Glen of the Downs and Callowhill 
to the 26 acre reservoir at Stillorgan, a distance of 22 statute miles, and thence, 
through a system of relieving tanks, by a gradient of 250 feet to the city 
boundary at Eustace bridge, upper Leeson street, though from prolonged 
summer drought and daily supply of 12 ½ million gallons the water had fallen 
below the sill of the overflow weir…” (U 17.164-172). 
We can observe here the same shift of register and perspective in the narration of the 
flow of water supply that we saw in the industrial fantasy of making human waste a 
self-sustaining means of profit: here it’s in the narrator’s constrast of the visible 
surfaces of bodies and objects in Bloom’s kitchen, as focalized variously through 
Bloom and Stephen, and the unexpected rending of that visual surface in a 
subterranean and invisible system of flow and circulation.  
Bloom, “waterlover, drawer of water, watercarrier” (U 17.183) further idealizes (and 
we have to presume that this idealization is at least partially unconscious or tacit, 
201 
 
because it is not suggested that it is present in Bloom’s awareness in the time of the 
story, that is, the time that it takes Bloom to fill the kettle with water from the sink; 
rather, it is presented in the eternal and impersonal present that the narrator of 
“Ithaca” so frequently employs) the materiality of water; an even more rigorously 
detailed presentation of the catalogue of qualities that Bloom admires in water. These 
qualities include but are by no means limited to  
“its universality: its democratic equality and constancy to its nature in seeking 
its own level: its vastness in the ocean of Mercator’s projection:120 its 
unplumbed profundity … the restlessness of its waves … the independence of 
its units … the variability of states of sea … its climatic and commercial 
significance … its preponderance of 3 to 1 over the dry land of the globe … its 
capacity to dissolve and hold in solution all soluble substances … its gradation 
of colours … its violence … its secrecy in springs and latent humidity … its 
healing virtues … its utility in canals, rivers … its submarine fauna and flora 
(anacoustic, photophobe)121…its ubiquity as constituting 90% of the human 
body,” and so on (cf. U 17.185-228).  
Bloom’s idealization consists not in projecting imaginary or fictitious qualities of water 
qua sheer physical substance but in demonstrating its capacity to bear so many 
                                                 
120 Mercator, of course, projected the three-dimensional globe onto the two-dimensional map. It would be tempting 
to see here a sort of geographical ekphrasis and yet another of the novel’s self-images.  
121 Or deaf and blind, reflecting an incorrect but thematically interesting belief that the animal life at the bottom of 
the sea – “the abyssal plain” – is insensate.   
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proliferating articulations, the (physical, chemical, cultural, biological, and so on) 
networks that it enters into. One way of putting this is that it’s not a matter of 
physical or metaphysical necessity that water cover the majority of the earth or 
especially that it’s amenable to commercial, technological and labor practices (because 
of its “docility in working hydraulic millwheels turbines, dynamos, electric power 
stations, bleachworks, tanneries, scutchmills” [U 17.221-22] or its “utility in canals” [U 
17.222]); Bloom’s catalogue is a fragment of the sorts of functions water can perform, 
the forms it can take, the relations it enters into, the social intercourse it allows, and 
even the political symbolism (“democratic equality”) that it supports. What is 
idealizing about Bloom’s encyclopedic hydrophilia is not the at it gives the real 
qualities, relations, and determinations of aquatic matter the status of less-than-real 
idea. On the contrary, it submits the reality of water to knowledge, to penetration and 
manipulation either by concept or by technology. And “Ithaca” imagines the 
expansion of knowledge not as a violent act forced on material being, but instead as a 
renovation of the possibilities of narrative art at the latter’s limit.  
 In the case of the citrus field fertilized by the waste of Dublin, idealization of 
dead matter was made incomplete by the thought of an economic disaster that would 
neutralize the material support of exchange value. It is also the case that “Ithaca” 
finds images – appropriately enough, because there is a sense these can only be figures 
– of the neutralization or elimination of knowledge. We have seen the projections of 
disembodied views from no one that support the narrative project of relentless and 
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rigorous expansion of knowledge, but this project is countersigned by the thought of 
the loss, destruction, or erasure of the subject of knowledge. Joyce famously wrote of 
“Ithaca” (in a widely cited letter to Frank Budgen) that the latter’s form of 
mathematical catechism meant that “all events are resolved into their cosmic physical, 
psychical &c. equivalents … so that not only will the reader know everything and 
know it in the baldest coldest way, but Bloom and Stephen thereby become heavenly 
bodies, wanderers like the stars at which they gaze” (JJ 501). What Joyce left implicit 
in this compact formula is the extent to which the aim of “knowing everything” erases 
itself from within, encompassing as it does knowledge of its own self-destruction.  
 In fact, images of radical destruction are central to a certain Joycean conception 
of aesthetic form. We have already seen how there is a fundamental sense in which 
the thought of Dublin’s erasure from the earth motivates the writing of Ulysses; when 
Joyce tells Budgen that he hopes for a picture of Dublin so complete that the city 
might be rebuilt using the novel as a blueprint, he binds the concept of realism to 
catastrophe, and unfolds in imagination the ultimate tragedy which licenses renewal 
and renovation through art. This reported remark to Budgen is not the first image of 
the relation between art and material destruction to be found in Joyce’s imagination. 
In a very early (1900) essay that Joyce wrote while at University College Dublin, 
entitled “Drama and Life,” Joyce wrote that “drama is … the least dependent of all 
arts on its material. If the supply of mouldable earth or stone gives out, sculpture 
becomes a memory, if the yield of vegetable pigment ceases, the pictorial art ceases. 
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But whether there be marble or paints, there is always the artstuff for drama” (OCP 
26). Joyce’s early characterization of the essential finitude of the plastic arts due to the 
possible exhaustion of their material forms a striking image, according to which the 
future of sculpture and painting depend in an essential way on the persistence of a 
material world, which future drama does not likewise share. It is impossible not to see 
this idea reflected in “Ithaca,” in the imagination of the end of the novel. That such 
an imagination takes place in an episode that can likewise be situated at the formal and 
historical limits of the novel form (both Fredric Jameson and the eminent 
narratologist Monika Fludernik, for example, have suggested that it is essentially non-
narrative) is no accident. This image of the end of the novel is, of course, also the end 
of the human species. The reminder of this end is prominent in “Ithaca.” When 
Bloom and Stephen enter the back garden and observe the “heaventree of stars hung 
with humid nightblue fruit” (U 17.1039), Bloom meditates on, among other things, 
“the years, threescore and ten, of allotted human life” which “formed a parenthesis of 
infinitesimal brevity” in the timescale of the cosmos (U 17.1054-56). But a yet more 
radical destruction is to be found in the passages which perform various comparisons 
of Bloom and Stephen, for example, their differential embodiments of artistic 
(Stephen) and scientific (Bloom) temperaments. The narrator here presents a 
comical/mathematical explanation of the “relation [that] existed between their 
ages”(U 17.446) that describes various mathematical operations that can be carried 
out on the difference and the ratio of Bloom’s and Stephen’s ages in years (“if the 
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proportion existing in 1883 had continued immutable, conceiving that to be possible, 
till then 1904 when Stephen was 22 Bloom would be 374 …” [U 17.452-54]). But in 
response to the question about what “might nullify” these circuitous (and, it must be 
noted, mathematically conceivable but physically impossible) calculations, the narrator 
offers the succinct answer: “the cessation of existence of both or either, the 
inauguration of a new era or calendar, the annihilation of the world and consequent 
extermination of the human species, inevitable but impredicatable” (U 17.462-65).  
 This image of apocalypse functions in (at least) two significant ways. That total 
knowledge encompasses knowledge of the destruction of knowing things invites 
metaphysical crisis. But it also precisely indexes the aesthetic labor that “Ithaca” 
carries out between matter and idea, knowledge and destruction, sensation and the 
insensible. It establishes the processes and limits of knowledge and idealization at a 
point where art appears as simultaneously impossible – because its materials are 
exhausted with the extinction of the species – and renewed, by making the void of 
this extinction material for an art (the novel) renovated at the limits of its fundamental 
technique (narrative). The final narrative question of “Ithaca,” “where?” (U 17.2331) 
has no answer, only a blank expanse of page. Stephen has left the house, Bloom has 
finally gone to sleep with Molly; the silence of the empty page terminates the 
accumulation and proliferation of knowledge with unconscious, insensate, unvoiced 
dream or sleep. This blankness of the page is the true limit of narrative uncovered by 
the coordination of matter and its idealization in “Ithaca;” it binds that episode’s 
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thought of the neutralization of knowledge in extinction to the novel’s recognition of 
its own techniques for transforming matter. For this reason, if we are looking for a 
Joycean materialism or materiality, we shouldn’t attempt to find it in the banal world 
of things, objects, and the cascade of bodily substance; instead, we should see in the 
empty page and the void it projects a materialism of nothingness, the thought of no 
thought. But if this is really a materialism, it is decisively not a philosophical doctrine 
to be found external to the ambivalent work of the text itself – the latter, when it 
encounters the “incertitude of the void” (U 17.1014-15), is ever ready to inscribe: hic 
sunt leones.   
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